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1.1.  Background of the study 
 
Economists argue that the accumulation of foreign debt is a common phenomenon of 
developing countries at the early stage of their economic development. Due to limited 
availabilities of domestic resources compared to required, most developing countries, such as 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs1) borrow from abroad to finance and fill the resource 
gaps which are vital for growth and development (Umaru et al. 2013; Siddique et al. 2016). 
For the past four decades, why HIPCs have accumulated excess and unsustainable external 
debt, leading to qualified repeated debt cancellations and relief and its solution has been the 
forefront of international discussion. Commonly, the causes of foreign debt are classified into 
domestic (Sachs 1989; Osei 1995; Uzun et al. 2012; Berensmann 2019) and external (Cline 
1985; Iyoha 2000; Easterly 2002; Berensmann 2019) factors and both are interrelated with each 
other.  
Since the early 1970s, the external debt accumulation of developing countries in general 
and HIPCs in particular has increased. Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries which constitute 
most HIPCs, the total external debt stock was US$ 60.02 billion in 1980, jumped to US$110.64 
billion in 1988 and US$ 172.98 billion in 1990. In addition, their entire foreign debt stock 
amounted to US$ 218.298 billion in 1995 (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2017). Between 
1980 and 1995, the debt stock increased by US$ 158.278 billion or on an average annual rate 
of 10.55. Furthermore, the average debt stock from 1995 to 2005 was US$ 215.5 billion. 
Besides, from 2006 to 2013, the average external debt of SSA was US$ 285.6 billion and 
reached US$ 385.5 billion in 2013 (IMF 2017). Similarly, the external debt of Latin America 
and Caribbean developing countries has increased continuously since 1970. It was only US$ 
22.8 billion and reached more than seven times in 1980, while the magnitude increased until 
                                                          
1Post-completion-point countries: Afghanistan, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 




1988/89. It is when, starting from 1990 to 1999, the external debt raised and reached US$ 
543.25 billion. However, it was reduced from 2000 to 2002. Except for 2005, the external debt 
increased for ten years between 2003 and 2014, and during 2014 it was US$ 1.3 trillion.  
Beyond the issue of accumulation of external debt, its unsustainability is a headache for 
most HIPCs. The IMF (1997, 17) defined external debt sustainability by saying that “A country 
can be said to achieve external debt sustainability if it can meet its current and future external 
debt service obligations in full, without recourse to debt rescheduling or the accumulation of 
arrears and without compromising growth.” 
Although debt has been substantially reduced after enhanced HIPC debt relief, debt 
sustainability has not been achieved for an extended period of time. According to IMF 
estimates, for 27 countries that reached their decision points, the NPV2 of the external debt-to-
exports ratio was 274% before enhanced HIPC relief. Even though the IMF and World Bank 
(WB) argued that this ratio should not have exceeded 128% at the completion point in 2005, 
after enhanced HIPC relief, some individual countries3 are still faced with ratios of debt to 
export earnings of over 150%, which exceeds the limit for debt sustainability set by the IMF 
and WB under the HIPC initiative. Furthermore, due to structural deficiencies (widespread 
unemployment, massive and frequent budgeted deficit, and fiscal cliff) in developing countries, 
several scholars contend that new external debt may be unsustainable in HIPCs (Yang – Nyberg 
2008; Beddies et al. 2009; Ellmers – Hulova 2013; Vaggi – Prizzon 2014).  
Due to the unsustainability of external debt, the HIPCs initiative was launched in the 
mid-1990s, aiming to reduce the debt burden of developing countries. Long-term debt 
sustainability was brought to the point of being a leading economic decision in the 1980s. The 
issue of external debt sustainability was addressed through several schemes. The Paris Club 
debt treatment of Toronto (1988), London (1991) and Naples (1995) were the leading schemes, 
and the other structures included the IMF and the WB HIPCs Initiatives (HIPC I and II), as 
well as the Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiatives (MDRI) (Isar 2012).  
                                                          
2 The rate was estimated as 6.0 percent for 2000 and 2001. In the costing exercise for the end of 2002, this factor 
was adjusted from 6.0 percent to 5.45 percent for 2000 and 2001 and a 5.45 percent rate was applied to increase 
costs from the end of 2001 to the end of 2002. The 5.45 percent rate corresponds to the implicit long-term interest 
rate of currencies that comprise the Special Drawing Rights for the 36 monthly periods from end-1999 to end-
2002. It was calculated as a weighted average of the average Commercial Interest Reference Rate for the period 
2000–02 (IMF – IDA 2003). 
3 Ethiopia, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Uganda. 
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Such type of external debt accumulation and unsustainability condition leads to a low level of 
foreign direct investment (private investment) and other macroeconomic distortions in the 
domestic economy, appreciation of the domestic currency, and underdevelopment of the 
financial sector (Ajayi 1991). Similarly, this day’s researchers and policymakers also worry 
about and predict a continuous growth of external debt, the unsustainability and 
unmanageability of which will adversely affect the macroeconomic variables that are the bases 
for growth and development directly and indirectly and lead the HIPCs to the second round 
debt crisis.  
1.2.  Statement of the problem  
As explained in the previous section, at the initial stages of a country’s development, 
domestic resources may not be adequate to finance basic growth factors (investment, savings, 
human capital development (HCD), and total factor productivity (TFP)) which are necessary 
to ensure the fast and sustained economic growth of developing countries, especially HIPCs. 
Hence, it becomes essential to look for overseas borrowing to supplement growth factors and 
then economic growth. However, the issue of external debt as a mechanism to promote 
economic growth creates a relevant debate among economists (Ayadi 2008). The main concern 
is whether external borrowing makes economic growth faster in debtor countries directly or 
indirectly. There are two leading opposing schools of thought on the economic theory of 
external debt and growth, namely the Keynesian4 and the Classical5 (disincentive effect) 
economists. To the Keynesians, indebtedness does not bring about charges either for future 
generations or present generations due to the investments that it generates. According to this 
theory, indebtedness stimulates demand, results in a more proportionate increase in investment 
through the accelerator effect; this, in turn, leads to a rise in production (Diallo 2009). Their 
justification is that external debt is one of the sources for financing capital formation and this 
financing in capital formation contributes to investment; therefore, it promotes economic 
growth (Oleksandr 2003).  
In contrast, classical economists argue a massive amount of external debt can reduce the 
growth of a country since the future debt will be larger than the repayment capacity of a 
country, which discourages capital accumulation. In this regard, the “debt overhang theory” is 
the most common theory which explains the effect of substantial external debt on investment 
                                                          
4 Early post Keynesian, Neoclassical, and Endogenous growth models 
5 The debt overhang theory of Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1989) and the crowding out effect theories 
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and economic growth. The debt overhang is defined as a situation in which the creditors do not 
expect to be fully repaid because of the presence of a large stock of debt (Arnone et al. 2005). 
This theory was first introduced by Krugman (1988) and then Sachs (1989), implying that when 
external debt grows large, investors fear high and progressively more taxes to repay their debt 
and they expect lower returns from their investment, which therefore adversely affects growth. 
Furthermore, the new investment will be discouraged due to the uncertainties regarding what 
portion of the debt will be repaid with the country's resources, and this, in turn, slows capital 
accumulation and growth (Agénor – Montiel 1996; Serven 1997; Serieux 2001; Pattillo et al. 
2002; Oleksandr 2003; Arnone et al. 2005; Ossemane 2007; Hwang et al. 2010; Sheikh et al. 
2014). Similarly, the crowding out effect theory is the one that describes a large number of 
external obligations can affect investment (both private and public) and then growth. It mainly 
occurs due to high real interest rates, worse terms of trade (TOT) of borrowed countries and 
lack of (shut-off) foreign credit markets. Hence, investments are expected to have declined 
because of a shortage of available resources for financing investment.  
In addition to the impact of external debt on growth through investment, there are also 
other channels (savings, HCD, TFP, interest rate) in which external debt is transmitted to the 
economy and affect economic growth. Regarding the saving channel, the above-mentioned 
contradicting schools of thought provided their point of view. The Classicals believe that 
massive accumulation of external debt adversely affects growth via savings, while the 
Keynesians argue the reverse. The other channel through which external debt depresses 
economic growth is by lowering TFP growth. The efficiency of investment and productivity 
can be affected by a lousy policy environment. Also, a large amount of external debt (the debt 
overhang) can hinder the incentive for technological advancement or use limited resources 
efficiently, which leads to slower productivity growth (Pattillo et al. 2002, 2004; Clements et 
al. 2005; Schclarek 2005; Kumar – Woo 2010; Checherita-Westphal – Rother 2012; Riffat – 
Munir 2015). Similarly, external debt accumulation can affect economic growth by decreasing 
human capital accumulation (Pattillo et al. 2004; Haaparanta – Virta 2007; Tabengwa 2014). 
Besides the above-described contradicting theories, based on the type of functional 
model, empirical findings concerning the impact of external debt on economic growth can be 
broadly categorized into two groups. The first group considers a linear relationship between 
external debt and growth, while the second group uses a non-linear model to examine the 
relationship between external debt and economic growth. Even though there are many 
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empirical findings about the linear or non-linear impact of external debt on growth, only 
Clements et al. (2003), Pattillo et al.  (2004), Schclarek (2005), Kumar –  Woo (2010),  Afonso 
– Jalles (2011), Checherita-Westphal – Rother (2012), Riffat – Munir (2015), and Silva (2020) 
examined the channels and impacts of external debt on growth using non-linear models. This 
implies that, to the best of the writer's knowledge, no study shows the non-linear effect of 
external debt on growth factors and growth in the case of HIPCs. Also, the channels through 
which external debt affects growth are not investigated in HIPCs, leading to a literature gap. In 
addition to differences in the applied models and channels explorations, the previous studies' 
findings are mixed and inconclusive.  
Even though HIPCs need external borrowing for growth and development, once the debt 
grows more prominent and unmanageable, it becomes a major macroeconomic destabilizing 
factor and a severe bottleneck to promoting the economy. To keep countries away from the 
macroeconomic instability caused by excessive external debt, identifying the determinants of 
external indebtedness in HIPCs needs a precise empirical analysis. Similarly, external debt 
sustainability has become a necessary condition for sustainable economic growth in open 
economies. Hence, since HIPCs are suffering from external debt accumulation, examining their 
debt sustainability condition is crucial for their economic growth and development. 
Furthermore, this huge amount of external debt of HIPCs can affect both growth factors and 
growth directly or indirectly. Therefore, exploring the channels and impacts of external debt 
on growth is vital to understand and develop effective policies for HIPCs.    
Therefore, based on all contradictory theories and empirical findings discussed above 
along with the essentiality of the study, this paper examines the determinants, sustainability, 
channels and impacts of external debt in HIPCs.  
Even though there are some findings which are related to this topic, most of the studies 
suffer from either one or several of the following issues; 
a. Although there are some studies about the determinants of external indebtedness, there 
is a lack of empirical findings in HIPCs, which leads to a literature (knowledge) gap in 
the area. 
b. Most studies in the case of developing or SSA countries or HIPCs did not pay attention 
to external debt sustainability, which leads to a literature gap. 
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c. Non-linear relationship – most empirical findings focus on the linear impact of external 
debt on growth factors (channels) and economic growth. Currently, however, an 
essential feature of the research in this area indicates that the impact of external debt on 
growth factors and growth could be non-linear rather than linear. Although some (few) 
empirical studies considered the non-linear relationship/impact of external debt on 
growth factors (channels) and economic growth, there are no empirical findings in the 
case of HIPCs, which leads to a literature gap.  
d. Channels explorations – most empirical findings did not analyze the channels through 
which external debt affects economic growth. Presently, however, an emerging concern 
among policymakers is for channels through which a country's external debt is 
transmitted into the economy and affects economic growth. Regarding this, there is no 
empirical exploration on the channels and impacts of external debt on economic growth, 
specifically in HIPCs, which results in a literature gap. 
e. Conventional estimation techniques and the problem of the cross-sectional dependence 
(CD) – most empirical studies (the determinants, sustainability, channels, impacts of 
external debt) employed either the static models (Pooled OLS, FE, or RE) or failed to 
capture the cross-sectional nature of the series and second-generation panel data 
analysis. However, this study considered the above drawbacks of other studies along 
with the dynamic panel estimations techniques. 
f. Most of the previous works' time scope was outdated compared to the fast and dynamic 
changes in global microeconomic situations. For example, the latest panel data study 
on the determinant of external debt is Chiminya – Nicolaidou (2018) and they used the 
dataset until 2012. Similarly, Llorca’s (2017) is the latest study on external debt 
sustainability and employed the dataset until 2014. However, this study used the dataset 
until 2017. Likewise, concerning external debt – investment relationship, Turan – 
Yanıkkaya (2020) is the latest, but they employed the data set until 2014. For external 
debt and growth relationship, the latest studies are Zaghdoudi (2018) (used non-linear 
model) and Turan – Yanıkkaya (2020) (used linear model); however, their time scope 
was until 2016 and 2014, respectively. Moreover, the latest studies focusing on the 
impact of external debt on saving or human capital or TFP also employed the data set 
until 2014, 2015, and 2019, respectively.      
g. Specific studies on HIPCs that consider all regions (SSA, Latin America, and Asia) are 
rare. Thus, this research can widen the scope in this area.  
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h. Simultaneous equations method – most studies independently estimated their models 
to examine the impact of external debt on growth factors or growth. However, except 
for chapter 6.2, this study evaluated the equations simultaneously, enhancing the 
accuracy of the estimated results.   
Relative to previous studies, this dissertation is unique in terms of: first, the study focuses 
on the most concerned countries (HIPCs) in which there are no (limited) studies. Secondly, the 
study uses a more robust estimation technique that safeguards the regression against cross-
sectional dependency, serial correlation, and endogeneity present in a panel dataset. Thirdly, 
this study employs an indicator, Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) policy 
rating, and an intertemporal approach to the current account in examining external debt 
sustainability. Fourth, the study follows the non-linear feature relationship between external 
debt and growth factors (economic growth), recommended by many scholars. Fifth, the study 
also considers the channels (indirect) through which external debt affects growth rather than 
the direct impact. Sixth, it employs simultaneous equations estimation technique to analyze the 
channels and impacts of external debt. Finally, compared to other empirical studies, the time 
frame for the dataset used in this study is the most recent (until 2017) and fills the time gap. 
This study's general time scope is broad and holistic. It considers international programs and 
events (Millennium Development Goals, Sustainable Development Goals, global financial 
crisis) and regional events (HIPCs initiatives and the economic boom of SSA countries).  
1.3.  Objectives of the study 
 
This study's primary objective is to investigate the main determinants of external 
indebtedness, its sustainability, and whether external debt affects growth mostly through an 
effect on investment, national saving, HCD, and TFP using panel time-series data for HIPCs. 
This study attempts to address the following research questions: 
I. What are the trends and components of external debt in HIPCs and how does it look 
like based on the region?  
II. Why are the HIPCs indebted, what are the main determinants and the extent to which 
the determinants influence their external debt? 




IV. What is the impact of external debt on growth factors and growth in HIPCs? What are 
the channels through which external debt affects economic growth, what is their impact 
(linear or non-linear), and how does external debt affect economic growth through its 
channels? 
 
The study's general objective is to examine the determinants, sustainability, channels, 
and impacts of external debt in HIPCs. Besides, specifically, the study seeks to: 
I. Show the magnitude and components of foreign debt in HIPCs and the regional level 
(East Africa, West Africa, Central & South Africa, Asia & Latin America). 
II. Examine the primary determinants of external indebtedness of HIPCs and select the 
significant factors that require urgent actions to overcome indebtedness. 
III. Investigate the debt sustainability condition of HIPCs after the initiatives. 
IV. Explore the channels and impacts of external debt in HIPCs.  
 The impact of external debt on investment and economic growth 
 The impact of external debt on national saving and economic growth 
 The impact of external debt on HCD and economic growth 
 The impact of external debt on TFP and economic growth 
V. Provides policy recommendations 
 
1.4.  Hypotheses of the study 
 
This study, in addition to the above research questions and based on different studies 
conducted in a different part of the world, is fundamentally guided by the following testable 
hypotheses (H): 
 On the determinant model  
H1: Both internal and external factors determine the level of external debt of HIPCs.  
 On the sustainability model 
H2: External debt is sustainable for HIPCs after their initiatives. 
 On channels and impacts of external debt models  
 
      H3: External debt has a direct or indirect impact on investment and economic  
             growth of HIPCs. 
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H3a: External debt has a significant and non-linear impact on both investment and 
growth in HIPCs.  
H3b: External debt has a significant impact on the growth of HIPCs through the 
investment channel.   
H4:  External debt has a direct or indirect impact on the national saving and economic  
             growth of HIPCs. 
H4a: External debt has a significant and non-linear impact on both national saving and 
growth in HIPCs.  
H4b: External debt has a significant impact on the growth of HIPCs through the saving 
channel. 
H5: External debt has a direct or indirect impact on human capital development and the 
economic growth of HIPCs. 
H5a: External debt has a significant and non-linear impact on human capital 
development and growth in HIPC.  
H5b: External debt has a significant impact on the growth of HIPCs through the HCD 
channel. 
H6: External debt has a direct or indirect impact on total factor productivity and 
economic growth of HIPCs. 
H6a: External debt has a significant and non-linear impact on both total factor 
productivity and growth in HIPCs.  
H6b: External debt has a significant effect on the growth of HIPCs through the TFP 
channel. 
1.5.  Significance of the study 
 
Developing countries in general and HIPCs in particular experienced external borrowing 
for an extended period to fill their resource gaps and achieve economic growth. However, 
excessive external debt beyond the limit can affect (directly or indirectly) growth factors and 
economic growth adversely. Therefore, detailed knowledge and understanding of the 
determinants, sustainability, channels, and impact of external debt accumulation of HIPCs is 
important for government leaders and policymakers to adopt appropriate policies that minimize 




Also, this thesis's output will contribute more to the existing literature, time, and 
methodology gaps of previous studies in this area. Furthermore, this thesis provides direction 
and guidance for further research related to external debt and other related issues of any country 
both in the HIPCs and other non-HIPCs suffering from excessive debt accumulations and 
unsustainability.  
1.6.  Scope of the dissertation 
 
Except for the sustainability model (2000 to 2017), this dissertation's time scope is from 
1990 to 2017. The sustainability time frame is relevant for the study because it examines 
whether the debt is sustainable or not after the second HIPCs initiative, which was applied in 
1999. Also, it captures the dawn of most HIPCs, such as SSA countries economic boom since 
2000, the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the global financial crisis in 2007/8, and 
Sustainable Development Goals since 2015. The time frame (1990 to 2017) for other models 
is also appropriate since it captures both before and after the decline of most HIPC economies, 
the two main HIPCs initiatives in 1996 and 1999, and others listed above.  
Similarly, depending on the study's availability of data and objective, except for the 
sustainability (included 32 HIPCs) model, this study's empirical analysis is limited to 15 
HIPCs. Furthermore, to represent the dynamic nature, this study used dynamic panel estimation 
techniques along with simultaneous equations model, recent cross-sectional dependence tests, 
both first and second-generations panel unit root tests, and accurate panel cointegration tests.     
1.7.  Organization of the study 
 
This dissertation generally contains six basic and four sub-chapters, and their structure 
has the following form: 
Chapter One: Introduction 
The dissertation begins with the introduction chapter. It contains the study's background, 
statements of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, hypotheses, significance, 
scope, and organization of the study.  
Chapter Two: Definitions, description of the study area, the debt crisis, and conditions after the 
debt crisis   
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This chapter discusses the definitions of external debt by well-known international 
institutions. Besides, it addresses the study areas' description and their socio-economic and 
demographic conditions along with an overview of foreign debt of HIPCs. This chapter also 
tries to achieve the first specific objective of the study.   
Chapter Three: Methodology of the study  
This chapter deals with the methodology of the study and aims to briefly explain data 
type, sources, and data analysis, basic panel data econometrics procedures, and model 
specification, justifications, and estimation techniques. 
Chapter Four: Determinants of external indebtedness of HIPCs 
The empirical studies of this dissertation begin from this chapter. It examines the 
determinants of external debt accumulation in 15 HIPCs employing Panel - Corrected Standard 
Error (PCSE) between 1990 and 2017. This chapter aims to achieve the first and second 
hypotheses and specific objectives of the study, respectively.  
Chapter Five: Is external debt sustainable in HIPCS after the initiatives? 
This chapter investigates whether an external debt is sustainable in HIPCs after the 1990s 
initiatives. It employs an indicator based CPIA policy rating and an intertemporal approach to 
the current account between 2000 and 2017/18. It also intends to achieve the third specific 
objective and the second hypothesis of the study.  
Chapter Six: The impact of external debt on growth factors and economic growth in HIPCs: 
the channels through which external debt affects growth 
This chapter has four different sub-chapters, and it focuses on the impact of external debt 
on growth factors and growth to investigate the channels through which external debt affects 
the growth of HIPCs. All chapters use a sample of 15 HIPCs for the period from 1990 to 2017. 
It also intends to achieve the fourth specific objective and hypotheses (third to sixth) of this 
study.   
 6.1:  The impact of external debt on investment and economic growth 
This chapter deals with the impact of external debt on investment and growth in HIPCs 
using a non-linear model and investment channel in which external debt affects growth. It 
employs the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model and second-generation dynamic 
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panel data analysis between 1990 and 2017 to investigate the third hypothesis (H3) and sub-
hypotheses. 
 6.2:  The impact of external debt on national saving and economic growth 
To examine the fourth hypothesis and sub-hypotheses of the study, this chapter 
investigates the impact of external debt on national saving and economic growth in HIPCs. 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter employs a non-linear model and considers the national 
saving channel through which external debt affects growth for the period from 1990 to 2017. 
However, it uses two – Pooled Mean Group (PMG) and PCSE – estimation techniques.      
 6.3:  The impact of external debt on HCD and economic growth 
This chapter focuses on exploring the impact of external debt on HCD and growth in 
HIPCs. Except for examining the HCD channel, all the methodology, and the scopes, this 
chapter's model type is similar to chapter 6.1 and aims to evaluate the fifth hypothesis (H5) and 
sub-hypotheses. 
 6.4: The impact of external debt on TFP and economic growth 
The final sub-chapter of chapter five focuses on examining the last hypothesis (H6) and 
sub-hypotheses of the study and it focuses on analyzing the impact of external debt on TFP and 
growth in HIPCs. It employs the SUR with a non-linear model for 15 HIPCs between 1990 and 
2017. 
Chapter Seven: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations  
The final chapter of this dissertation summarizes the study's major findings and 
concludes the study by comparing the results with the stated objectives and hypothesis. Based 
on the empirical results, this chapter also provides policy recommendations and future studies 




DEFINITIONS, DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA, THE DEBT 
CRISIS, AND CONDITIONS AFTER DEBT CRISIS 
Introduction 
 
For a long period, institutions and researchers defined external debt differently depending 
on different international statistical guidelines over time. This chapter focuses on reviewing the 
definitions of foreign debt by well-known international institutions. Besides, the problem of a 
large stock of external debt in the HIPCs has a long history, and such accumulation of external 
debt may be linked with the countries' economy. To better understand the nature of the external 
debt, this chapter also discusses the description of the study areas and their socio-economic and 
demographic conditions along with an overview of the foreign debt of HIPCs. Therefore, the 
chapter is organized as follows: the first section provides definitions of external debt and then 
describes the study area in the second section. The third section provides a brief history of the 
debt crisis in HIPCs, while the final section presents the descriptive statistics of an overview 
of external debt. 
 2.1. Definitions of external debt 
 
Since the definition of external debt varies from time to time, this section chronologically 
(from the late 1980s) provides some of the definitions available in the theoretical literature.  
The 1988 Grey book6 provided an agreed (common) definition of what constituted 
external debt, intending to encourage a greater consistency of approach in its measurement. 
Hence, the book defined gross external debt as: “It is the amount, at any given time, of 
disbursed and outstanding contractual liabilities of residents of a country to non-residents to 
repay principal, with or without interest, or to pay interest, with or without principal.” (IMF 
1988). 
                                                          
6 Published jointly by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), IMF, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank.  
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However, depending on the stage of economic development, borrowing by the public 
sector from banks and government sources may remain the focus of external debt analysis for 
several countries. Nevertheless, for many countries, the growth during the 1990s of cross-
border private sector capital flows, the exposure of the private sector to foreign borrowing, the 
widespread issuance of debt securities, and the use of financial derivatives and similar 
instruments necessitated a broader scope of external debt analysis. In responding to these 
developments, other new definitions were developed in 1993 by the United Nations (UN) and 
IMF – the System of National Accounts 1993 (1993 SNA) and the fifth edition of the IMF’s 
Balance of Payment Manual (BPM5).  
The UN (1993) SNA7 could be a comprehensive, consistent, and versatile set of 
macroeconomics accounts supposed to fulfil the needs of state and private sector analysts, 
policymakers, and decision-takers. It is also the point of reference in establishing standards for 
related statistics, such as government finance and monetary and financial statistics. According 
to the 1993 SNA document, the economy net financial claim on the rest of the globe, i.e., 
external financial assets minus financial liabilities characterizing the economy as net debtor or 
creditor. Such a label is not accurate as a depiction of the net external position of the economy. 
Instead, it is more relevant to view only the non-equity components of the external balance 
sheet as debt, i.e., all recorded liabilities other than shares and other equity. This view is in 
general concordance with the “core” definition of IMF (1988) of external debt.  
The BPM5 approach facilitates consistency and comparability among external debt and 
other macroeconomic statistics, such as the national accounts, the balance of payment, and the 
international investment position. In this framework, external debt comprises all liabilities 
defined in the 1990 SNA (without including equity liabilities and financial derivatives) that are 
due to non-residents and the gross amount of these liabilities considered as gross external debt 
position.  
The IMF (2003) updated the previous definitions of external debt, and its definition is 
based on the concept that if a resident has a current liability to a non-resident that needs 
payments of principal along with interest in the future, this liability represents a future claim 
on the resources of the economy of the resident, and so is an external debt of that economy. 
This approach offers a broad measure of foreign debt consistent across the range of debt 
                                                          
7 Published jointly by the Commission of the European Communities (Eurostat), IMF, OECD, United Nations, 
and World Bank. 
21 
 
instruments irrespective of its structure. The emphasis of the definition rests on gross 
liabilities— i.e., exclusive of any assets and defined as: “Gross external debt, at any given time, 
is the outstanding amount of those actual current, and not contingent, liabilities that require 
payment(s) of principal and/or interest by the debtor at some point(s) in the future and that are 
owed to non-residents by residents of an economy.” 
IMF (2014) recently updated the previous guides on external debt statistics and provided 
a new definition of external debt. Under this guide, external debt contains all obligations 
defined in the 2008 SNA (exclusive of equity liabilities and investment fund shares, financial 
derivatives, and employee stock options) that are billed to non-residents, and the total sum of 
such liabilities is presented as the total external debt position. Hence, the focus of the definition 
is on gross liabilities, i.e., excluding any assets and defined as: “Gross external debt, at any 
given time, is the outstanding amount of those actual current, and not contingent, liabilities that 
require payment(s) of principal and/or interest by the debtor at some point(s) in the future and 
that are owed to non-residents by residents of an economy.”  
Similarly, the WB (2009) describes total external debt as a debt owed to non-residents 
by a particular country, which must be paid in foreign currency, goods, or services. The 
compositions of external debt are long term8 and short-term9 credits that are owed to a non-
resident of a particular economy.  
This chapter, therefore, summarize all the above definitions of external debt and defines 
(uses) it as: external debt is money borrowed with interest by residents of a country from 
foreign lenders (either government of foreign countries, commercial banks, or international 
financial institutions) which will be paid in the future in the currency of the lender. This 
definition was also used by different scholars, such as Zaki (1995) and Ampah (2020), even 
though their definitions were not phrased with the same words.   
 2.2. Description of the study area 
 
According to IMF (2019), HIPCs are classified into 36 post-completion-point countries 
3 pre-decision-point countries10. Of the 39 countries eligible or potentially eligible for HIPC 
Initiative assistance, 36 are receiving full debt relief from the IMF and other creditors are after 
                                                          
8 Public, publicly guaranteed, private nonguaranteed and IMF credit 
9 Debt with a maturity of one year or less 
10 Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. 
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reaching their completion points. Three countries, which have been identified as potentially 
eligible for HIPC Initiative assistance, have not yet reached their decision points. Out of 39 
HIPCs, 33 are in SSA countries, which represent 84%.  HIPCs has 17,378,791 a size of square 
kilometers, which is 13 % of the world and more than 800 million of the population (10 % of 
the world) along with total labor force of over 300 million (8% of the world) (WB online data 
2020).  
 Figure 2.1 Map of HIPCs  
 
Note: The green color represents countries qualifying for full HIPC relief  
           The olive color refers to countries qualifying for partial HIPC relief. 
            The yellow color is for countries eligible for HIPC relief but not yet meeting the  
             necessary conditions 
 2.3. Socio-economic and demographic conditions of HIPCs since the debt crisis  
 
Even though this dissertation focuses on the post-completion-point countries of HIPCs, 
due to data availability from the WB, which combines both post-completion-point and pre-
decision-point countries, in an exceptional case, this section provides the socio-economic and 
demographic conditions of all 39 HIPCs. 
The annual GDP growth of HIPCs was 2.9% in the 1970s. However, it reduced to 1.8% 
in the 1980s, which might be an adverse effect of the debt crisis. In the 1990s, when the two 
significant HIPCs initiatives took place, the GDP growth of HIPCs recovered and became 
2.5%. Besides, the GDP growth of the countries increased after the new millennium and 
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reached 5.23%. Hence, we can say that the economy of HIPCs was worse during the crisis, and 
good progress was recorded after the initiatives. In the early 1990s, most countries 
implemented structural reforms, such as privatization, financial sector reform, and trade 
liberalization. As a result of these efforts, the GDP of HIPCs improved.  
Except in the 1990s, similar behavior was observed for GDP per capita growth of HIPCs 
(i.e. during the debt crisis of the 1970s and 80s, the growth of GDP per capita was 0.2 and -0.9 
%, respectively). Similarly, GDP growth per capita was negative during the initiatives, but it 
was better than in the previous decade. Even though there were initiatives in the 1990s, the 
growth of GDP per capita was negative; it might be the highest population growth (around 
3%).  
The other critical macroeconomic variable affected by the debt crisis is inflation, and it 
continuously increased during the crisis and initiatives periods. In the 1990s, most HIPCs 
implemented comprehensive macroeconomic adjustment policies; however, inflation did not 
reduce. This might be explained by the adopted policies in which countries that have reached 
the completion point have benefited from resources that were used to finance social projects. 
For this reason, growth in money supply in some countries, such as Ethiopia and Uganda and 
the rise in oil price in Tanzania caused inflation through investment and salaries. However, 
inflation was reduced in HIPCs in the 2000s and 2010s.  
Trade openness in HIPCs was the lowest in the 1980s, which is observed by the lowest 
values of both exports (19%) and imports of goods and services (26%). However, countries 
have become more open since the initiatives period. This might be due to the trade liberalization 
policies adopted by HIPCs. For example, in the 1990s, exports and imports were 21% and 
29.6%, respectively. This trend also continued in the 2000s and 2010s; however, exports 
decreased in the 2010s compared to the previous decade. Nevertheless, from exports and 
imports performance, we can derive and observe that HIPCs had worse and increasing trade 
balance from 1970 and even worse recorded during initiatives and in the 2010s.     
The Gross capital formation of HIPCs was 10.7% in the 1980s and significantly jumped 
to 17.2% in the initiatives period. Furthermore, it was around 20 and 26% in the 2000s and 
2010s, respectively. A similar trend was also observed in the growth of gross capital formation 
from the 1990s; however, it reduced in the 2010s compared to 2000s performance. Likewise, 
in the 1980s, the gross domestic savings of HIPCs was 4.6%, but it jumped more than double 
24 
 
in the 1990s. The countries' domestic saving also increases after the initiatives even though it 
is not too significant, especially in the 2000s.   
The main social factor of HIPCs is schooling, which is proxied as compulsory education, 
duration (years). The data for this is available from the 1990s (7 years), and it increased to 8.1 
and 8.5 years in the 2000s and 2010s, respectively. This might be the contributions of the two 
major plans – Millenium Development Plan (MDP), which had a goal in achieving universal 
primary education and the 4th goal of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) to “ensure 
inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”.  
The population growth of HIPCs was increasing from the 1970s and reached the highest 
in the 1990s (3%). However, it became the lowest in the 2000s (2.1%), even though it again 
increased to 2.8% in the 2010s. The three main components of population growth rate are birth 
rate, death rate, and net migration. From the 1970s, both birth and death rates of HIPCs reduced. 
Likewise, the life expectancy of HIPCs improved from time to time and reached 61 years in 
the 2010s.    
Table 2.1 Socio-economic and demographic conditions of HIPCs 





After initiatives  
1970-80 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-10 2011-17 
GDP growth (annual %) 2.89 1.75 2.47 5.23 5.23 
GDP per capita growth 
(annual %) 
0.21 -0.93 -0.42 2.32 2.33 
Inflation, GDP deflator 
(annual %) 
9.22 10.37 11.03 6.79 4.67 
Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %) 
NA 8.04 10.87 6.14 5.09 
Exports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
21.16 19.22 21.24 27.22 25.61 
Imports of goods and 





29.66 34.85 35.53 
 
Gross capital formation (% 
of GDP) 
NA 10.78 17.27 19.96 25.70 
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Gross capital formation 
(annual % growth) 
NA NA 6.09 7.46 6.33 
Gross domestic savings (% 
of GDP) 
NA 4.69 10.25 11.95 16.95 
Secondary education, 
duration (years) 
6.36 6 6 6 6 
Compulsory education, 
duration (years) 
NA NA 7 8.1 8.5 
Population growth (%) 2.68 2.72 2.91 2.16 2.83 
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 
people) 
47.58 46.38 44.09 40.92 37.14 











-1.97  -4.09 -0.44 -3.30 -2.17 
Life expectancy at birth 
(years) 
45.79 49.14 50.91 55.68 61.24 
Note: NA refers to the data that is not available and all values in the table are averages.   
Source: Author’s own computation from the WB online database 
 2.4. Causes of HIPCs debt crisis: A brief history 
 
The large stock of external debt in the HIPCs has a long history. Different factors 
aggravated the debt crisis in HIPCs, and this section presents them in chronological order in 
the 1970s. In the early 1970s, countries' positive growth and optimistic assumptions were the 
leading causes for the debt crisis in HIPCs. Governments of HIPCs played the main role in the 
build-up of external debt. Following a decade of good growth in the 1960s (and after gaining 
independence), several African and sub-Saharan governments started externally financed 
public projects in the 1970s, intending to build up their economies. Much of foreign borrowing 
went towards improving domestic industry and infrastructure (Greene 1989) and the expansion 
of current expenditure (Krumm 1985). They assumed that national economies would grow over 
time and that commensurate increases in export production and continuing favorable export 
                                                          
11 The data for net migration is available every 5 years from 1972.  Except for 1992, it was negative for all years.  
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performance would allow the debt service obligations arising from these projects to be met 
(Mustapha 2014). Similarly, during the early 1970s, there was a rise in the price of commodities 
and the growth of imports of capital and intermediate goods to develop infrastructure, which 
was complemented by foreign borrowing. At this particular moment, most countries were hit 
by the first oil price shock (1972-1973). This shock was tackled, partly by resorting to external 
financing (which eventually turned into debt) requirements of African countries as a policy 
response to the external shocks they were facing (Balassa 1983; Sellewe 1993; Alemayehu 
2003). Both the African governments and creditors believed that these shocks were temporary 
and expected an increment in commodity prices and a low real-world interest rate. However, 
their expectation turned out to be the opposite, which led to an enormous burden on Africa 
rather than the creditors (Alemayehu 2003). 
Besides, these optimistic expectations were shaped by the prevailing macroeconomic 
conditions of the 1970s. After the first oil shock, the current account surpluses in oil-exporting 
countries resulted in a large excess of liquidity in financial markets, which led to the evolution 
of the international banking system (Dommen 1989). In particular, the Euromarkets became an 
essential source of financing for many governments that had never borrowed in it before 
(Krumm 1985). In addition to Africa, in the mid-1970s, the Latin American countries' debt 
crisis began due to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) accumulated 
wealth. Banks were willing to lend the collected money and many developing countries 
borrowed at small and floating interest rates. However, the borrower countries did not use the 
new dollars for productive investment; instead, they spent on direct consumption, and hence 
they could not repay their external obligations.  
Besides borrowers, lenders' optimistic expectation was the leading cause of the debt crisis 
in the 1970s. The relatively high growth in the world economy, stable commodity prices and 
the low-interest rates in 1974–1979 encouraged positive risk assessment analysis for HIPCs 
debt (Dommen 1989; Prizzon 2009). Therefore, creditors perceived HIPCs as creditworthy, 
which simultaneously matched with developed countries’ commercial interest of Export Credit 
Agencies (ECA). These agencies played a significant role in the debt evolution of HIPCs, 
especially SSA countries (Mustapha 2014). The rapid debt accumulation of HIPCs was thus 
the result of a process jointly determined by borrowers and lenders, a process that was shaped 
by an optimistic set of assumptions that became unrealistic due to a change in the favorable 
condition at the end of the 1970s (Mustapha 2014).  
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Furthermore, in the 1980s and 90s, disappointing growth, exogenous shocks and 
inadequate policy response also represented the main causes of indebtedness in HIPCs. The 
developing countries' debt crisis began to unfold in the 1980s, when the shocks of the second 
oil crisis (1979-1980), rising interest rates, and a fall in global prices for primary commodities 
began to take a toll (Mustapha 2014). During adjustment programs undertaken by several 
African nations, especially between 1985 and 1990, due to deteriorations in TOT, the average 
export commodities were declined by 40% compared to 1977-1979 even though the export 
volume increased by 75% (Husain 1994), which led African countries became more vulnerable 
to further indebtedness. Moreover, African countries external debt stock also increased due to 
the Paris and London clubs rescheduling of capitalization of amortization and interest payment 
(Van der Hoeven 1994; Alemayehu 2003). Besides the long-term trend in external debt from 
1985 to the early 1990s, African economies were hugely indebted by the end of the 1990s. 
Moreover, in Africa, external finance was needed not only for investment in infrastructure but 
also imported intermediate inputs were dependent on external funding to ensure the smooth 
functioning of their economy (Ndulu 1986; Ngwenya – Bugembe 1987; Fantu 1992; Rattso 
1992; Mbelle – Sterner 1991; Alemayehu 2002b, 2003).  
The second shock of oil price and the recession in OECD countries had a devastating 
effect upon the price of non-oil commodities and HIPCs terms of trade, especially for countries 
characterized by a limited diversification of their export base. Indeed, total debt levels rose 
steadily from 1978 in SSA countries, including the majority of HIPCs, while their export 
earnings were limited. With diminished export earnings and rising import prices, these 
countries found it increasingly difficult to meet their debt service burdens (Mustapha 2014). 
For example, in August 1982, Mexico proclaimed it to the international financial community 
that it did not have sufficient external liquidity to fulfil its external debt and demanded a 90-
day rollover of the principal's payments to prepare toward a definite restructuring financial 
package. Just a few weeks later, the problem spread throughout Latin America.  Furthermore, 
due to the second oil price shock, the revenue of oil exporters increased, which was more than 
their demand. Hence, like the first oil price shock, they deposited these “petrodollars” in the 
Eurodollar markets, and consequently, other developing countries, including HIPCs, borrowed 
large sums of money (Menbere 2004; Ali – Mustafa 2012). For more details concerning the 
evolution of the debt build-up in developing countries in the 1980s, see Menbere (2004, p. 84). 
Restrictive monetary policies of industrialized countries were also the causes of the 1980s 
debt crisis. In the 1980s, the tight monetary policy led to an increasing international real interest 
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rate, as well as exchange rate appreciation of their currencies (Krumm 1985). For example, in 
Africa, due to the USA's negligent fiscal and tight monetary policy, by 1981, the real foreign 
interest rate was 17.4% compared to -17.9% in 1973 (Khan – Knight 1983). The tight monetary 
policy aggravated the interest rate cost of non-concessional and private debts that became 
increasingly important during this period (Alemayehu 2003). This development encouraged 
many African governments to continue borrowing (and get credit) on the assumption of a 
cyclical turnaround in commodity prices. These new loans were used to finance enlarged oil 
bills and avoid sharp politically/socially disruptive cutbacks in public expenditure (Mistry 
1988; Alemayehu 2003). Furthermore, this interest rate shock exacerbated some key high-debt 
countries' situation, especially those that made significant use of commercial borrowing at a 
variable interest rate (Prizzon 2009). The US dollar's appreciation further contributed to the 
debt burden's worsening as loans were denominated in that currency. Moreover, when the 
commodity prices fell sharply and the TOT declined, several HIPC governments did not cut 
back their expenditure programs and borrowed more instead. Many countries continued living 
beyond their means, with high trade and budget deficits before and during the crisis. This delay 
in macroeconomic adjustment was, in turn, facilitated by the policy responses of authorities 
such as the IMF (Mustapha 2014). However, these responses were mostly inadequate, and to a 
large extent, worsened the crisis (Brooks et al. 1998). While private creditors typically reduced 
their exposure and cut their losses when a commodity price shock adversely affected a 
country’s debt-servicing capacity, the IMF and the rest of the international community 
provided support in the form of new finance and rescheduling. However, a large part of this 
support in the 1980s was in non-concessional loans, particularly from the IMF, IBRD, and 
multilateral development banks. This contributed to excessive borrowing, which was 
inconsistent with the country’s debt-servicing capacity. Moreover, several HIPCs were unable 
to service their rescheduled obligations, and the regular rescheduling of debt service payments 
also helped to increase the outstanding debt stocks (Brooks et al. 1998; Daseking – Powell 
1999; Mustapha 2014). 
In addition, poor debt management along with poor project selection were the other 
factors for HIPCs debt crisis. Before and during the crisis, the new borrowing generally did not 
translate into productive investments that would generate returns to service this debt (Krumm 
1985; Varma 2006). Even in the productive sectors, many projects also proved to be 
economically unviable, such as luxury hotels, oil and sugar refineries, and steel mills. 
Therefore, the loan funds which were designed to increase productivity and generate exports 
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failed to produce the expected yields and brought very little long-term benefit in terms of 
capacity to earn foreign exchange (Mustapha 2014). Concerning this, a lack of systematic and 
comprehensive assessment on debt management and capacity was also the cause of HIPCs debt 
crisis. Until 2001, there was no systematic assessment made across the HIPCs. In 2001, a self-
assessment of 33 HIPCs was conducted. The assessment found that countries at or close to the 
decision point needed significant improvements in a basic debt management capacity, 
including data management and debt renegotiation, and that they lacked a clear legal and 
institutional framework for debt management (Mustapha 2014).  
Also, several HIPCs struggled with the sustained implementation of sound 
macroeconomic policies during the debt crisis — loans from the multilateral provided balance 
of payments and development financing to support adjustment programs. However, loans for 
adjustment programs did not fully succeed in many HIPCs and led the countries unsustainable 
in their debt. Furthermore, civil conflict was another major factor exacerbating the debt burden 
in some HIPCs (Brooks et al. 1998). In some cases, it eroded the export base by destroying the 
country’s infrastructure. In contrast, in others, it led to a rise in the debt-financed military and 
non-military imports and may have given rise to what is known as ‘odious debt’. This is 
generally understood as debt taken on by a country that serves the ruler's interests or the ruling 
regime (typically a non-democratic one) rather than the entire country and its people (Mustapha 
2014). 
Due to HIPCs poor macroeconomic policies and other factors discussed above, the 
external debt of HIPCs became unsustainable; hence, HIPCs initiatives were launched in 1996 
and 1999.  The program was designed to ensure that the poorest countries in the world were 
not overwhelmed by unmanageable or unsustainable debt burdens. It reduced the debt of 
countries meeting strict criteria.  
According to Johnson (1998), the World Bank and the IMF made a preliminary 
determination that 20 of the 40 countries might eventually receive relief based on the 
initiative’s specific criteria concerning income, indebtedness, and reform efforts underway. 
The total cost of HIPC Initiative debt relief to creditors is estimated at US$76 billion in end-
2010 present value (PV) terms (International Development Association (IDA) – IMF 2011) 
About two-thirds of the cost (US$54.6 billion) represents irrevocable debt relief to the 
32 post-completion point countries. The estimated cost for the four interim countries amounts 
to US$4.4 billion. The estimated cost of HIPC Initiative debt relief to the creditors of the 
30 
 
remaining four pre-decision point HIPCs is estimated at US$17 billion, most of which is 
accounted for by two countries, Sudan and Somalia. Topping-up assistance, which has been 
provided so far to seven HIPCs, represents less than 3% of the total HIPC Initiative cost (IDA 
– IMF 2011). These costs are about equally divided between multilateral and bilateral creditors. 
The World Bank, IMF, the African Development Fund (AfDF) and Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) account for about 44%, while Paris Club creditors account for about 
36% of the total costs.  
The debt sustainability criteria under HIPCs I was the following: the ratio of NPV of a 
country’s debt-to-exports would need to exceed 200-250%, the ratio of debt service-to-exports 
needed to be over the range of 20-25% (Boote – Thugge 1997) while the NPV of debt to-fiscal 
revenue needed to be over 280%. The minimum ratios of export-to-GDP and fiscal revenue-
to-GDP would need to reach 40% and 20%, respectively (Gautam 2003). The debt 
sustainability criteria were also altered following the introduction of the HIPC II. The Net 
Present Value of debt-to-export was lowered from 200-250% to 150%, while the debt-to-
revenue was reduced from 280% to 250%. In addition, the minimum ratio of export-to-GDP 
and fiscal revenue-to-GDP were reduced from 40% and 20% to 30% and 15%, respectively 
(Gautam 2003).  
Following the 1990s HIPCs initiatives, a new debt relief initiative called Multilateral 
Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI) was proposed by G8’s in 2005. The three multilateral 
institutions, the World Bank, IDA of the World Bank and the AfDF, forgave 100% of debts of 
countries who owed them only on their reaching to the completion point. Countries with a per-
capita income of $380 a year or less (whether HIPCs or not) would receive debt relief (Isar 
2012) 
Due to the initiatives, HIPCs increased their social spending, reduced debt services, and 
improved public debt management. However, it also had limitations, e.g., it was a very slow 
process, ignored exogenous economic shocks that unavoidably affected many debt-burdened 
countries, it helped more for larger economies to influence global governance and maintain 
smaller countries dependence on biased decisions. Therefore, the initiative was not entirely 
successful for HIPCs (Isar 2012). 
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2.5. Overview of external debt in HIPCs during the debt crisis, initiatives, and after 
initiatives 
The previous section provided a detailed discussion about the historical origin of the 
HIPCs debt crisis from the 1970s. To strengthen the above historical evidence, this section 
presents a descriptive study about an overview of HIPCs external debt from 1970 to 2017. Due 
to the availability of data, the descriptive study in section 2.5.1. discusses all HIPCs, while 
section 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 discuss post-completion-point HIPCs.  
2.5.1. External debt, international comparison, and capital inflows in HIPCs 
This section presents the magnitude of external debt and its service, the flow of HIPCs 
external debt compared to other capital inflows, and the amount of external debt of HIPCs 
compared to other regions in the world from 1970 to 2017.   
2.5.1.1. External debt and its service in HIPCs 
The external debt of HIPCs was increasing from 1970 to mid of 1995 and started to 
decline afterwards until the beginning of the 2000s. Except for a few years, the external debt 
of HIPCs was increasing from the early 2000s and reached around 261 billion in 2017. Unlike 
the external debt stock of HIPCs, the external debt service shows some fluctuation in trend. It 
had an increasing trend in the 1970s and 80s, but it showed a little reduction in 1982 and 1983. 
In the 1990s, the debt service shows a frequent fluctuation, but it is still high compared to 1970 
and early 1980s. From 1970 to mid-1990s, global oil price shocks and both borrowers and 
creditors wrong predictions about these shocks and global macroeconomic, excess Petro-dollar 
accumulations in the financial institutions, disappointing growth, exogenous shocks, and 
inadequate policy response are the reasons for the continuous rise of foreign debt in HIPCs. 
Nevertheless, due to insolvency, HIPCs external debt showed some reduction (stability) 
between 1995 and 2006. However, from 2007 up to now, it is increasing, and it might be 
connected to previous decades’ governments having better reputation and development 
projects; hence, borrowing more money. Similarly, HIPCs had a continuous increment of 
external debt service from 1970 to the end of the 1980s. This might be related to high debt 
accumulation and tight monetary policy of industrialized countries, which aggravated the 
interest rate cost of non-concessional and private debts. However, from 1990 to the mid-2000s, 
the external debt service of HIPCs was relatively stable. This might be due to the two HIPCs 
initiatives in the 1990s and the Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI) in 2005. 
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However, except for a few years, HIPCs debt service increased from 2006 and reached 15.4 
billion USD in 2017 (see Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2 External debt and its service in HIPCs, 1970-2017 (current USD) 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the author using WB data 
 
The story is quite similar when we see the trend of external debt and its service as a 
percentage of GDP. The HIPCs external debt (% GDP) increased continuously from 1970 to 
1998, but it started to decline afterwards until the beginning of the 2010s. However, it started 
rising from 2012. When we see HIPCs debt service % of GDP increasing from 1970 to early 
1980s, it fluctuated afterwards and reached a maximum (6.1 % of GDP) in 1995. A continued 
reduction of HIPCs external debt service was observed between 1996 and 2006 and again 
started rising (see Figure 2.3).  




Source: Constructed by the author using WB data 
 
2.5.1.2. HIPCs foreign capital inflows 
 
Besides foreign borrowing, HIPCs have different capital inflows, such as income from exports, 
foreign aids, and foreign direct investment. Among these, the magnitude of exports as % GDP 
is substantial from 1978. Next to income from the export of goods and services, official 
development assistance is also a part of capital inflows from the 1970s. Even though foreign 
direct investment (FDI) does not contribute a lot compared to the others, it is one source of 
HIPCs foreign capital inflows. Generally, HIPCs are highly dependent on foreign capital to 
finance their economy (see Figure 2.4).   




Source: Constructed by the author using WB data 
 
2.5.1.3. External debt of HIPCs compared with other regions  
Even though the WB classified the regions into different categories, including developing 
countries, low-income countries, most HIPCs are from SSA, developing and low-income 
countries, and this section focuses on other areas. Therefore, compared to the other regions, the 
external debt stock of HIPCs is the highest and followed by Latin America & Caribbean and 
upper-middle-income countries. However, the story is different when we compare the debt 
service of HIPCs with other regions. It means that except for a few years (1991-1995), HIPCs 
debt service's magnitude is lower than that of Latin America & Caribbean countries. The debt 
service of HIPCs was higher than that of upper-middle-income countries between 1970 and 
1995, but it became lower afterwards. A similar trend is observed when comparing HIPCs debt 
service with the Middle East & North Africa and Europe & Central Asia countries. However, 
except for the period from 2001 to 2005, the debt service of HIPCs was higher than in East 







Table 2.2 Comparison of external debt stocks and service of HIPCs with other regions   







































































































































Note: NA refers to not available data. Figures outside the brackets are average values of 
external debt stocks (% of GNI), and inside the brackets are average values of external debt 
service (% of GNI).  
Source: Computed by author using WB data 
 
2.5.2. External debt components of HIPCs 
 
This section presents components of the external debt of HIPCs during the period from 
1970 to 2017. According to Global Development Finance (GDF) (2012, p. 317), foreign debt 
components can broadly be classified as long-term, short-term, and use of IMF. Furthermore, 
long-term debt is classified into private non-guaranteed and public & publicly guaranteed debt 
on the debtor’s side. Besides, public & publicly guaranteed debt can be further classified into 
official and private creditors on the creditor's side. Official creditors are multilateral and 
bilateral. However, private creditors are commercial banks, bonds, and others. Hence, this 
section discusses the components of HIPCs external debt.  
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2.5.2.1. External debt classification by type and debtor 
 
Similarly to GDF (2012), the total external debt of HIPCs is divided into long-term, short-
term and IMF credit. Long-term debt can be further divided into public & publicly guaranteed 
and private non-guaranteed external debt. Figure 2.5 presents the three types (long-term, short-
term, and IMF credit) of external debt of HIPCs.  
Figure 2.5 The Types and the amount of HIPCs External Debt, 1970-2017 (current US$) 
 
Note: the percentage values in the figure are the share of long-term, short-term, and IMF 
credits to the total external debt, respectively. 
Source: Computed by the author using WB data 
The total external debt of HIPCs increased for the past four decades. It was 47.6 billion 
US$ in the first half of the 1970s, and it became triple in the second half. Furthermore, it was 
298.8 and 510 billion US$ in the first and second half of the1980s respectively, and the trend 
continued and reached 749 billion US$ at the end of the 1990s. However, in the early 2000s, 
the external debt reduced, and it was 714 and 570.6 billion US$ in the first and second half of 
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the 2000s. Recently, over the years of 2010-2017, the total external debt stock of HIPCs 
reached 1.3 trillion US$. 
Furthermore, a major part of the total external debt of HIPCs is long-term debt. On 
average, the long-term debt has a share of around 84.4% of the total external debt over the 
studied period. However, the short-term and the IMF credits cover only 10.6 and 4.8% of the 
total external debt stock of HIPCs, respectively. Considering the external debt movements, all 
types of external debts are not stable for the last 40 years. The long-term debt fluctuates 
between 80-89% of the total debt and its maximum & the minimum level was during 1970-74 
(89.6%) & 1980-84 (80.5%), respectively. Besides, the maximum amount of short-term debt 
was 15.1% between the years of 1975-79. However, its minimum share was 7.4 % over the 
period of 2011-17. Also, IMF credit reached a maximum during the 2010s (7.38%) and reached 
a minimum during the early 1970s (1.8%) (see Figure 2.5). 
The long-term debt of HIPCs is further divided into public & publicly guaranteed and 
private non-guaranteed debt, even though the share of the latter one is too small. Figure 2.6 
shows that the public & publicly guaranteed debt has a lion share (averagely 95%) of long-
term debt over the last four decades. The maximum amount of public & publicly guaranteed 
debt occurs in the early 1970s (87.9%) of the total long-term debt. However, currently, it has 
reduced to 74.8%. Thirty years ago, the HIPCs privately non-guaranteed debt was too low; it 
was 2% of the long-term debt in the first half of the 1970s. However, it increased from time to 
time and reached 10.3% of the long-term debt during the 2010s. 
Figure 2.6 Long-term debt, private non-guaranteed debt, and public & publicly guaranteed debt 




Note: The figure's percentage values are the share of public & publicly guaranteed debt and 
private non-guaranteed to the long-term external debt in HIPCs, respectively. 
Source: Computed by the author using WB data 
 
2.5.2.2. Creditors classification of external debt 
 
The sources of public & publicly guaranteed debt are official and private creditors. The 
official creditors include loans from multilateral12 (international organizations) and bilateral13 
(from governments) sources. Furthermore, the loan from private creditors is commercial bank 
loans from private banks, publicly or privately issued bonds, and other private loans (from 
manufacturers, exporters, suppliers of goods, and bank credit in the form of guarantee of export 
credit agencies) (GDF 2012).   
                                                          
12 Loans and credits from the World Bank, regional development banks, and other multilateral and 
intergovernmental agencies 
13 Loans from single government donor and their agencies (including central banks), loans from autonomous 
bodies, and direct loans from official export credit agencies 
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Except for a few countries, most HIPCs have public & publicly guaranteed debts. 
Similarly to the GDF (2012) structure of debt, the multilateral and bilateral creditors are the 
two types of official debt creditors of HIPCs. However, commercial banks, bonds, and others 
belong to private creditors. Table 2.3 and 2.4 show that the primary providers of credit to HIPCs 
are from official and private sources, respectively. The total official debt of HIPCs is around 
28 billion US$ in the early 1970s; it became more than double at the end of the 1970s. Also, in 
the 1980s and 90s, it becomes 237 and 456 billion US$, respectively. Currently, it is around 27 
times higher than in the early 1970s. Likewise, the private debt of HIPCs has also increased for 
the past 40 years. In the early 1970s, it was 11 billion US$. However, it became above triple in 
the second half 1970s and reached a maximum during the 1980s (73 billion US$).  
Table 2.3 Official external debt and its sources in billions, 1970-2017 (current US$) 




Total  official debt (% of public and 
publicly guaranteed debt)   
1970-74 5.9 22.2 28.1 67.22 
1975-79 19.4 39.9 59.3 54.74 
1980-84 48.7 69.6 118.3 52.79 
1985-89 113.3 123.9 237.2 58.31 
1990-94 188.7 172.1 360.8 64.05 
1995-99 248.3 183.4 431.7 69.75 
2000-04 300 156.1 456.1 76.22 
2005-09 233 128.1 361.1 81.24 
2010-17 483 284.1 767.1 75.97 
Source: Computed by the author using WB data 
 
Table 2.4 Private external debt and its sources in billions, 1970-2017 (current US$) 
Years  Commercial 
credit  
Bonds  Others  Total  Total private debt (% of public 
and publicly guaranteed debt)   
1970-74 2.6 0.89 7.5 10.99 26.28 
1975-79 12.8 0.68 21.8 35.3 32.58 
1980-84 29.7 0.38 34.1 64.1 28.6 
1985-89 35.2 0.25 37.6 73 17.9 
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1990-94 31.4 2.66 27.2 61.26 10.87 
1995-99 15.6 8.36 14.4 38.36 6.19 
2000-04 9.7 12 9.4 31.1 5.19 
2005-09 12.7 15.7 6.5 34.9 7.85 
2010-17 58.1 84.9 31.4 174.4 17.27 
Source: Computed by the author using WB data 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the official debts of HIPCs are mainly from bilateral sources. 
This is, maybe, due to the bilateral loan's direct contract by the other governments or their 
export credit agencies and private loans were insured for payment by export credit agencies. 
However, after the 1990s, multilateral debt consists of a significant proportion of total official 
debt.  
In HIPCs, commercial credit, bonds, and other types of debt come from private creditors. 
All the loans from private creditors are small in the early 1970s. However, commercial and 
other types of debts increased more than triple in the second half of the 1970s. The trend 
continued until the end of the second half of the 1980s. At that time, the commercial credit and 
other types of private external debt reached 35.2 and 37.6 billion US$, respectively. However, 
their amount reduced over the period from the 1990s up to 2000s. To the reverse, the bond 
increased during these periods and reached 84.9 billion US$ in the 2010s (see Table 2.4).  
The share of the official credit to the total external debt and public & publicly guaranteed 
debt is high relative to a private loan. Out of this large share of official sources, multilateral 
and bilateral accounts for a massive amount of total external debt of HIPCs. On average, 
multilateral creditors' external debt shares 49.2, 27, and 33.5 % of the official, total, and public 
& publicly guaranteed debt during the studied period. Besides, bilateral debt also has a share 
of 50.6 % of the official debt, 26.6 % of the total external debt, and 32.8 % public & publicly 
guaranteed debt (see Table 2.5).   




Multilateral  Bilateral  
% share to 
total official 
debt  
% share to 
total external 
debt 
% share to 
total long-
term debt 












1970-74 20.5 12.13 13.8 79.4 47 53.6 
1975-79 31.9 14 17.9 68 30.6 38.7 
1980-84 41 16.1 20.9 58.9 23.2 30 
1985-89 47.3 21.9 27.3 52.6 24.2 30.3 
1990-94 52.2 27.5 34.3 47.7 25.1 31.3 
1995-99 57.5 33.2 42.1 42.4 24.4 31 
2000-04 65.5 41.8 52 34.4 21.8 27.2 
2005-09 63.7 40.3 49.2 36.2 22.7 27.8 
2010-17 63.4 36.3 44.5 36.5 20.8 25.5 
Average 49.2 27.0 33.5 50.6 26.6 32.8 
Source: Computed by the author using WB data 
 
Similarly, on average, the commercial banks’ share is 38.3, 5.03, and 6.29 % of the 
private, total, and public & publicly guaranteed external debt, respectively. Likewise, the loan 
from other sources has a share of 44.4%, 6.97%, and 8.63% of private, total, and public and 
publicly external debt, respectively. However, the bonds have a small share of the total, private 
and long-term debt (see Table 2.6).  
Table 2.6 Private external debt, its sources and shares in percentage, 1970-2017 (current US$)  
 Private debt 















































1970-74 21.1 4.9 5.6 8.9 2 2.3 69.9 16.1 18.4 
1975-79 36 9.2 11.7 2.1 0.55 0.69 61.7 15.7 20.1 
1980-84 46.2 9.98 12.9 0.6 0.13 0.17 53.1 11.6 15.1 
1985-89 48.2 7 8.8 0.35 0.05 0.06 51.4 7.47 9.34 
1990-94 51.4 4.6 5.75 4.46 0.38 0.47 44.1 4 5 
1995-99 38.9 2 2.6 23.8 1.13 1.43 37.2 1.9 2.4 
2000-04 30.7 1.35 1.68 38.8 1.68 2.1 30.5 1.32 1.65 
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2005-09 36.3 2.25 2.75 45.2 2.8 3.46 18.5 1.14 1.39 
2010-17 36.2 4 4.9 42.9 5.59 6.72 33.3 3.5 4.3 
Average 38.3 5.03 6.29 18.5 1.59 1.93 44.4 6.97 8.63 
Source: Computed by the author using WB data 
 
2.5.3. External debt by region 
 
To show the external debt conditions of HIPCs by different geographical region, this 
section clustered the HIPCs into four regions (three from Africa and one from Asia & Latin 
America). The three African regions are East14 (8 countries), West15 (14 countries), and Central 
& Southern African16 (8 countries). Besides, we categorized six countries in one group to 
represent the Asian and Latin American17 countries. Hence, we have four regions (three from 
Africa and one from Asia & Latin America). East African countries share around 33.6 % of the 
total external debt of HIPCs, on average. Except in the 2000s, all regions' external debt had an 
increasing trend for the past 40 years. However, the West African external debt is substantial 
relative to the other areas. Following the West African countries, the East and the central & 
southern part of African countries share 24.8 and 24.6 % of the total external debt of HIPCs, 
respectively. Furthermore, Asian, and Latin American countries share only 16.6 % of the total 
external debt of HIPCs. Even though the share of the total external debt of Asia and Latin 
American countries is little, their per capita external debt is higher than the per capita debt of 
other regions of HIPCs (see Figure 2.7)   
Figure 2.7 The External Debt of HIPCs by Region (current US$) 
                                                          
14 Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda. 
15 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cotedvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 
16 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Mozambique, São Tomé & 
Príncipe, Zambia.  




Note: the percentage values in the figure are the share of total external debt of East, West, 
Central, Southern African, and Asian & Latin American HIPCs to total external debt of 
HIPCs, respectively.  
Source: Computed by the author using WB data 
For the past 40 years, the percentage share of East African external debt fluctuates in 
between 19 % (in 2005-09) and 28.6 % (in 2010-17). Similarly, in West Africa, the percentage 
share varies between 30.6 % during the early 1970s and 36.6 % in the second half of the 2000s. 
Furthermore, in the central and southern parts of Africa, the minimum share (20.2%) was 
during the 2010s, and the maximum share was in the second half of the 1990s. Unlike the years 
of other regions, the Asian & Latin American countries have a maximum share (18.4 %) and 




 2.6. Chapter summary 
 
When we compare and contrast the socio-economic and demographic performance of 
HIPCs during the debt crisis on one hand and during and after initiatives on the other, except 
for a few, most indicators performed better during and after the initiatives. This implies HIPCs 
initiatives contribute to a better socio-economic and demographic improvement in the 1990s 
and the initiatives were also used as a base for the 2000s and 2010s.  Besides, the total external 
debt of HIPCs increased for the past four decades, and a major part of it was long-run debt. 
Besides, the public & publicly guaranteed debt has the lion's share of long-term debt. Compared 
to private creditors, official creditors were the primary providers of credit to HIPCs. The 
multilateral and bilateral creditors are the two types of official debt creditors of HIPCs. 
However, commercial banks, bonds, and others belong to private creditors. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the official debts of HIPCs are mainly from bilateral sources. However, after the 1990s, 
multilateral debt consists of a significant proportion of total official debt. When we see the 
accumulation of external debt by regions, following the West African countries, the East and 
the central & southern part of African countries accumulated a considerable amount of external 
debt. Even though the share of the total external debt of Asia and Latin American countries is 





METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the data, the model specification, and the methodology 
(estimation techniques) of the study. Specifically, data type, source, and data analysis, model 
specification along with the expected signs of explanatory variables. Moreover, it provides 
estimation techniques and procedures. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 informs 
about data type, sources, and data analysis, while section 3.2 provides basic panel data 
econometrics procedures. Section 3.3 covers model specification, justifications, and estimation 
techniques. 
 
3.1. Data type, source, and data analysis 
 
This study used secondary time-series panel data collected from well-known 
international institutions, such as World Development Indicator (WDI), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Polity IV, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Penn World Table 
databases (for more details, see Table 3.1). It also used descriptive statistics (averages, 
percentages, ratios, and tabulations) and an econometrics approach to examine its objectives.  
Table 3.1 Definitions, measurement, and sources 
Variables Definition Source 
ED  External debt as a percentage of GDP  WDI database 
DSRN Debt service as a % of Gross national income. WDI database 
IMP Import of goods and services % of GDP  WDI database 
EXP Export of goods and services % of GDP  WDI database 
FDI Foreign direct investment as a % GDP   WDI database 
POP Population growth rate (%)   WDI database 
GDPGR GDP growth rate (annual %) WDI database 




Political Stability is measured as the 
country's elections competitiveness and openness, the nature 
of political involvement in general, and the degree of checks 
on administrative authority. The estimate gives the country's 
score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal 
distribution, ranging from -10 to +10. 
Polity 2 data 
series from the 
Polity IV 
database  
GRMAC Growth rate of major advanced countries (%) WDI database 
INV Investment as a percentage of GDP IMF database 
ED  External debt as a percentage of GDP  WDI database 
ED2 Square of external debt as a percentage of GDP WDI database 
DSR Debt service as a Percentage of GDP  WDI database 
OPPN Trade as a proxy variable for Oppness and measured the sum 
of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
percentage of GDP 
WDI database 
EXCH Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) WDI database 
DMCR Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP WDI database 
LAB  Labour force as a percentage of the total population  WDI database 
SAV Gross national savings % GDP IMF database 
DEPEN Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population) WDI database 
HDI Proxy of human capital, it is a summary measure of average 
achievement in key dimensions of human development: a 
long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent 
standard of living. 
UNDP database 
INSQ  Institutional quality proxied as Polity 2, which is measured as 
the country's elections competitiveness and openness, the 
nature of political involvement in general, and the degree of 
checks on administrative authority. The estimate gives the 
country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a 
standard normal distribution, ranging from -10 to +10. 




NBTOT Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100) WDI database 
TFP It is the portion of output not explained by the amount of 






power parity (PPP) rates relative to the United States in terms 
of the prices in that period (i.e. current prices). 
UNEMP Unemployment, total (% of the total labor force) (modeled 
ILO estimate) 
WDI database 
HC Human capital, proxies as human development index (HDI) 
which is a summary measure of average achievement in key 
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, 
being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. 
UNDP database 
GCF  Gross capital formation (% of GDP) WDI database 
Source: Constructed by the author 
 3.2. Basic panel data econometrics procedures  
 
A growing body of the panel data literature concludes that panel-data models are likely 
to exhibit substantial cross-sectional dependence (CD) in the errors resulting from frequent 
shocks, unobserved components, spatial dependence and idiosyncratic pairwise dependence. 
Even though the impact of CD in estimation depends on several factors, such as magnitude of 
the correlations across cross-sections and the nature of CD itself, relative to the static model, 
the effect of CD in dynamic panel estimators is more severe (De Hoyos – Sarafidis 2006). 
Moreover, Pesaran (2006) noted that occurrences such as recessions, economic or financial 
crises potentially affect all countries, even though it might start from one or two countries. 
These occurrences inevitably introduce some cross-sectional interdependencies across the 
cross-sectional unit, their regressors, and the error terms. Hence, overlooking the CD in panel 
data leads to biased estimates and spurious results (De Hoyos – Sarafidis 2006; Pesaran 2007). 
Therefore, examining the cross-sectional dependence is vital and the first step in panel data 
econometrics.  
In literature, there are several tests for CD, such as the Breusch – Pagan (1980) LM test, 
Pesaran (2004) scaled LM test, Pesaran (2004) CD test, and Baltagi et al. (2012) bias-corrected 
scaled LM test (for more details, see Tugcu – Tiwari 2016), Besides, the Friedman’s (1937) 
nonparametric test based on Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient and Frees (1995, 2004) of 
the sum of the squared rank correlation coefficients also existing CD tests (for more details, 
see Hoyos – Sarafidis 2006). However, in addition to Pesaran (2004) CD test, he also developed 
Friedman (1937) and Frees (1995) CD tests (Hoyos – Sarafidis 2006).  
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The panel unit root and panel cointegration tests are also common steps following the 
CD test. However, the CD test determines the type of the panel unit root and cointegration tests 
that we should apply. Generally, there are two types of panel unit root test: (1) the first- 
generation panel unit root tests, such as Im et al. (2003), Maddala – Wu (1999), Choi (2001), 
Levin et al. (2002), Breitung (2000), and Hadri (2000) and (2) the second-generation panel unit 
root test, e.g. Bai – Ng (2004); Chang (2002, 2004); Choi (2002); Phillips – Sul (2003); Harris 
– Sollis (2003); Smith et al. (2004); Moon – Perron (2004); Cerrato –  Sarantis (2007); Pesaran 
(2007); and Palm et al. (2011).  
The first-generation panel unit root tests have been criticized because they assume cross-
sectional independence and this assumption is appropriate (O’Connell 1998; Hurlin – Mignon 
2005; Baltagi 2008; Chudik – Pesaran 2015). This hypothesis is somewhat restrictive and 
unrealistic because macroeconomic time series exhibit significant cross-sectional correlation 
among countries in a panel (Baltagi 2008), and co-movements of economies are often observed 
in the majority of macroeconomic applications of unit root tests (Hurlin – Mignon 2005). The 
presence of cross-sectional correlation of errors in panel data applications in economics is 
likely to be the rule rather than the exception (Chudik – Pesaran 2015). Moreover, the 
correlation across units in panels may have significant consequences on the first-generation of 
tests assuming cross-sectional independence. When applied to cross-sectional dependent 
panels, such panel unit root tests can generate substantial size distortions (O’Connell 1998). 
Using the first-generation panel unit root test in the case of CD in errors resulting in the null 
hypothesis of nonstationary being quickly rejected (Pesaran 2007; Eberhardt – Presbitero 
2015). As a result, second-generation panel unit root tests have been proposed to take cross-
sectional dependence into account. 
The cointegration test is the third basic panel data econometric test but the type of the 
test is determined by the results of the CD. The three, widely used and easily available in 
EViews and Stata, Engle-Granger based cointegration tests when there is no CD are Pedroni 
(1999, 2004), Kao (1999), and Fisher-type (Choi 2001). The main advantage of the Pedroni 
residual-based test relative to the others (Kao and Fisher) is that it accounts for heterogeneity 
by using specific parameters, and it assumes CD (for more details, see Beyene – Kotosz 2020). 
However, it sometimes cannot provide results when there is a large number of explanatory 
variables in the model. In this case, the Kao and Fisher types of cointegrations are 
recommended. Unlike the Pedroni test, the Kao cointegration test has two values (t-statistics 
and probability) to decide the long-run relationship. The third type of panel cointegration test 
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is the Fisher type of combined Johansen. Nevertheless, the Kao cointegration test is relatively 
more comprehensive than the Fisher type.  
However, the most common cointegration tests when there is CD are Westerlund (2007), 
Westerlund – Edgerton (2007), and McCoskey – Kao (1998). Both the Westerlund (2007) 
error-correction panel cointegration test and Westerlund – Edgerton (2007) test can be used 
both in the existence and non-existence of CD. These tests allow autocorrelation to differ from 
one cross-section to another cross-section. In these tests, the bootstrap method is used in the 
existence of cross-sectional independence, while McCoskey – Kao (1998) are used in its the 
non-existence. However, the Westerlund (2007) and Westerlund – Edgerton (2007) 
cointegration tests may not accept when the model's regressors are more than seven and six, 
respectively; in this case, the McCoskey – Kao (1998) test is recommended. Examining and 
knowing the results of these basic panel econometrics tests can help us to choose relatively 
appropriate estimation techniques, prevent spurious results, and develop appropriate policy 
recommendations; therefore, this study followed these procedures to get valid results.    
 3.3. Model specification, justifications, and estimation techniques 
 
This study employed ten macroeconomic models to examine the objectives empirically. 
Except for four models (examined independently), all others are estimated using a simultaneous 
model called the SUR. However, the study used PCSE estimation technique for the external 
indebtedness and external debt-growth models, applied unit root and cointegration approaches 
for external debt sustainability model, and employed PMG estimation technique for external 
debt-national saving model. 
3.3.1. External indebtedness model  
 
The external debt model is used to identify the causes of indebtedness for two country 
groups empirically. Due to a lack of relevant data, the model used a sample of 15 HIPC18s and 
12 HIPCs in SSA19 for the period between 1990 and 2017. This implies the study has n*T=420 
(for HIPCs) and 336 (for HIPCs in SSA) observation which is fulfilled above the minimum 
rule – 5*parameters < observations in econometrics. Hence, the estimated results and policy 
                                                          
18 Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Honduras, Bolivia, Nicaragua. 
19 Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Togo. 
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recommendations can represent and work for the other HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA. Furthermore, 
the time scope of this study is also appropriate since it captures both before and after the decline 
of most HIPCs economies in 2000, the two main HIPCs initiatives in 1996 and 1999, the 
Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the global financial crisis in 2007/8, and Sustainable 
Development Goals from 2015. Therefore, the findings of this study considered various global 
development programs and events related to the title.  
Similarly to other empirical studies, this study’s analytical framework includes both 
domestic and external causes of the foreign debt variables. Therefore, based on the theoretical 
framework described so far, the study uses the following model: 
𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ղ𝑡        (1) 
where 𝐸𝐷 is external debt stock to GDP ratio at period t; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of explanatory 
variables included in the model at period t; ղ𝑡  is the stochastic error term at period t. 
Besides, variables in the vector X were identified based on theoretical and empirical 
evidence in the literature. It captures both internal and external factors that cause indebtedness 
directly or indirectly. Hence, X can be specified as: 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑁, 𝐼𝑀𝑃, 𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝐹𝐷𝐼, 𝑃𝑂𝑃, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅, 𝐼𝑁𝐹, 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2, 𝐺𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐶)   (2) 
Finally, the model we used is: 
EDit =  β0 + β1DSRNit + β2IMPit + β3EXPit +  β4FDIit+ β5POPit + β6GDPGRit +
β7INFit + β8POLITY2it + β9GRMACit + ղit                              (3) 
where β0 is an intercept term, and (+) β1, (+) β2, (-) β3, (-) β4, (+) β5, (-) β6, (-/+) β7, (-) β8 and (-
/+) β9 are the estimated long-run coefficients. The signs in the parenthesis are the expected 
hypothesized signs of the variables. 
The GRMAC is external factors; in addition, Tiruneh (2004) used debt service as an 
external factor in his study. Other variables, such as imports, exports, FDI, POP, GDPGR, INF 
and POLITY 2 are considered as internal factors. Although this study is more focused on 
internal factors, it does not mean that external factors are not important. Rather, we believe that 
HIPCs should cure their internal problems, which leads to borrowing from abroad rather than 
blaming external creditors.  
In the theoretical section, this study mentioned oil prices and TOT, and changes in 
international borrowing rates as external factors. However, this paper did not include all the 
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variables in the model. It is because changes in oil prices were an external factor, especially for 
oil-dependent economies or countries that imported a lot of oil. However, this situation was in 
the 1970s and early 1980s due to petrodollars accumulation in the banks. Nevertheless, 
currently, there is no (limited) petrodollar in international financial institutions. Hence, we 
believe oil price is not a significant variable today. Besides, the study included exports and 
imports instead of TOT to follow the theoretical framework of Equations 25 and 26 and if we 
add TOT, it leads to a multicollinearity problem with exports and imports. Of course, we can 
use TOT instead of exports and imports; however, as it has an insignificant effect on 
indebtedness, it is better to use exports and imports rather than TOT. Furthermore, the 
international borrowing rates can be external factors, but it is already included in external debt 
service.  
Due to basic panel econometric results, such as CD, unit root and cointegration, this study 
adopts the two-stage modified OLS estimator, commonly known as the PCSE estimator. 
According to Hoechle (2007), this estimation technique is more robust in correcting the cross-
sectional dependence, serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity in the datasets when the number 
of the cross-sectional units is smaller than the time series. In the estimation, the PCSE estimator 
implicitly assumes that the error terms are autocorrelated within the panel and heteroskedastic 
across the panel with the autocorrelation parameter assuming to be fixed across panels or vary 
for each panel (Ampah – Kiss 2019).   
3.3.2. External debt sustainability model 
 
Depending on the availability of data, the number of countries (32 HIPCs21+22, 27 HIPCs 
in SSA20 and five HIPCs in non-SSA21) included in econometrics estimation is different from 
the indicator and CPIA policy rating approaches. Due to the objective of the study, the time 
frame for the empirical model of this study is from 2000 to 2017. This implies the model has 
n*T=576 (for HIPCs), 486 (for HIPCs in SSA), and 90 (for HIPCs in non-SSA) observations 
which fulfil the minimum rule (5*parameters < observations) in econometrics. Therefore, the 
estimated results and policy recommendations of this study can be valid even though its time 
scope is after the millennium.  
                                                          
20 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. 




Most empirical studies on the sustainability of external debt focus on testing whether 
variables which are related to the external debt satisfy the solvency condition in Equation (29). 
To do so, there are two steps: firstly, the stationary properties of the current account, exports, 
imports, and external debt should be tested. External debt sustainability requires that these 
variables be integrated of order zero. If imports and exports are integrated of order one (non-
stationary at level), it is essential to investigate in a second step whether there is a cointegration 
relationship between them. Cointegration between these variables is a necessary condition for 
external sustainability.  
3.4. External debt – Growth factors – GDP growth models 
 
Due to a lack of relevant data and for consistency, all models used a sample of 15 HIPCs22 
from 1990 to 2017 and this scope (time and sampled countries) is sufficient to represent HIPCs 
in general. Each chapter has n*T=420 observation which is fulfilled above the minimum rule 
– 5*parameters < observations in econometrics. Therefore, the estimated results and policy 
recommendations of all studies can represent and work for the other HIPCs. Furthermore, 
similarly to external indebtedness model, the time scope of all studies is also appropriate. 
Therefore, the findings of all studies considering various global development programs and 
events are related to the title. 
To examine the impacts of external debt on growth factors and GDP growth in HIPCs, 
and the channels through which external debt affect growth, this thesis examined four different 
studies, and each study has two models. To make the studies consistent, except for the channel 
variables, all explanatory variables of growth models are the same. Besides, except for the 
external debt-national saving-growth model, all other models were estimated using the SUR 
approach developed by Zellner (1962) and later adopted by Kmenta (1971), Felmlee – Hargens 
(1988), Kim – Cho (2019), and Abdelaziz et al.  (2019). 
Unlike standard panel data approaches (pooled OLS, Least Square Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) or fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE)), the SUR model is a dynamic panel 
approach, which is able to capture the dynamic nature of the data. However, according to 
Samargandi et al. (2014), random or fixed effects estimators can only deal with the structural 
heterogeneity but impose homogeneity in the model’s slope coefficients across countries even 
                                                          
22 Post-completion-point countries: Benin, Burundi, Cameron, Central Africa Republic, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Honduras, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. 
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when substantial variations between them. Besides, the pooled OLS estimation, FE, and RE do 
not consider the correlation across equations. However, the seemingly unrelated regressions -
generalized least squares (SUR-GLS) estimator takes the cross-equation correlation into 
account (Baltagi – Pirotte 2011). Also, the SUR method estimates all equations' parameters 
simultaneously so that the parameters of every single equation also take the information 
provided by the other equations into account. This results in greater efficiency of the parameter 
estimates because additional information is used to describe the system (Cadavez – 
Henningsen, 2012). Moreover, the SUR approach is feasible for T (the number of time series) 
> N (the number of cross-sectional units) (Coakley et al. 2006). Therefore, since this study 
considers the dynamic behavior of the data, has a large number of T compared to N, and has 
two equations that will be estimated simultaneously, the SUR estimator is better to overcome 
spurious results than standard panel data approaches. 
In addition, Breitung – Pesaran (2008) noted that SUR-GLS estimation technique is more 
robust in correcting the CD in the datasets when N < T. Moreover, the SUR method was 
motivated by the efficiency gained in estimation since it results in a combination of information 
from different equations. Furthermore, this method can test restrictions that involve parameters 
in different equations. Compared with OLS estimators, the two-stage general least square and 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimators, the SUR model is considered more efficient (Abdelaziz 
et al. 2019).  
The SUR model is a system of several equations (S) with a single dependent 
(endogenous) variable for each equation and (D) independent or exogenous variables. Greene 
(2012) also noted that SUR is a linear regression model that contains several regression 
equations, each having its dependent variable, and potentially different sets of explanatory 
variables.  
Therefore, based on previous studies that adopted the SUR method, the general 
specification of the SUR simultaneous equation systems model of this study is: 
𝑌1 =  𝛽11 +  𝛽12𝑆12 + 𝛽13𝑆13 + 𝛽14𝑆14 + ⋯ + 𝛽1𝐷𝑆1𝐷1 + 1                                        (4) 
 
𝑌2 =  𝛽21 +  𝛽22𝑆22 + 𝛽23𝑆23 + 𝛽24𝑆24 + ⋯ + 𝛽2𝐷𝑆2𝐷2 + 2                                       (5) 
                                                 … 
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                                                 … 
                                                 … 
𝑌𝑆 =  𝛽𝑆1 + 𝛽𝑆2𝑆𝑆2 + 𝛽𝑆3𝑆𝑆3 + 𝛽𝑆4𝑆𝑆4 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆 + 𝑆                                     (6)  
 
 3.4.1. External debt – Investment – GDP growth model 
 
In this model, growth and investment are considered dependent variables. However, due 
to the channels through which investment can be a driver for growth and, reciprocally, a high 
level of economic growth has the ability to attract more investment, both investment and 
growth can also be used as independent variables.  
The methodology used in GLS-SUR is based on a simultaneous model. Hence, the 
investment and growth models of the study are given in Equations (7) and (8) and estimated 
together. 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐸𝐷
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼6𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑀𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + ղ𝑖𝑡                                             (7) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑2𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑3𝐸𝐷
2
𝑖𝑡 +  𝜑4𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡+ 𝜑5𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 +
𝜑6𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑7𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑8𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡+ղ𝑖𝑡                                                                         (8) 
 
In Equation 7, α0 is an intercept term, ղ𝑖𝑡 is stochastic error terms, and (-) α1, (-) α2, (-) 
α3, (+) α4, (-/+) α5, (+) α6, (-/+) α7, (-/+) α8 and (+) α9 are the estimated long-run coefficients. 
However, φ0 is an intercept term, and (+) φ1, (-) φ2, (-) φ3, (-) φ4, (+) φ5, (+) φ6, (-/+) φ7, and (-
/+) φ8 are the estimated long-run coefficients in Equation (8). The signs in the parentheses are 
the expected hypothesized signs of the variables. 
However, Equation 7 and 8 do not address unobserved heterogeneity, and therefore, we 
must account for the cross-section and time heterogeneity in these models. This can be done 
by using a two-way error component assumption for the disturbances, ղ𝑖𝑡, with  
ղ𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                                      (9) 
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where 𝜇𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜆𝑡 (called within components) represent the unobservable individual 
(cross-section) and unobservable time heterogeneities, respectively. However, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (called panel 
or between component) is the remaining random error term.  
Therefore, Equation 7 and 8 written as: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐸𝐷
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼6𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐷𝑀𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 +   𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡              (10)         
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑2𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑3𝐸𝐷
2
𝑖𝑡 +  𝜑4𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡+ 𝜑5𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 +
𝜑6𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑7𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑8𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                    (11) 
The fixed effects and random effects are the two types of models that will be estimated 
based on the assumptions about whether the error components are fixed or random. If the 
assumptions are –  𝜇𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜆𝑡 are fixed parameters to be estimated and the random error term, 
𝑣𝑖𝑡, is identically and independently distributed with zero mean and constant variance 
(homoscedasticity) – then Equation (9) gives a two-way fixed effects error component model 
or simply a fixed-effects model. However, Equation (9) gives a two-way random effects error 
component model or a random-effects model, if we assume 𝜇𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜆𝑡 are random much like 
the random error term or 𝜇𝑖 , 𝜆𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑖𝑡 are all identically and independently distributed with 
zero mean and constant variance or all of them are independent of each other and explanatory 
variables (Vijayamohanan 2016). 
Instead of both the error components, 𝜇𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜆𝑡 , if we consider either of the components 
only at a time (fixed or random), then we will have a one-way error component model, fixed 
or random effects. In this case, the stochastic error term ղ𝑖𝑡 in (9) will become: 
ղ𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  , 𝑜𝑟                                                                                                              (12) 
ղ𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                      (13) 
 
 3.4.2. External debt – National saving – GDP growth model 
 
Using the framework developed by Hall (1978) as a benchmark, Oageng – Boitumelo 
(2017) developed a model that ensures that all the variables that affect the savings decisions 
are included, in which saving is a function of income and other factors (including borrowing) 
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that affect consumption directly and saving indirectly. Further, Aliyu – Usman (2013) 
examined the impact of external debt, public debt, and debt servicing on Nigeria's national 
savings. Hence, this study combined and adopted the model of Aliyu – Usman (2013) and 
Oageng – Boitumelo (2017) to examine the effect of external debt on national saving. However, 
our model differs from the others; it considers the non-linear impact of external debt on national 
savings (see Equation 14).  
SAVit =  θ0 + θ1EDit + θ2𝐸𝐷
2
it + θ3DSRit + 𝜃4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃5𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 +
𝜃6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃7𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃8𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  ղit                                                                          (14) 
Where θ0 is an intercept term, ղit the stochastic error term, and the parameters  𝜃1, 𝜃2, 
 𝜃3, 𝜃4, 𝜃5, 𝜃6, 𝜃7, and 𝜃8 are the coefficients of  𝐸𝐷, 𝐸𝐷
2, 𝐷𝑆𝑅, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅, 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁, 𝐼𝑁𝐹, 𝐿𝐴𝐵, 
and 𝑃𝑂𝑃, respectively. 
This study also analyzed the impact and channels through which external debt affects 
economic growth, and it used Equation (15) as a model. This model has two different purposes 
– it examines the impact of external debt on growth, and it also shows the effect of the national 
saving channel on growth.  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝜎0 + 𝜎1𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎2𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎3𝐸𝐷
2
𝑖𝑡 +  𝜎4𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡+ 𝜎5𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 +
𝜎6𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎7𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎8𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡+ղ𝑖𝑡                                                                        (15) 
Where, the parameters 𝜎1,  𝜎2,  𝜎3,  𝜎4, 𝜎5,  𝜎6,  𝜎7, and  𝜎8 are the coefficients of 𝑆𝐴𝑉, 
𝐸𝐷, 𝐸𝐷2, 𝐷𝑆𝑅, 𝐿𝐴𝐵, 𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁, 𝐼𝑁𝐹, and 𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻, respectively.  
Unlike the previous and the following studies, this study estimated the national saving and 
growth models independently due to basic panel econometric results. Therefore, for the saving 
model, the study applied the panel Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) called PMG 
estimation approach, which combines pooling and averaging of coefficients. According to 
Pesaran et al. (1999), the PMG is efficient compared to others (for more details, see Beyene – 
Kotosz 2020). Furthermore, the PMG estimator is less sensitive to outliers when the number 
of observations is small. It can also correct serial autocorrelation and endogenous regressors 
by choosing an appropriate lag structure for both dependent and independent variables (Pesaran 
et al. 1999; Beyene – Kotosz 2020). Therefore, the estimated saving model using PMG is 
specified as follows:     
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The re-parameterized form of Equation 16 can be formulated as follows: 
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 𝜇𝑖𝑡           (17) 
However, for the growth model, this study used the PCSE regression estimation 
technique. Therefore, the study used Equation 15 to analyze the impact of external debt on 
growth and the saving channel through which external debt affects growth.   
 
 3.4.3. External debt – Human capital development – GDP growth model 
 
Similar to external debt – investment – GDP growth model, the external debt – HCD –
growth model performs a simultaneous equations model – GLS-SUR. In this model, GDP 
growth and HCD (proxies as HDI) considered dependent variables. However, due to the 
channels through which HCD can be a driver for growth and that, reciprocally, a high level of 
economic growth has a capacity to enhance HCD, the two variables can also be used as an 




𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝜓0 + 𝜓1𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓2𝐸𝐷
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓3𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝜓4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓5𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
𝜓6𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓7𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑡+ղ𝑖𝑡                                                                                            (18) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛷0 + 𝛷1𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛷2𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛷3𝐸𝐷
2
𝑖𝑡 +  𝛷4𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡+ 𝛷5𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 +
𝛷6𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛷7𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛷8𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡+ղ𝑖𝑡                                                                     (19) 
Where, ψ0 and 𝛷0 are an intercept terms, ղ𝑖𝑡 is the stochastic error terms, and (+) ψ1, (-) 
ψ2, (-) ψ3, (+) ψ4, (-) ψ5, (+) ψ6, and (+) ψ7 are the estimated long-run coefficients of Equation 
(18). However, (+) Φ1, (+) Φ2, (-) Φ3, (-) Φ4, (+) Φ5, (+) Φ6, (-/+) Φ7, and (-/+) Φ8 are the 
estimated long-run coefficients of Equation (19).  
 
 3.4.4. External debt – Total factor productivity – GDP growth model 
To examine the link between external debt, TFP, and GDP growth, this study employed 
GLS-SUR approach. In this model, the dependent variables are TFP and GDPGR. Besides, the 
study used both variables as independent variables due to their reciprocal relationship; hence, 
the study specified the following models:  
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛶0 + 𝛶1𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛶2𝐸𝐷
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛶3𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛶4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛶5𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛶6𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛶7𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛶8𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛶9𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛶10𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛶11𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛶12𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2𝑖𝑡 + ղ𝑖𝑡                                                                                                             (20) 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛺0 + 𝛺1𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛺2𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛺3𝐸𝐷
2
𝑖𝑡 +  𝛺4𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡+ 𝛺5𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 +
𝛺6𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛺7𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛺8𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡+ղ𝑖𝑡                                                                         (21) 
Where, 𝛶0 and Ω0 are an intercept terms, and (+) 𝛶1, (-) 𝛶2, (-) 𝛶3, (+) 𝛶4, (+) 𝛶5, (+/-) 𝛶6, 
(-) 𝛶7, (+) 𝛶8, (-) 𝛶9, (-) 𝛶10, (+) 𝛶11, and (+) 𝛶12 are the estimated long-run coefficients of 
Equation (20). However, (+) Ω1, (+) Ω2, (-) Ω3, (-) Ω4, (+) Ω5, (+) Ω6, (-/+) Ω7, and (-/+) Ω8 




DETERMINANTS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS IN HIPCs 
Introduction  
Developing countries borrow from abroad to finance their resource gaps for development 
needs. Nevertheless, once the debt grows more prominent and unmanageable, it becomes a 
major macroeconomic problem. Regarding this, the countries classified as HIPCs suffer a lot 
because of their substantial external debt stock. It has been on researchers' and policymakers' 
agendas to identify the causes that lead them. However, the potential empirical studies of the 
determinants of external indebtedness with the latest methodology have received little attention 
in the case of HIPCs, and it has resulted in a lack of knowledge and methodology in the 
available literature. Therefore, this chapter aimed to examine the determinants of external debt 
accumulation in HIPCs employing the recent estimation technique known as PCSE for the 
period between 1990 and 2017. A sample of 15 countries for which relevant data are available 
was used. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 provides background information, 
while section 4.2 reviews the literature on the causes of external indebtedness. Section 4.3 
covers empirical results and discussion, while section 4.4 summarizes the chapter. 
 4.1. Background of the study 
Countries aim to achieve rapid and sustainable economic growth. However, the economic 
problem of developing countries, such as in Africa, Asia, and Latin America can be a composite 
of interrelated factors of both internal and external nature and these factors become a cause for 
the HIPCs debt crisis. Developing countries, especially at the early stage of economic growth, 
need foreign borrowing to finance their domestic resource gaps and to achieve economic 
growth and development. However, if external debt becomes unsustainable, it will adversely 
affect the macroeconomy. 
The external debt accumulation of developing countries in general and HIPCs (SSA, 
Latin America and Caribbean countries) in particular has increased since the early 1970s (for 
more, see the background of the study). Similarly, determinants of external indebtedness of 
developing countries have been an issue for researchers, academicians, and policymakers 
(Maghyereh – Hashemite 2003; Berensmann 2004; Menbere 2004; Bader 2006). Commonly, 
the causes of foreign debt are classified into domestic (Sachs 1989; Osei 1995; Uzun et al. 
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2012; Berensmann 2019) and external (Cline 1985; Iyoha 2000; Easterly 2002; Berensmann 
2019) factors and both are interrelated with each other.  
Most developing countries borrow from abroad to finance their resource gaps and 
domestic investment, thereby enhancing their economic growth and development (Umaru et 
al., 2013; Siddique et al., 2016). According to the neoclassical economic growth model, each 
state should achieve a steady-state level of capital. Thus, any investment injection could lead 
them to have accelerated economic growth. However, once the debt grows more prominent and 
unmanageable, it adversely affects countries' socio-economic growth. To keep countries away 
from the macroeconomic instability generated by the unsustainable external debt, identifying 
the primary causes of external indebtedness of HIPCs requires a precise empirical analysis. 
Even though there is one empirical study using panel time-series data, Chiminya – 
Nicolaidou (2018), about determinants of external debt in African countries, it did not focus 
specifically on HIPCs. From the HIPCs perspective, Menbere (2004) examined the 
determinants of external debt in HIPCs and developing countries, whiles Mensah et al. (2017) 
investigated for HIPCs in Africa. This implies that empirical studies on the determinants of 
external debt in African and HIPCs are few (leading to knowledge and literature gap). 
Furthermore, previous studies did not consider serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and CD 
among the error terms, which leads to spurious results. Besides, even though Menbere (2004) 
examined the determinants of external debt for HIPCs, it is outdated. As a result, this study 
filled the literature, methodology, and time gaps of previous studies by considering both HIPCs 
in Africa and non-Africa countries, taking serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and CD into 
account, and employing the PCSE estimation technique. Therefore, this study's main objective 
is to examine the determinants of external indebtedness of 15 HIPCs in general and 12 HIPCs 
in SSA using time series data from 1990 to 2017.  
 
4.2.  Literature review 
This section reviews theoretical and empirical literature about the topic. Specifically, the 
theoretical framework and literature that explain the causes of external debt of a given/group 
country/countries are discussed, besides, empirical findings which describe the causes of 
external indebtedness are presented. 
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4.2.1. Theoretical framework and causes of external indebtedness 
This section discusses theoretical and empirical literature about the above-mentioned 
topic. The theoretical framework that justifies the need for external borrowing developing links 
the increase in gross external debt (current account deficit - direct and long-term portfolio 
capital inflows) + (official reserve increases + other private capital outflows) (Dornbusch 1984; 
McFadden et al. 1985; Menbere 2004). The model starts by summarizing the determinants of 
the current account (CA) balance, where CA is the difference between items that generate 
foreign exchange and those that require foreign exchange expenditure. 
𝐶𝐴 = 𝑋 − 𝑀 − 𝐼𝐿𝐹 − 𝑂𝑇𝑃       (22) 
where: X = exports, M = imports, ILF = interest paid on loans from foreigners and 
OTP =  other net factor payments and transfers to foreigners. 
We can write Equation (22) as: 
𝐶𝐴 = 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑅 + 𝛥𝐵𝐹 − 𝛥𝐿𝐹 − 𝐹𝐷𝐼      (23) 
where: 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑅 = 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠, 
𝛥𝐵𝐹 = 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦,  
𝛥𝐿𝐹 = 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠,  
𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, and 
𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑅 = 𝑁𝐼𝑅 – 𝑁𝐼𝑅−1 denotes a net addition to stock 
Let NFL = new foreign loans and PLF = payments of foreign loan principal due. Then ΔLF = 
NFL - PLF and then, the demand for new foreign loans (NFL) would be: 
𝑁𝐹𝐿 = 𝑃𝐿𝐹 + 𝐼𝐿𝐹 + 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑅 + 𝛥𝐵𝐹 − 𝐹𝐷𝐼 + 𝑂𝑇𝑃 − 𝑋 + 𝑀             (24) 
debt service paid is a summation of interest and principal payments on foreign loans (ILF + 
PLP = DSP). Debt service paid can also be written as debt service due (including past arrears 
outstanding) less current arrears, DSP = DSD - A. Substituting these definitions in (24) yields: 
𝑁𝐹𝐿 + 𝐴 = 𝐷𝑆𝐷 + 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑅 + 𝛥𝐵𝐹 − 𝐹𝐷𝐼 + 𝑂𝑇𝑃 − 𝑋 + 𝑀     (25) 
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According to Menbere (2004), the assumption here is that countries prefer to protect their 
reputation by rolling over their external debt rather than by arrears. This gives an equation for 
a one period – ahead ex-ante demand for new loans, which satisfies: 
𝑁𝐿𝐷 = 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑒 + 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑅𝑒 + 𝛥𝐵𝐹𝑒 − 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑒 + 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑒 − 𝑋𝑒 + 𝑀 𝑒             (26) 
where: NLD stands for new loan demanded, and the superscripts e stands for expectations. 
Equation (26) implies that the demand for overseas borrowing is a function of total debt 
service, the change in international reserves, the change in foreign bonds placed domestically, 
trade balance, and net factor payments and transfers to foreigners (which partly reflects Current 
account balance). Using this theoretical framework, Imimole et al. (2014) analyzed the 
determinants of external debt for Nigeria's case. Besides Dornbusch (1984), McFadden et al. 
(1985) and Menbere (2004) – the two-gap model which is prepared by Chenery – Strout (1996) 
and its elongated Bacha (1990) fiscal gap model is the well-known models for how external 
debt is accumulated. Hence, this study adopted the theoretical framework of Dornbusch (1984), 
McFadden et al. (1985), Menbere (2004) and Imimole et al. (2014) in analyzing determinants 
of external indebtedness of HIPCs.  
As discussed previously, the causes for external indebtedness fall into two categories –
domestic factors and external factors. Regarding this, poverty (savings-investment gap) is one 
of the domestic factors for developing countries' external indebtedness. According to growth 
economists, poverty has a leading role in the external indebtedness of a country. The wide gap 
between savings and investment because of different factors, especially during a depressed 
economy, leads to the accumulation of foreign debt (Solomon et al. 1977; Menbere 2004). 
Besides, Ayadi – Ayadi (2008) and Uzun et al. (2012) argued that since developing countries’ 
saving is low relative to investment and investment is essential for growth, it is rational to look 
for external funds.  
The foreign trade performance is another factor for the external borrowing of developing 
countries. The import structure of developing countries focuses on imports of capital goods 
which are vital for further expanding the tradable sector. Moreover, export earnings of 
developing countries are usually insufficient to generate enough foreign exchange for financing 
imports; external borrowing is the essential means of gaining access to the technology that is 
vital for the expansion of the export sector and rapid economic growth (Menbere 2004). Also, 
developing countries' worse trade balance is one of the causes of external debt accumulation 
(Helkie – Howard 1990; Ng’eno 2000). 
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Furthermore, because of wrong macroeconomic policies, extensive and repeated fiscal 
deficit and the current account deficit can accumulate external debt in developing countries 
(Ajayi 1991). Fischer – Easterly (1990) set four ways (printing money, running down foreign 
exchange reserves, borrowing abroad, and borrowing domestically) of financing the budget 
deficit. They argue that the budget deficit in developing countries aggravates the current 
account deficit and leads to external indebtedness.  
Moreover, political economy models explain how countries get indebted (Chiminya – 
Nicolaidou 2018). Strategic considerations by politicians can produce inefficiently high public 
deficits and lead to debt accumulation (Snider 1990). The theory of strategic debt accumulation 
suggests that the current policymakers can restrain future policymakers spending by increasing 
debt levels. For many developing nations, irresponsible political leaders make countries 
indebted (Alesina –Tabellini 1990, Easterly 2002). Besides, governments accumulate more 
debt during transitions, thereby leaving the burden to the next government.  
The oil price shocks and policies of developed countries and their banks are the external 
factors for foreign borrowing. Due to the Egypt-Israel war, the increase in oil prices during 
1973 and 1979 was one of the factors for the 1970s international debt crises. At that time, the 
non-oil-producing developing countries were knocked by macroeconomic imbalance. The fall 
in primary commodities TOT worsened the trade balance and made things complex. Because 
of the rise in oil price, the revenue of oil exporters increased, which was more than their 
demand. Hence, they deposited these “petrodollars” in the Eurodollar markets by OPEC 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) (Menbere 2004, Ali – Mustafa 2012).  
According to Suma (2007) and Dymski (2011), the developed countries and their banks' 
policies are other factors for the debt crisis during the 1970s and early 1980s. With the rise in 
oil price, oil exporter countries deposited a large amount of petrodollar, which is above their 
economy, in the banks of developed countries. On the contrary, developing countries needed 
funds for their economic development programs, which these banks 'recycled' in loans to 
developing countries.  
4.2.2. Empirical literature 
This section presents the empirical findings (studies) related to the topic. These studies 

















From 1970 to 
1988, Nigeria 
Deteriorating the TOT, the rise in 
foreign real interest rates, and a fall in 
industrial countries' growth increase 
external debt. However, the reverse is 






From 1970 to 
1995, Uganda 
An increase in the foreign interest rate, 
appreciation in the real effective 
exchange rate, deterioration of the 
fiscal position, and worsening of trade 
terms significantly worsens the debt to 
export ratio.  
Menbere 
(2004) 
 Random effects 
(RE) and Fixed 
effects (FE) 




Poverty (saving gap), income 
instability, debt service payment and 
capital flight are the leading causes of 
external borrowing. 
Greenidge 
et al. (2010)  
Dynamic OLS 




An increase in the output gap, the 
decline in government spending, a rise 
in the real effective exchange rate leads 
to a reduction in the stock of external 
debt, but the higher the difference 
between actual and expected 
government expenditure, and 
depreciation of currency leads to more 




From 1975 to 
2008, Tanzania 
Domestic factors such as budget deficit 
and low domestic saving have a 
significant share in explaining external 








The scope and 
case study 
Results 
as trade deficit, real exchange rate, and 
interest payment even though all are 
the causes of foreign debt. 




From 1972 to 
2008, Pakistan 
The fiscal deficit has no significant 
impact on external debt. However, 
three channels of uni-directional 
causality were found running from 
fiscal deficit to foreign debt, TOT to 


















Economic growth, Trade openness, 
liquid liability, and inflation reduces 
the debt burden. However, income 
inequality increases the external debt. 
Awan et al. 
(2014) 
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From 1976 to 
2010, Pakistan 
The budget deficit, nominal exchange 





and the Johansen 
cointegration test 
From 1986 to 
2010, Nigeria 
The debt service and exchange rate 
significantly increase external debt, 




From 1990 to 
2014, Jordan 
TOT lead to indebtedness in the long 
run. However, GDP per capita has a 





From 1970 to 
2013, Nigeria 
Oil price, exchange rate debt service, 
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are causes for external debt 
accumulation. 
Mensah et 
al. (2017)  
Accounting and 
panel VAR 




In the long run, external debt growth 
rates respond positively to changes in 
government investment spending, 
consumption spending, and domestic 
borrowings, while in the medium term, 
external debt growth rates respond 
negatively to a change in tax revenue, 




Pooled OLS and 
FE 
From 1975 to 
2012, 36 SSA 
countries 
Political factors – democratic 
governments accumulate more debt 
than autocratic, while countries which 
a parliamentary system accumulate 
more debt than presidential. However, 
constrained executives’ governments 
tend to accumulate less debt than 
unconstrained and countries with more 
open and competitive electoral systems 
are likely to accumulate less debt. 
Furthermore, other factors, such as 
GDP growth rates, trade openness, a 
dummy of HIPCs initiatives reduce 
external debt while real interest rate 







From 1981 to 
2012, Ethiopia 
Current account deficit, fiscal deficit, 
capital flight, debt service and the 
interest rate contributed to external 
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Results 
of the TOT significantly reduced 
external debt.  




From 1981 to 
2018, Nigeria 
Insecurity level and exchange rate 
significantly increase external debt 
while debt service and trade openness 
reduce it.  
Source: Constructed by the author 
Most of the studies in the determinants of external debt have some similarities, even 
though their time scope, case studies, and methodologies are different. However, only a few 
works, such as Menbere (2004), Greenidge et al. (2010), Bittencourt (2015), Mensah et al. 
(2017), and Chiminya – Nicolaidou (2018) used the panel data along with different 
methodologies. Also, only Menbere (2004), Mensah et al. (2017), and Chiminya – Nicolaidou 
(2018) examined it for the case of HIPCs and African countries. Menbere (2004) analyzed it 
for HIPCs and developing countries using static models of FE and RE 15 years ago. Mensah 
et al. (2017) and Chiminya – Nicolaidou (2018) are the latest studies, even though the first one 
focused only on African HIPCs while the latter focused on SSA countries. Generally, none of 
the studies considered serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and CD among the error terms in 
their estimation with static models. 
4.3.  Empirical results and discussion 
Econometric results, interpretations, and the theoretical and empirical support of this 
chapter are featured in this section. More specifically, the descriptive statistics, the CD test, 
unit root test, and the estimated determinants of external indebtedness are presented.  
4.3.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
The descriptive statistics of the variables in the models found in Table 4.2 and described 
as: the average value of the variables is indicated by the mean values. The distribution of the 
data from the mean value is also expressed by the standard deviation. Furthermore, the range 
of the variables (the difference between the maximum and the minimum value), showing the 
spread of data and being an indicator of the level of variation in the variables used for the study, 
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can be implicitly calculated from the table. Due to the different number of countries in the 
models, the number of observations (420 or 336) also varies. For both sampled countries, the 
range of the dependent variables is between 10.2 and 279, implying that the variation is not 
high since the variable is external debt. Similarly, the debt service variable has a mean of 3.44 
and 2.74 for HIPCs and HIPCS in SSA, respectively, and the range is between 0.06 and 47 for 
HIPCs and 0.06 and 20 for HIPCs in SSA (see Table 4.2 for other variables). 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ED 420(336) 57.88(55.63) 41.46(37.77) 10.23(10.23) 278.97(278.97) 
DSRN 420(336) 3.44(2.74)  3.42(2.42) 0.061(0.06) 47.1(19.9) 
IMP 420(336) 37.34(34.71) 15.46(14.06) 12.53(12.53) 84.76(84.76) 
EXP 420(336) 24.15(21.34) 12.24(10.18) 4.68(4.68) 59(56.13) 
FDI 420(336) 3.46(3.25) 5.5(5.97) -2.49(-2.13) 41.8(41.8) 
POP 420(336) 2.48(2.61) 1.17(1.25) -6.76(-6.76) 8.11(8.11) 
GDPGR 420(336) 3.79(3.78) 5.79(6.39) -50.24(-50.24) 35.22(35.22) 
INF 420(336) 31.9(9.10) 328.87(14.42) -9.15(-9.15) 5016.1(128.76) 
POLITY2 420(336) 1.87(0.46) 5.23(4.89) -8(-8) 9(9) 
GRMAC 420(336) 1.7(1.70) 1.40(1.40) -4.2(-4.2) 3.75(3.75) 
Note: the values in the bracket are for HIPCs in SSA; however, the other values are for HIPCs 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata15. 
4.3.2. Serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence, unit root, 
and cointegration tests 
The existence of serial correlation in linear panel-data models biases the standard errors 
and causes the results to be less efficient; researchers need to identify serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic error term in a panel-data model (Drukker 2003). Similarly, in many panel 
datasets, due to differences in the dependent variable scale between units, the variance among 
cross-sectional units can differ. Also, panel-data models probably include CD in the errors. 
Hence, this study conducted a serial correlation (using Wooldridge (2002) test), 
heteroscedasticity (using modified Wald test), and a CD test using Pesaran (2004) (see Table 
4.3). The result strongly rejects the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence, which 
means there is a CD in both models of HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA. However, the result fails to 
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reject the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence for the case of HIPCs in non-SSA. 
As a result, hereafter, this chapter only focuses on HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA. 
Table 4.3 Serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional dependence 
Serial correlation and heteroscedasticity tests 
Tests 











Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation 
210.179 0.000*** 626.352 0.000*** 116.90 0.000*** 
Heteroskedasticity: 
Modified Wald test for 
GroupWise 
Heteroskedasticity 
1559.62 0.000*** 429.01 0.000*** 1451.6 0.000*** 
Cross-Sectional Dependence test 
Tests HIPCs HIPCs in SSA HIPCs in non-SSA 
Pesaran's test of cross-
sectional independence 
10.028 7.999 -1.282 
The average absolute 
value of the off-diagonal 
elements 
0.313 0.286 0.157 
Probability 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.2000 
Note: * ⇒ presence of cross-sectional dependence; *** ⇒ presence of serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
Following the cross-sectional dependency test, the study checked the stationarity of the 
variables in the model. Due to the existence of CD in our models, this study uses the second-
generation panel unit root test – ‘CIPS’ test of Pesaran (2007) (see Table 4.4). The result fails 
to reject the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary) for all variables at a 1% level of 
significance at the first difference. Since all the variables are highly statistically significant at 
the first difference, we notice that all measures are integrated of order one (I (1)). Thus, we 
might expect there is a long-run connection between these variables collectively.  




CIPS (intercepts only) 
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DSRN -2.678*** -5.731*** -2.935*** -5.207*** 
IMP -2.528*** -4.843*** -2.539*** -4.877*** 
EXP -1.665 -4.618*** -1.635 -4.735*** 
FDI -3.293*** -5.544*** -3.433***   -5.662*** 
POP -1.910 -3.533*** -3.239*** -3.705*** 
GDPGR  -4.584*** -3.533*** -4.681*** -6.175*** 
INF -3.968 ***   -5.897*** -4.548*** -6.190*** 
POLITY2 -2.661*** -2.663*** -3.012***    -5.503*** 
GRMAC 2.610*** 2.610*** 2.610*** 2.610*** 
Note: ***⇒ significant (stationary) at 1% level. 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15. 
 
Following the unit root test, this study conducted a cointegration (long-run relationship) 
test and since our models have many variables, using McCoskey and Kao (1998) cointegration 
test. Table 4.5 shows a long-run relationship among the variables in both models of HIPCs and 
HIPCs in SSA at a 5% level of significance.  
Table 4.5 Panel cointegration test 
 HIPC HIPCs in SSA 
Statistic   p-value Statistic   p-value 
Modified Dickey-Fuller t -2.1792 0.0147** -3.9264 0.0000*** 
Dickey-Fuller t -1.8534   0.0319** -2.8336 0.0023*** 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -3.6145    0.0002*** -2.2659 0.0117** 
Unadjusted modified Dickey-Fuller t -3.0198 0.0013*** -4.3243 0.0000*** 
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t   -2.2408 0.0125** -2.9673 0.0015*** 
Note: **, *** ⇒ significant at 5% and 1% level, respectively. 




4.3.3. PCSE estimation results  
Even though HIPCs constitute Latin American countries, this chapter did not estimate 
the empirical model for HIPCs in non-SSA countries due to (1) the existence of CD in our 
model's errors (see Table 4.3). (2)  HIPCs in non-SSA are only three countries, and hence the 
observations will be n*T = 84. However, in econometrics, the minimum rule for estimation is 
5*parameters < observations. The parameters for three countries (n+T) are 31, and estimation 
for HIPCs in non-SSA did not fulfil the minimum rule of econometrics and hard to accept the 
estimated results. Therefore, this study estimated only for HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA using the 
PCSE regression (see Table 4.6). The result shows that debt services, imports and growth of 
major advanced countries significantly increase the external debt accumulation of HIPCs and 
HIPCs in SSA. A one percentage point increase in debt servicing leads to the rise of external 
debt of HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA by 5% and 6%, respectively. This is because the debt service 
payment incites further demand for external borrowing, especially when the debt service is 
announced suddenly. This result is similar to Menbere (2004), Adamu – Rasiah (2016), Beyene 
– Kotosz (2019). This study differs from Menbere (2004), which is the latest in time and 
methodology. For example, the current HIPCs are not similar to those 15 years ago. 
Furthermore, the methodologies (FE and RE) of Menbere (2004) cannot consider the dynamic 
nature of the variables with unobserved heterogeneity (for more details, see Hill et al. 2019), 
while this study considered the dynamic nature of the variable. Unlike Menbere (2004), this 
study also considered serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and CD among the error terms. 
Similarly, this study is different from Adamu – Rasiah (2016) and Beyene – Kotosz (2019), 
which examined a group of countries rather than one country case. Also, as for the result, this 
study coincides with the sign of our hypothesis and the theoretical framework. 
Equally, one percentage point rise in imports increases the indebtedness of HIPCs and 
HIPCs in SSA by 1.6% and 1.4%, respectively. When imports of goods and services increase, 
HIPCs lack foreign exchange and reserves to undertake different development. As a result, the 
countries are forced to borrow from abroad even at worth terms and loan conditions. This result 
also coincides with Menbere (2004). Also, a percentage point increase in major advanced 
countries' growth rate increases the external debt stock of HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA countries 
by 3.3% and 2.5%, respectively. This condition, for instance, happened during the 2007/8 
global financial crisis – when most developed counties were knocked by financial crises, their 
economy reduced and hence the external debt of HIPCs also declined – implying that when the 
economy of major advanced countries increases, they can borrow money to demanders, and 
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the external debt accumulation of HIPCs rises. Previous studies, such as Ajayi (1991) and 
Mbire –Atingi (1997) also included the growth rate of industrialized countries as an 
independent variable, even though its contribution is negative and insignificant, it makes our 
result different from the previous findings. Furthermore, this study is the latest and included 
many countries relative to Ajayi (1991) and Mbire – Atingi (1997).  
On the other hand, a one percentage point increase in goods and services exports reduces 
the indebtedness of HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA by 2% and 1.5%, respectively. When exports of 
HIPCs increase, they will have enough foreign exchange to fill the existing resource gap and 
hence their demand for external debt will reduce. Furthermore, this result is in line with our 
hypothesis, the sign of the theoretical framework and with the work of Greenidge et al. (2010) 
in the case of 12 Caribbean communities. Furthermore, the foreign direct investment and 
political stability significantly reduce the external debt of HIPCs but not HIPCs in SSA. A one 
percentage point rise in foreign direct investment and political stability reduces the external 
debt of HIPCs by 1% and 0.6%, respectively. Foreign direct investment can reduce the resource 
gap, especially the saving-investment gap of countries and hence their demand for overseas 
borrowing will reduce. Likewise, when countries have political stability, their overall economy 
will increase and then their resource gap declines, and finally, the external debt accumulation 
of countries will be reduced. Also, when countries have a stable political environment, the 
lenders expect (a guarantee) that borrowers can quickly repay their liability. Due to a stable 
political environment, the foreign direct investment will increase, and hence all these can 
reduce the external debt accumulation. However, surprisingly, both foreign direct investment 
and political stability are insignificant in reducing the external debt accumulation of HIPCs of 
SSA. This implies that the inflow of (the incumbent) foreign direct investment is not enough 
to reduce the external debt. Besides, due to frequent political instability in SSA, the countries 
use the resources for unproductive purposes. Hence, the countries' external indebtedness could 
not be reduced. Nevertheless, a one percentage point increment of inflation increases the 
external debt of HIPCs in SSA by 0.7 percentage points. 
Table 4.6 Estimated determinants of external indebtedness in HIPS and HIPCs in SSA 
Variables 
HIPC HIPCs in SSA 
Coefficient Std. Err Coefficient Std. Err 
DSRN 4.933*** 0.832 6.089*** 0.972 
IMP 1.663*** 0.216 1.481*** 0.215 
73 
 
EXP -2.027*** 0.240 -1.561*** 0.203 
FDI -1.044* 0.585 -0.855 0.539 
POP -0.303 1.330 1.878 1.212 
GDPGR 0.100 0.299 0.071 0.264 
INF 0.013 0.010 0.727*** 0.140 
POLITY2 -0.635* 0.269 -0.418 0.312 
GRMAC 3.309** 1.526 2.546* 2.547 
CONSTANT 26.857 5.74 7.644 6.764 
Note: *, **, *** ⇒ significant at 10 %, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
4.4.  Chapter summary 
Borrowing from abroad is a common characteristic of developing and emerging countries at 
the early stage of development. However, unmanageable and unsustainable external debt 
accumulation can adversely affect the macroeconomic variables and can be a bottleneck for the 
economy. This chapter thus examined the determinants of external indebtedness in the case of 
HIPCs using two models – HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA using panel time-series data ranging 
between 1990 and 2017. Therefore, this chapter set the following hypothesis – both internal 
and external factors determine the level of external debt of HIPCs. The study in this chapter 
partially filled the literature, methodological, and time gaps of previous studies by considering 
both HIPCs in Africa and non-Africa countries, taking serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, 
and CD into account, and employing PCSE estimation technique. For both models, the debt 
service, imports, and growth rate of major advanced countries significantly increase external 
debt. At the same time, exports reduce external debt. Furthermore, foreign direct investments 
and political stability significantly reduce the external debt of HIPCs, but these variables are 
insignificant in reducing the external debt for HIPCs in SSA. Therefore, based on the empirical 
result, this chapter fails to reject the hypothesis that both internal and external factors 








In recent years, the accumulation and sustainability issues in external debt have been 
exciting for researchers and policymakers in developing and emerging countries. However, 
external debt sustainability has not been addressed in HIPCs. Therefore, this chapter focused 
on examining the sustainability of external debt in HIPCs, especially after the 1990s initiative, 
employing an indicator-based, CPIA policy rating, and intertemporal approaches to the current 
account. To get robust and assertive results, in the intertemporal approach to the current 
account, this chapter classifies countries into three strata – HIPCs in general, HIPCs in SSA 
countries and HIPCs in non-SSA. For the indicator-based and CPIA policy rating approaches, 
this chapter used a sample of 36 HIPCs; however, 32 HIPCs were included for an intertemporal 
approach to the current account. The chapter begins with background information in section 
5.1. Section 5.2 reviews the literature about HIPC initiative, external debt sustainability and its 
approaches, and the study's theoretical framework along with empirical literature. Section 5.3 
presents descriptive results on external debt burden and debt servicing capacity (sustainability) 
indicators. The study's empirical results are presented and discussed in section 5.4. Section 5.5, 
the last section, provides a summary of the chapter.  
5.1.  Background of the study  
The IMF (1997, 17) defined external debt sustainability by saying that “A country can 
be said to achieve external debt sustainability if it can meet its current and future external debt 
service obligations in full, without recourse to debt rescheduling or the accumulation of arrears 
and without compromising growth.”  
External debt sustainability is a burning issue and a topic of debate due to the worldwide 
debt crisis in Latin America and other developing regions. External borrowing is increasing 
radically day by day and across the world, which implies there is no guarantee about the non-
existence of foreign debt crises in the future. Developing countries, including HIPCs, borrow 
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from abroad to finance their domestic investment (Bulut 2011), maintain economic growth, 
and refinance their existing debt. However, once the debt grows more prominent, 
unmanageable, and unsustainable, it becomes a major macroeconomic destabilizing factor and 
a severe bottleneck to the promotion of both domestic and foreign investment. 
Although debt has been substantially reduced after enhanced HIPC debt relief, debt 
sustainability has not been achieved for a long time. There are different interrelated factors, 
such as inappropriate eligibility criteria, unrealistic growth assumptions, insufficient provision 
of interim debt relief, delivery of HIPC debt relief through debt rescheduling, lack of creditor 
participation and financing problems, and currency-specific short-term discount rates, and their 
combination makes it unlikely that the enhanced HIPC initiative could remove the excess 
external debt (Gunter 2003). For example, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea were originally 
considered to be HIPCs but have been dropped from the list, as they were later considered to 
be no more IDA only countries. On the other hand, Malawi, Comoros, and Gambia have been 
added, as it became clear that their debt is higher than initially estimated. Besides, the Cote 
d’Ivoire criterion shows that the HIPC framework’s debt sustainability criteria were also 
heavily influenced by political considerations. Lack of using more comprehensive measures of 
poverty and indebtedness would give us a considerably different group of HIPCs. For example, 
using (a) the UNDP’s human poverty index for developing countries and the net present value 
(NPV) external debt-to-GNP ratio as reference criteria for poverty and overall external 
indebtedness, countries, such as Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Djibouti, El 
Salvador, Gabon, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe are all 
poorer and more indebted than Bolivia and Guyana, the two highest-ranking eligible HIPCs.  
According to IMF estimates, for 27 countries that reached their decision points, the NPV 
of the external debt-to-exports ratio was 274% before enhanced HIPC relief. Even though the 
IMF and WB argued that this ratio should not have exceeded 128% at the completion point in 
2005, after enhanced HIPC relief, some individual countries are still faced with ratios of debt 
to export earnings of over 150%, which exceeds the limit for debt sustainability set by the IMF 
and WB under the HIPC initiative. Furthermore, due to structural deficiencies (widespread 
unemployment, massive and frequent budgeted deficit, and fiscal cliff) in developing countries, 
several scholars contend that new external debt may be unsustainable in HIPCs (Yang – Nyberg 
2008; Beddies et al. 2009; Ellmers – Hulova 2013; Vaggi – Prizzon 2014). Hence, having a 
glance at the figures above, no one can understand whether this external borrowing will be a 
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blessing or a curse for the borrowing countries (Sheikh et al. 2014). To predict this, it is 
essential to analyze the sustainability of the external debt of HIPCs after the initiative. 
Regarding the recourse of foreign capital, there are two alternatives: either accepting or 
refusing external financing. The first option can be the choice due to the general argument that 
since there is limited national saving, foreign capital is vital for financing investments that are 
necessary for economic growth. Hence, it is ideal for a country to borrow from abroad if it can 
carry out profitable investment projects promising the intertemporal solvency of the country 
and thus to repay the debt later on. However, a major obstacle of borrower countries is external 
financing may not always be available easily. The second option is based on a national 
economy’s careful choice to emphasize the current account balance (Bayoumi 1990). This 
implies that current account surplus plays an important role in reducing foreign debt through 
its potential to increase a higher share of exports, promote job creation in export sectors, and 
increase the accumulation of foreign assets. This can also be due to the difficulty of depending 
on foreign financing, thus forcing economic agents to depend solely on their internal funding 
sources (Essayem 2015). However, the debt overhang theory of Krugman (1988), Sachs (1989) 
and Cohen (1995) state that when external debt reaches a certain level, foreign debt discourages 
consumption and investment; thus, there is declining growth of the economy, which causes 
external debt to rise further; hence, the focus will be on its sustainability (Essayem 2015).  
External debt sustainability has become a necessary condition for sustainable economic 
growth in open economies, and it is crucial to enhance the theoretical expansion as well as the 
advancement of world economies in the third millennium. That is why this analysis is 
significant for the economic development of any economy, which is considered as the primary 
function of financial capital availability, among other factors. Countries that face a shortage of 
domestic financial capital can finance development by dint of the countries’ access to the 
international financial markets and the international lending institutions. These countries 
borrow from other countries to finance their projects (Sheikh et al. 2014). Unlike neo-classical 
models, such as Modigliani – Miller (1958), who argue that there is full availability of finance 
in the development process, Kalecki (1937, 1990) believes that there is a shortage of finance 
for growth. Regarding this, Sawyer (1999) discussed the Kaleckian analysis about the 
importance of financial markets in the growth process and how the expansion of an economy 
is financed. The investment equations in the Kaleckian model include the influence of profits, 
which could be seen to reflect views about the roles of internal versus external finance. Kalecki 
suggested that the financial system as largely passive in its relations with the real sector because 
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of lending to individual enterprises is limited by the principle of increasing risk (Kalecki 1937), 
which means finance is not readily available to all enterprises at the single prevailing price 
(Sawyer 1996; 1999). 
Therefore, the general objective of this chapter is to analyze the external debt 
sustainability using panel data in the case of HIPCs after the 1990s initiative. This chapter 
attempts to conduct an external debt sustainability analysis using both descriptive data and 
econometrics for HIPCs. This chapter used three categories to test the sustainability of external 
debt: indicator-based and CPIA policy rating approaches (descriptive statistics) and an 
intertemporal approach to the current account using the econometrics (empirical) approach. 
Besides, unlike other findings in the literature, our study fills the time gap by considering the 
situations after and before the 2007/8 global financial crisis.  Furthermore, this chapter differs 
from others in filling the literature (knowledge) and scope gap, focusing on the most concerned 
countries which experienced excessive external debt accumulation and qualified for repeated 
debt cancellations and reliefs. 
5.2.  Literature review 
This section presents the literature about the HIPC initiative, external debt sustainability 
and its approaches, and the theoretical framework of the study. Additionally, it discusses the 
empirical literature. 
5.2.1. HIPC initiative 
Due to the unsustainability of external debt in HIPCs, the HIPC initiative was launched 
in the mid-1990s, aiming to reduce the debt burden of developing countries. Long-term debt 
sustainability had been brought to the point of being a leading economic decision in the 1980s. 
The issue of external debt sustainability was addressed through several schemes. The Paris 
Club debt treatment of Toronto (1988), London (1991) and Naples (1995) were the leading 
schemes, and the IMF and the WB HIPCs Initiatives (HIPC I and II) and the Multilateral Debt 
Reduction Initiatives (MDRI) were the other structures (Isar 2012).  
HIPC I (launched in 1996) and HIPC II (in 1999) were prominent schemes. These 
initiatives became unique because of the involvement of multilateral institutions, such as the 
IMF and the WB (Spratt 2007). The initiatives went through two stages – the HIPC I (original 
HIPC) and the HIPC II (enhanced HIPC) (Isar 2012). 
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HIPC I was started in response to increasing pressure of debt relief for HIPCs. It also 
aimed to end repeated rescheduling of debts (Addison et al. 2004; Isar 2012). Initially, it was 
planned to reduce the debt burden of the poorest economies. To be qualified for debt relief, the 
macroeconomic policy of developing countries had to appear to be robust from the IMF and 
WB perspective, and many complex criteria had to be met (Esquivel et al. 1998; Isar 2012). 
Three years later, the HIPC initiative was enhanced. HIPC I was improved and 
represented as the enhanced HIPC, or HIPC II (Isar 2012; Mustapha – Prizzon 2014). The new 
initiative had three key objectives: ensuring debt sustainability, providing a permanent exit 
from rescheduling, and ensuring an increasing long-term growth rate by removing overhung 
debts & reducing the poverty rate by reducing cash debt-service payments (Gautam 2003).  
HIPC II has two stages: firstly, countries should complete a three-year term of good 
economic performance and a strategy paper on sustained poverty reduction. Then the WB and 
the IMF can decide the sustainability of the countries’ debt (Forum on Debt and Development 
2004). After three years, if the countries’ debt is considered unsustainable, they move on to the 
second stage, and creditors pledge the delivery of debt relief to the floating completion point. 
Finally, if the second stage is considered fruitful, the process reaches the completion point 
(Gautam 2003; Forum on Debt and Development 2004; Spratt 2007; Isar 2012). 
5.2.2. External debt sustainability and its approaches 
A country’s external debt can be sustainable if the country can complete all its current 
and future debt-service payments without having to restructure its debt and without impairing 
its economic growth prospects. Figure 5.1 shows the detailed structure of external debt 










Figure 5.1 External Debt Sustainability Approaches  
 
Sources: Author’s construction based on Ossemane (2007) and Sheikh et al. (2014) 
The financial sustainability perspective-based approaches are mainly concerned with the 
financial position of the borrowing country regarding the repayment of its debt (Sheikh et al. 
2014). It has two types of approach: borrower- and lender-based approaches. The borrower-
based approach focuses on the behavior of the borrowing country concerning its capacity and 
willingness to retire its external debt obligations. It also concentrates on the internal and 
external gaps which the borrower country faces. These gaps ultimately determine the debt 
capacity of a country (Ossemane 2007; Sheikh et al. 2014). The lender approach, on the other 
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hand, focuses on the lenders’ liquidity and investment alternatives available in international 
markets (Ossemane 2007).  
Borrower-based financial sustainability is classified into three types of model: threshold, 
debt optimizing, and non-optimizing models. The threshold models are based on the notion of 
a non-linear relationship between external debt and growth. According to these models, there 
are one or more critical levels of external debt sustainability indicators. When external debt 
reaches these levels, it hampers the economic activity and turns out to be detrimental to 
economic growth and considered to be unsustainable, and the reverse is true when it is below 
these levels (Sheikh et al. 2014). According to Nasa (2009), concerning the method of 
determination of the threshold level, the threshold models are divided into two categories: 
exogenous threshold and endogenous threshold models.  
The exogenous threshold models include the models which are built using the concept of 
a non-linear relationship between external debt and growth, and the use of the critical levels of 
external debt to analyze the sustainability of external debt. However, these models do not 
determine the critical levels of endogenously and specifically to the country. Widely used 
exogenous threshold models include the interaction debt dummy model, the linear spline 
model, and the Low-Income Countries Debt Sustainability Framework (LIC-DSF) indicator-
based approach (Sheikh et al. 2014). But the endogenous threshold models determine the 
threshold level of debt endogenously. Hansen’s threshold model (1999, 2000) is the 
predominant and most accurate category of this model, which does not require a specific 
functional form for applying the methodology of estimating the coefficients and the threshold 
level of debt simultaneously. However, the Hansen models in the strict sense of endogeneity 
of threshold variables do not resolve or address the potential endogeneity issues such as reverse 
causation between the dependent variable and the threshold variable. In Hansen, thresholds are 
assumed exogenous, even though they are not imposed or selected from outside the model. The 
exogeneity here means the thresholds are not allowed to, for example, bear reverse causation 
with the dependent variable. However, newer models addressing threshold endogeneity have 
been developed by Seo – Shin (2016) (Seo et al. 2019). 
The other kind of financial sustainability perspective, which is based on the borrower-
based approach, is the debt optimizing model. This model deals with the question of the optimal 
level of debt and how much a country should borrow so that the mobilized resources would be 
beneficial for the country after retiring the debt. The underlying notion in these models is 
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similar to the threshold models, but these models determine the optimal level of debt where the 
marginal cost of external borrowing is equal to the marginal benefit. If the marginal cost of 
external borrowing is higher than its marginal benefit, it is beneficial for a borrower not to 
borrow, and vice versa (Sheikh et al. 2014). 
The last type of borrower-based financial perspective of external debt sustainability is 
the non-optimizing debt model (Sheikh et al. 2014). These models examine the sustainability 
of particular debt situations and policies in light of the expected future growth path of the 
economy. The non-optimizing models are classified into two groups. The growth-cum-debt 
model and its derivative (the debt cycle model) are extensions of the intertemporal 
borrowing/lending model to multiple periods (Nissanke – Ferrarini 2001). Similarly, the debt 
dynamic model compares the benefits from external borrowing to its costs, but unlike the 
growth-cum-debt model (which focuses on domestic capacity), it considers the value of exports 
as the best indicator of the repayment capacity of a country (Sheikh et al. 2014). This approach 
directly addresses the issue of the borrowing country’s external solvency by taking the 
country’s external performance into account while neglecting the domestic savings-investment 
gap (Nissanke – Ferrarini 2001).  
The financial sustainability perspective approach can be analyzed by the lender-based 
approach/Intertemporal Budget Constraint (IBC). According to the IBC debt sustainability 
model, the external debt of a country is considered to be sustainable if the country satisfies the 
condition of no Ponzi Game, which requires the equivalence of actual external debt and present 
discounted value of the country’s future trade surpluses (Sheikh et al. 2014). 
5.2.3. Empirical literature  
This section presents the empirical literature about external debt sustainability. Table 5.1 
displays the authors’ names together with the year, their model, the time scope of their case 








Table 5.1 Empirical Review 
Author Name and 
Year 




Mohammadi et al.  
(2007) 
Cointegration, ECM, and 
threshold and momentum 
threshold autoregressive 
models 
From 1962 to 
2003, Turkey 
Sustainable 




with an autoregressive 
unit 
From 1990:Q1 to 
2007:Q2, Turkey 
Unsustainable 
Emilia – Emilian 
(2008) 
Phillips Perron unit root 
test and OLS regression 
Monthly data from 





Mahmood et al.  
(2009) 
Debt ratios and debt 
sustainability conditions 
approach 
From 1971 to 2008, 
Pakistan 
Sustainable 
Boengiu et al. (2011) Quantile autoregression 
model 
From 1990: Q4 to 
2010: Q4,  
Romanian 
Sustainable  
Nasir – Noman (2012) Non-linear ADF unit root 
test 
From 1973 to 2008, 
36 and 55 countries 
Sustainable 
Lau et al. (2013) Intertemporal budget 
constraint model 
From 1981 to 2010, 
19 Asian countries 
Sustainable 
Lin (2014) Quantile autoregression 
model and ADF 
regression model 
From 1980: Q1 to 
2013: Q3, 21 
OECD countries 
Unsustainable 
Sheikh et al. (2014) Panel unit root test and 
Engle–Granger residual-
based panel cointegration 
approach 






Essayem (2015) Unit root and causality 
test 
From 1983 to 2010, 
Tunisia  
Sustainable  
Kiran (2015) Multiple structural break 
model 
From 1970 to 2010, 
Turkey 
Unsustainable  
Goktas – Hepsag 
(2015) 
Periodic unit root test 
with a structural break 
From 1990:Q1 to 
2012:Q3, Turkey  
Unsustainable 
Llorca (2017) Panel unit root and 
cointegration test  
From 1993 to 2014, 




Source: Constructed by the author  
Although empirical studies on external debt sustainability followed different 
methodologies – case study and time scope – most studies found sustainability of external debt 
(Mohammadi et al. 2007; Mahmood et al. 2009; Boengiu et al. 2011; Nasir – Noman 2012; 
Lau et al. 2013; Essayem 2015; Llorca 2017), while some confirmed external debt as 
unsustainable (Yilanci – Özcan 2008; Lin 2014; Sheikh et al. 2014; Kiran 2015; Goktas – 
Hepsag 2015). 
 
Table 5.1 also shows that few studies, e.g., Mohammadi et al. (2007); Yilanci – Özcan 
(2008); Emilia – Emilian (2008) did not consider the period after the 2007/8 global financial 
crisis. Even though others tried to conduct analysis after the financial crisis, the latest study of 
Llorca (2017) examined the topic only until 2014. Unlike others, our study combined the time 
scope before as well as after the crisis with the latest dataset, which can fill the time gap in the 
literature. Besides, the previous empirical papers did not consider the most vulnerable regions 
(HIPCs) and countries which experienced excessive external debt accumulation and qualified 
for repeated debt cancellations and reliefs. This implies studies concerning external debt 
sustainability for concerned countries is given limited attention, which leads to a knowledge 
(literature) gap. Hence, investigating the sustainability external debt situation in the case of 
HIPCs is a critical research area and vital to providing policy recommendations. Furthermore, 
except for few, the scope of most studies is limited to a single country case, and hence their 
finding and recommendations cannot represent the broad regions in which they are located. 
Nevertheless, our study differs from others by incorporating a broad group of countries 
stratified into three sub-groups along with both descriptive and econometric findings. 
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5.2.4. Theoretical framework of the study  
There are two types of approaches (financial sustainability perspective and economic 
sustainability) in analyzing the sustainability of external debt. The financial sustainability 
approach alone can be examined by three different methods: borrower, lender, and 
comprehensive approaches. However, this study focused only on the borrower approach.  
5.2.4.1.  Indicator-based approach and the intertemporal approach to the current 
account 
Although there are few prominent studies – Bulut (2011) and Ibhagui (2018) – related to 
the relationship (link) between external debt and the current account, the issue of external debt 
sustainability using the current account approach is not investigated. However, this study used 
two different approaches to analyze the debt sustainability of HIPCs. The first approach is the 
threshold debt ratios (indicator-based) approach. The second approach based on theoretical 
models derives debt sustainability conditions of external debt. This approach is based on the 
framework of the intertemporal approach to the current account. According to Llorca (2017), 
some of the available empirical studies about external debt sustainability are based on the 
intertemporal approach to the current account. Llorca’s benchmark was Husted (1992), who 
offered a simple small-economy framework in which a representative household can borrow 
and lend freely in international financial markets at a given world rate of interest. Individuals 
or countries may acquire debt to increase short-run consumption (Arnade et al. 1989). 
Regarding this, Winters (1985) believes that countries assume debt to increase imports when 
there are liquidity constraints. Besides, Eaton – Gersovitz (1980) claim that countries use 
international loans as much as households use credit cards. Like households, countries can 
consume beyond their budget by acquiring debt. Countries also pay off internationally acquired 
debt out of their export earnings just as households pay off debt out of income (Arnade et al.  
1989). Studies show that most developing countries prefer and find it easier to borrow from 
abroad than domestically. For example, in SSA countries, unlike domestic loans, the foreign 
loan is highly concessional. Although numerous countries have a medium or long-term 
domestic debt, in most cases, it stems from loans imposed on terms that were incompatible 
with market conditions, implying that external borrowing has lower interest rates compared to 
domestic.  Moreover, due to the low saving rate in SSA countries, loanable funds are very 
limited. Furthermore, institutions, such as insurance companies and the social security system 
were supposed to generate financial surpluses, but some of them invested in government 
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securities (Beaugrand et al. 2002). Therefore, domestic borrowing in SSA is not easily possible, 
effective, and sufficient, and hence countries prefer to look for external borrowing.      
The household faces the following current period budget constraint: 
𝐶0 = 𝑌0 + 𝐵0 − 𝐼0 − (1 + 𝑟0)𝐵−1                                                                              (27) 
where C0 and Y0 represent current consumption and output, respectively. Furthermore, 
B0 and I0 represent international borrowing and investment, respectively. Also, 𝑟0 is the one-
period world interest rate and (1 + 𝑟0) 𝐵−1 is the initial debt of the representative agent, 
corresponding to the country’s external debt.  
Equation (27) must hold for every time period. According to Husted (1992), iterating 
(27) forward yields the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint. 





𝛿𝑛𝐵𝑛                                                                                             (28) 
where 𝛿𝑡 = ∏ 𝜌𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=1  where 𝜌𝑠 = 1/(1 + 𝑖𝑠). 𝑇𝐵𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡 − 𝑀𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 represents 
the trade balance, 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑀𝑡 are exports and imports, respectively, while δt is the discount 
factor and the subscript n is the nth period.  
Equation (28) implies that the amount a country borrows or lends in international markets 
equals the present value of the future trade surpluses or deficits, assuming the last term equals 
zero. If the limit term is nonzero and 𝐵0 is positive, then it implies “bubble financing” of 
external debt, while a negative 𝐵0 suggests the country could improve welfare by lending less 
(Binatli – Sohrabji 2012). 
The necessary and sufficient condition for external sustainability is that as n → ∞, the 




𝛿𝑛𝐵𝑛 = 0                                                                                                                                   (29)  
Equation (29) implies that to finance the trade deficit (surplus) a country cannot borrow 
(lend) indefinitely. If this transversality condition holds, then the amount a country borrows 
(lends) equals the present value of the future trade surplus (deficits) (Llorca 2017). 
Assuming that the world interest rate is stationary, Husted (1992) expresses (28) as: 
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𝑍𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡−1 = 𝑋𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡                                                                                                         (29𝑎) 
Where 𝑍𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡 + (𝑟1 − 𝑟)𝐵𝑡−1. When we solve Equation (29a) forward as Hakkio – Rush 
(1991), we obtain the following equation. 




[∆𝑋𝑡+𝑗 − ∆𝑍𝑡+𝑗] + lim
𝑗→∞




 , the interest rate 𝑟1 is stationary around the mean 𝑟 (taken around the zero 
mean). The left-hand side consists of spending on imports and interest payments (receipts) on 
net foreign debt (assets).  If we subtract 𝑋𝑡 from both sides, the left-hand side becomes the 
economy’s current account 




[∆𝑋𝑡+𝑗 − ∆𝑍𝑡+𝑗] + lim
𝑗→∞
𝜆𝑡+𝑗𝐵𝑡+𝑗                                                             (29𝑐) 
Assuming that X and Z are non-stationary at level, but the first differences of them are 
stationary, and that the last right-hand term of Equation (29c) is zero, then Equation (29c) will 
be Llorca’s (2017) Equation. 




[∆𝑋𝑡+𝑗 − ∆𝑍𝑡+𝑗]                                                                                (30) 
Given the right-hand variables from Equation (30) are the first-difference stationary, the 
left-hand side must be stationary in order to satisfy the present-value external constraint. Thus, 
𝑀𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 must be examined for stationarity. If 𝑀𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 are I(1), then they must be 
cointegrated so that the current account deficit is stationary (Llorca 2017). Due to problems 
with data availability, however, this study used different sources of data for current account 
balance and export and imports (trade balance). Nevertheless, some studies in the literature, 
such as Osakwe – Verick (2007) and Moussa (2016) show that exports and imports (trade 
balance) play a dominant part of the current account balance in many SSA countries. Similarly, 
evidence shows that SSA had current account deficits from 1986 until 2000, when large shifts 
in the trade balance contributed to sizeable current account deficits. The region also 
experienced current account deficits in the period between 2001 and 2003 and from 2008 to 
2013. Besides, SSA had trade surpluses in the period between 1985 and 1990; this was due to 
the reduction in imports as a result of the goal of structural adjustment policies to have a trade 
surplus. Also, between 2000 and 2008, SSA had a trade surplus because of a strong flow in 
87 
 
exports (Moussa 2016). Therefore, from the evidence above, and because most HIPCs are 
found in SSA countries, we might consider that the trade balance is the dominant part of the 
current account balance in the countries that have been analyzed. Thus, a test for the 
sustainability of the external debt can be concluded to check the cointegration of these two 
variables, 𝑀𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 – if they are I(1). This cointegration regression takes the following form: 
 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                                                                    (31) 
Formally, if 𝑀𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 are I(1), the null hypothesis is that 𝑀𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 are cointegrated and 
b = 1. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then the external debt is said to be sustainable 
(Llorca 2017). 
Hence, this study followed the theoretical framework of Husted (1992) and Llorca (2017) 
to analyze the external debt sustainability of HIPCs.  
5.3.  External debt burden, debt servicing capacity (sustainability) indicators, and 
CPIA policy rating 
In 2005, the WB, in collaboration with the IMF, developed the debt sustainability 
framework, aiming to support low-income and developing countries in their struggles to attain 
the Millennium Development Goals without generating future debt problems and to place 
countries that have received debt relief under the HIPC initiative on a sustainable path (WB 
2019). The Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) was reviewed twice (in 2012 and 2017) with 
different values of indicators (see Table 5.2). The new framework was developed in September 
2017 and has been implemented since July 2018 (IMF 2019). However, these DSFs are for 
low-income countries (LICs). Since this study focuses on HIPCs and different alternative 
options for debt burden thresholds, we used the “narrower band with upper bound equivalent 
to the HIPC initiative threshold approach set by the IMF in 2005”. This debt sustainability 
framework classifies countries into one of three debt-carrying capacity categories (strong, 
medium, and weak) using CPIA policy rating. Countries with values in strong categories imply 
that these countries, with sound macroeconomic performance, policies, and institutions, can 





Table 5.2 Indicative External Debt Burden Indicators (in %), Debt Burden, and CPIA under 
Narrower Band with Upper Bound Equivalent to HIPC Initiative Threshold  
 
Quality of Policies and Institutions 
NPV of External Debt in % 
of 
External Debt 
Service in % of 
GDP Exports Revenue Export Revenue 
Weak policy (CPIA ≤ 3.25 20 50 150 10 20 
Medium policy (3.25 < CPIA < 3.75) 30 100 200 15 25 
Strong policy (CPIA ≥ 3.75) 40 150 250 20 30 
Source: IMF 2005 
Table 5.3 External Debt Burden, Servicing Capacity Indicators, and CPIA in All Post-
completion-point HIPCs23+24 (see IMF 2019), 2000 to 2018 
Years EDT/GDP EDT/XGS TDS/XGS  Average CPIA 
2000 25.39 353.535 14.545 --- 
2001 26.55 342.210 12.244 --- 
2002 27.78 313.512 12.161 --- 
2003 28.36 291.532 10.232 --- 
2004 29.5 249.492 8.903 --- 
2005 29.9 202.410 7.764 3.083 
2006 29.2 130.624 6.561 3.069 
2007 29 115.978 7.426 3.138 
2008 28.8 99.372 6.952 3.208 
2009 25.6 124.727 6.440 3.277 
2010 29 95.525 4.976 3.333 
2011 32.9 81.208 4.427 3.388 
2012 32.3 80.917 4.315 3.444 
2013 29.65 94.975 4.989 3.472 
2014 28.9 102.910 5.919 3.5138 
2015 25.68 133.293 7.439 3.472 
                                                          
23 Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia (IMF 2019). 
24 Afghanistan, Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
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2016 24 148.064 9.772 3.291 
2017 25.8 143.910 10.249 3.236 
2018 20.2 180.155 14.023 3.152 
2019 --- --- --- 3.097 
Source: Computed by the author using WB 2019  
Total external debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (EDT/GDP) is one of the 
indicators which measures the external debt sustainability and macroeconomic and institutional 
performance in handling external debt accumulation. The result shows that the EDT/GDP value 
was above the weak indicator value (20), and also, in 2011/12, it exceeded the medium 
indicator. Since HIPCs external debt as a percentage of GDP shows over the lower and medium 
(in 2011/12), their debt considered unsustainable (see Table 5.3). 
Moreover, between 2000 and 2003, the total external debt as a percentage of the export 
of goods and services (EDT/XGS) shows that HIPCs had very high external debt and 
categorized in the above strong threshold. However, in 2004 and 2005, HIPCs external debt as 
a percentage of the export of goods and services reduced but was still above a medium threshold 
level. Surprisingly, there was no time that the magnitude of EDT/XGS of HIPCs went below 
the weak threshold level. Therefore, this indicator was breaching the thresholds; it suggests 
that HIPCs have budgetary problems in servicing their debt, leading to unsustainable state (see 
Table 5.3). 
Initially, the total debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services 
(TDS/XGS) of HIPCs was above the lower threshold (10) level. However, from 2004 to 2016, 
it went below the lower threshold level. Similar to the early 2000s, the TDS/XGS started to 
breach the lower threshold (see Table 5.3). The other external debt sustainability indicator is 
total external debt as a percent of revenue (EDT/REV). However, due to difficulties in getting 
revenue data, this study did not use the indicator for the analysis.  
According to OIC Outlook Series (2012), debt stress (unsustainability) depends not only 
on the debt indicators of the present value approach but also on other macroeconomic 
fundamentals such as the quality of institutions. Debt sustainability can be affected by 
institutional factors through policy credibility and consistency (Manasse et al. 2003). The CPIA 
can be a proxy variable for institutional quality. According to the World Bank Groups (2019), 
the CPIA debt policy rating examines whether the debt management strategies of countries are 
efficient to reduce budgetary risks and provides debt sustainability in the long run.  
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Due to the lack of availability of the data, unlike the present value approach, this study 
analyzed HIPCs debt sustainability from 2005. The result shows that the average CPIA was 
below 3.25 between 2005 and 2008, which means HIPCs had weak macroeconomic 
performance and policies and institutions in general. However, there were some improvements 
to medium institutional quality between 2008 and 2016, while from 2017 to 2019, HIPCs 
turned to weak performance in handling the debt accumulation (see Table 5.3).  
5.4. Empirical results and discussion 
Econometric results and their interpretations, along with the theoretical and empirical 
support of the study, are presented in this section. More specifically, it includes descriptive 
statistics, the CD test, unit root test and the cointegration tests.  
5.4.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
The descriptive statistics of the variables of the external debt sustainability model for 
HIPCs, HIPCs in SSA and HIPCs in non-SSA countries are presented in Table 5.5. The 
justification behind evaluating external debt sustainability in HIPCs in SSA and HIPCS in non-
SSA is that around 30 out of 36 countries of HIPCs are found in SSA, but the remaining ones 
are found in Latin America and Asian countries. Since these groups are located in different 
continents, they may have different macroeconomic policies and institutional structures to 
handle external debt stock. Besides, even though the share of the total external debt of Asia 
and Latin American countries is small, their per capita foreign debt is higher than the per capita 
debt of other regions of HIPCs. Furthermore, we must check the robustness of the result of 
HIPCs by examining for HIPCs in SSA and non-SSA countries. 
Due to the different number of sampled countries in the models, the number of 
observations is 576 (for HIPCs), 486 (for HIPCs in SSA), and 90 (for HIPCs in non-SSA). For 
both HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA models, the current account range is between -84 and 19.6, 
showing that the variation is not high because the variable is the current account deficit. 
However, the range of HIPCs in non-SSA countries is between -18.3 and 12.2. The mean value 
of the external debt variable is around 46.5 for HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA, while it is 48.8 for 
HIPCs in non-SSA. Besides, it ranges between 8.6 and 288 for HIPCs and HIPCs of SSA, 
whereas the range is between 11 and 104 for HIPCs in non-SSA (see Table 5.5 for other 
variables). 
Table 5.5. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
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Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
CA   576 (486) 90 -7.06(-7.41)-5. 9.2(9.6)6.13 -84.10(-84.1) -18.3 19.67(19.67) 12.2 
ED 576 (486) 90 46.8(46.5)48.8 35.2(36.8)24.9 8.60(8.6) 11.1 288.3(288.33) 104 
IMP 576 (486) 90 43.3(40.6) 57.5 23.5(23) 20.7 13.05(13.05) 25.2 236.3(236.39)110.6 
EXP 576 (486) 90 29.3(27.4)39.5 16.4(14.9) 19.9 6.04(6.04) 12.12 96.07 (94.03) 96.07 
Note: the first, second, and third values in the table are for HIPCs, HIPCs in SSA and HIPCs 
in non-SSA countries, respectively.  
Source: Computed using Stata 15. 
 
5.4.2. Unit root, cross-sectional dependence and cointegration tests 
This study conducted the CD test using the Pesaran (2004) test and found the null 
hypothesis of cross-sectional independence rejected at a 1% level of significance in both HIPCs 
and HIPCs in SSA (see Table 5.6). Hence, it is a must to employ the second-generation panel 
unit root test. However, except for external debt, the result fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
cross-sectional independence in HIPCs in non-SSA for other variables (current account, 
exports, and imports). The existence of cross-sectional independence only on one variable does 
not represent the whole model. Thus, to clearly understand the model, we need a further 
cointegration test. Therefore, this study tested the cointegration for the whole model by 
including all variables collectively. The result shows the test fails to reject the null hypothesis 
of cross-sectional independence at a 1% level of significance in HIPCs in non-SSA, suggesting 
the presence of cross-sectional independence in this sub-group (see Table 5. 6). In this case, to 






Table 5.6 Pesaran (2004) Test for Cross-sectional Dependence 
Panel Variables 
(% of GDP) 
CD-test P-value 
HIPCs  Current account 8.884 0.0000 
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Further cross-sectional dependence tests for HIPCs of non-SSA using Stata 
Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence                                         (1.701) 
The average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements                        (0.254) 
Probability                                                                                               (0.0890) 
Source: computed using EViews 10 and Stata 15 
 
Following the CD test, the study examined the stationarity of variables in the model. Due 
to the presence of CD, this study used the Pesaran (2007) CIPS test for HIPCs and HIPCs in 
SSA (see Table 5.7). 




CIPS result (only intercept) Critical Values 
Levels 1st diff. 































 Note: the values in brackets are for HIPCs in SSA; however, the other values are for HIPCs 
*, *** ⇒ Significant at the 10 and 1 % level, respectively. 
Source: Computed using Stata 15 
 
The results in Table 5.7 show that the current account and external debt are stationary at 
a level at 1 % level of significance, which is a necessary condition (but not sufficient) for 
external debt sustainability. However, imports and exports are significant at the first difference, 
and hence we can proceed to the next step to examine the sustainability of external debt using 
the panel cointegration test between exports and imports. Therefore, the study checked the 
long-run relationships among the variables in the models using Westerlund (2007) 
cointegration test due the presence of CD and only two variables (exports and imports) in the 
model (see Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8 Westerlund (2007) Panel Cointegration Test between Exports and Imports 





















-11.00 (-10.95)   
-5.432 (-5.988) 
 
1.086 (0.025)  
3.230 (2.495) 
 





Note: the values in brackets are for HIPCs in SSA; however, the other values are for HIPCs  
Source: computed using Stata 15. 
The Gt and Ga statistics test whether cointegration exists for at least one individual series. 
The pt and pa statistics pool information over all the individual series to test whether 
cointegration exists for the panel as a whole. To account for cross-section interdependence, the 
robust p-value is computed with bootstrapping with 100 replications. For both HIPCs and 
HIPCs in SSA, our result fails to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between exports 
and imports (see Table 5.8). Therefore, we can conclude that external debt is unsustainable in 
both HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA countries.  
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However, the CD test in Table 5.6 confirmed that there is no CD in the case of HIPCs in 
non-SSA. Hence, this study used the first-generation panel unit root test for HIPCs of non-SSA 
(see Table 5.9).  
Table 5.9 First-generation Panel Unit Root Test  
Variables (in 
% of GDP) 
LLC IPS ADF  
level 1st diff level 1st diff level 1st diff 
CA -2.86*** -6.11*** -2.15*** -5.629*** 19.72** 47.1*** 
ED -2.124** -4.93*** -2.44*** -3.85*** 24.04*** 32.67*** 
IMP -1.79** -7.7*** -0.379 -6.26*** 8.93 51.49*** 
EXP -0.929 -5.12*** 0.443 -4.725*** 5.40 38.88*** 
**, *** ⇒ Significant at the 5 and 1 % level, respectively. 
Source: Computed using EViews 10. 
 
The panel unit root test in Table 4.9 shows that for all types of tests, none of the variables 
are stationary at a level at 1 % level of significance but stationary at first difference. This is an 
indication of the existence of an unsustainable external debt. However, to confirm it, we have 
to conduct the cointegration test for all I(1) variables in general and between exports and 
imports in particular. Therefore, since there is cross-sectional independence and a small 
number of variables in the model, this study employed the Pedroni residual-based test.   
Table 5.10 Pedroni Cointegration Test for HIPCs in Non-SSA 







-0.03(0.35) 0.512(0.361) 0.085(0.172) 0.465(0.431) 
Panel rho 
statistic 
0.779(0.06) 0.782(0.525) 0.677(-0.13) 0.751(0.448) 
Panel PP 
statistic 
-0.430(-0.053) 0.333(0.478) -0.738 (-0.19) 0.23(0.424) 
Panel ADF 
statistic 















*, ** ⇒ Significant at the 10 and 5 % level, respectively.  
Note: the values in brackets are the cointegration result between exports and imports; however, 
the other values are the result for all I (1) variables  
Source: Computed by the author using EViews 10. 
 
In this model, employing the Pedroni cointegration test for all I(1) variables, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration fails to be rejected at a 1 % level of significance for HIPCs in 
non-SSA (see Table 4.10). Similarly, the cointegration test between exports and imports fails 
to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at a 1 % level of significance. Therefore, the 
above cointegration results among all I(1) variables and between exports and imports lead us 
to conclude that external debt is not sustainable in these countries.  
To summarize our results, all the indicator-based, CPIA policy rating, and the 
intertemporal approach to the current account confirmed that external debt is not sustainable in 
HIPCs. There are different reasons for this: failure of domestic policies to develop robust and 
stable economies, whereby critical industries fail to develop and generate sufficient export 
earnings; weak (ineffective) public finance, leading governments to look for additional 
overseas borrowing; persistent budget deficits due to excessive spending on unproductive 
sectors and limited revenue because of limited tax bases; collapse in primary and semi-finished 
commodity prices, leading to reduced export revenues and increased need to borrow; and a rise 
in the oil price, which may lead to an adverse effect on economies which are dependent on oil 
imports and hence need to borrow more to finance their development. Moreover, the findings 
of chapter three also confirmed that an increase in debt service, an increase in imports, a 
reduction in exports and a reduction in foreign direct investment, and political instability lead 
to resource gap in HIPCs Therefore, all these reasons and empirical evidence led countries to 
demand more foreign borrowing, and their debt accumulation became unsustainable. 
Furthermore, even though the case studies are different, our results are in line with other 
findings, such as those from Yilanci – Özcan (2008), Lin (2014), Sheikh et al. (2014), Kiran 
(2015) and Goktas – Hepsag (2015). 
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5.5.  Chapter Summary  
External debt sustainability is vital in achieving a stable macroeconomic environment 
and sustainable economic growth. Due to unsustainability of external debt in HIPCs, there were 
two main initiatives – HIPC I (original HIPC) and HIPC II (enhanced HIPC) – in the 1990s. 
However, after the enhanced HIPC relief, some countries had a debt to export earnings beyond 
the IMF and WB limit for debt sustainability. Hence, it is vital to know and investigate whether 
HIPCs external debt is sustainable after the 1990s initiatives based on the stated hypothesis 
(H2) – external debt is sustainable for HIPCs after their initiatives. Therefore, this chapter's 
primary objective was to analyze the sustainability of external debt in HIPCs using the 
indicator-based approach (for the period between 2000 and 2018 for 36 HIPCs), the CPIA 
policy rating (for the period between 2005 and 2019 for 36 HIPCs), and intertemporal approach 
to the current account (between 2000 and 2017 for 32 HIPCs). The indicator-based and CPIA 
policy rating approaches examined the quality (weak, medium, strong) of policies and 
institution based on different debt indicators and found that HIPCs’ macroeconomic policies 
and institutional performance are weak to handle and service the borrowed fund, and hence 
their external debt is unsustainable. However, the intertemporal approach to the current account 
used the current account, external debt, import, and export variables in the analysis and 
confirmed that external debt is unsustainable in all HIPCs, HIPCs in SSA, and HIPCs in non-
SSA. As a result, this chapter fails to accept the hypothesis that external debt is sustainable 





THE IMPACTS OF EXTERNAL DEBT ON GROWTH FACTORS AND 
GROWTH IN HIPCs: THE CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH 
EXTERNAL DEBT AFFECT GROWTH 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has a broad scope that focuses on the impact of external debt on growth 
factors and growth to investigate the channels through which external debt affects the growth 
of HIPCs. In other words, it focuses on exploring the channels and impacts of external debt on 
growth; hence, this chapter contains four different sub-chapters dealing with different 
objectives. Due to a lack of relevant data and for consistency, this chapter used a sample of 15 
HIPCs25 from 1990 to 2017 and this scope (time and sampled countries) is sufficient to 
represent HIPCs in general. Each chapter has n*T=420 observation which is fulfilled above the 
minimum rule – 5*parameters < observations in econometrics. Therefore, the estimated results 
and policy recommendations of all chapters can represent and work for the other HIPCs. 
Furthermore, the time scope of this chapter is also appropriate since it captures both before and 
after the decline of most HIPCs economies in 2000, the two main HIPCs initiatives in 1996 
and 1999, the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the global financial crisis in 2007/8, 
and Sustainable Development Goals since 2015. Therefore, the findings of this chapter 
considered various global development programs and events related to the title. Even though 
human capital is included in the calculation of TFP, this study prefers to examine chapter 6.3 
and 6.4 separately instead of combining them. In the TFP calculation, human capital is 
measured as years of schooling, which is narrower than the HDI we used in chapter 6.3. Hence, 
if we combine the two chapters, the scope of the study will be limited. Besides, the study goes 
far to calculate or exclude the human capital from the TFP using the (Inklaar – Timmer 2013) 
formula, but it could not find the accurate value due to some hidden information on how TFP 
is calculated. Furthermore, although we asked the concerned body, we did not get any tangible 
and detailed information about how the TFP is calculated. Therefore, due to the unavailability 
of data on TFP without human capital, there is a huge difference between the measurement of 
                                                          
25 Post-completion-point countries: Benin, Burundi, Cameron, Central Africa Republic, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Honduras, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. 
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HDI in chapter 6.3 and human capital in chapter 6.4; this study examined the two chapters 
independently to provide a detailed and broad analysis. Thus, this chapter is organized as 
follows: The first chapter (chapter 6.1) deals with the impact of external debt on investment 
and growth. The second chapter (chapter 6.2) examines the impact of external debt on national 
saving and growth, while the impact of external debt on HCD and growth is investigated in 
chapter 6.3. The fourth chapter, chapter 6.4, evaluates the impact of external debt on TFP and 
growth. Besides, all chapters examine the channels through which external debt is transmitted 




6.1. THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL DEBT ON INVESTMENT AND 
GROWTH 
Introduction 
External debt accumulation is a common characteristic of developing and emerging 
countries at the early stage of economic growth and development. Regarding the debt – growth 
relationships, the Keynesian and Classical economists are the leading and contradicting school 
of thoughts. Besides, scholars noted that the relationship between external debt and growth can 
be non-linear rather than linear and also, external debt can affect growth indirectly through the 
investment channel. However, empirical studies about the channels and impact of external debt 
on the growth of HIPCs is given limited attention. Therefore, this chapter aims to examine the 
impact of external debt on investment and economic growth in the case of HIPCs by taking the 
non-linear relationship between the variables and the second- generation panel data analysis 
into account. The study uses panel time-series data ranging from 1990 to 2017 and employed 
SUR estimation techniques. This chapter starts by providing background information in section 
6.1.1. Section 6.1.2 discusses the literature review regarding the topic. The empirical results 
along with discussion are also found in section 6.1.3. Finally, section 6.1.4. offers a summary 
of the chapter.   
6.1.1. Background of the study 
 
Scholars argue that an excessive amount of foreign debt is a common characteristic of 
most developing countries at the early stage of their economic development. Most developing 
countries borrow from abroad to finance their domestic investment and thereby economic 
growth. According to the neoclassical economic growth model, each state should achieve a 
steady-state level of capital. Thus, any additional investment could lead them to have faster 
economic growth and development. However, once the debt grows more significant (see the 
magnitude in chapter one) and unmanageable, it becomes a major cause of macroeconomic 
instability and hinders investment and growth promotion. Regarding this, the results in chapter 
five also confirmed that external debt is unsustainable in HIPCs.  
There are different factors (natural resources, labor, physical capital, human capital, 
savings, etc.) of economic growth. Physical and human capital accumulation, TFP, and savings 
are the channels through which external debt is likely to impact economic growth. According 
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to Pattillo et al. (2002), the effect of debt on growth can occur through all the primary sources 
of growth. The two arguments that support the capital accumulation channel are (a) the debt 
overhang theory of Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1989) implies that when external debt grows 
large, investors will be discouraged to invest because of fear of high taxes to repay the debt. 
Furthermore, the new investment will be discouraged due to the uncertainties regarding what 
portion of the debt will be repaid with the country's resources, and this, in turn, reduces capital 
accumulation (Agénor – Montiel 1996; Serven 1997; Serieux 2001; Pattillo et al. 2002; Hwang 
et al. 2010). (b) The other theory suggesting that a huge amount of external debt obligations 
can adversely affect physical capital accumulation is the crowding out effect. It mainly occurs 
due to high real interest rates, worse TOT of borrowed countries, and lack of (shut-off) foreign 
credit markets. Thus, investments are expected to decline because of a shortage of available 
resources for financing investment. Similarly, Abdullahi et al. (2016) noted that the crowding 
out effect concept assumes that government debts expend a more significant part of the national 
savings intended for investment due to an increase in demand for savings while supply remains 
constant; therefore, the cost of money increases. Crowding out effect sets in at a point when 
only the government and its agencies would be able to borrow due to excessive interest charges. 
Individual entrepreneurs and firms are thus unable to compete and crowded out from the 
market. Therefore, economic growth is affected due to the inability of economies to generate 
enough capital for investment. 
However, the early post-Keynesian models of growth, the neoclassical growth model, the 
AK26 theory, and the endogenous growth models have emphasized the importance of savings 
and investment in furthering growth. Nevertheless, there are resource gaps for developing 
countries, and they need foreign borrowing to fill these gaps and achieve the required 
investment for growth. According to these theories, indebtedness stimulates demand, resulting 
in a more proportionate increase in investment through the accelerator effect and increased 
production and growth.  
                                                          
26 Due to diminishing return in factors of production, accumulation of factors will not provide sustainable per 
capita income. Hence, neoclassical model assumes the steady state growth will be achieved only by exogeneous 
rate of technological progress. However, the AK theory postulate that the possibility to overcome the diminishing 
returns without considering the exogeneous rate of technological progress (i.e., 𝑔 ≡ ?̇? 𝐴 = 0⁄ ) and assuming 𝛼 =
1, modified the Cobb-Douglas form of Solow production function to linear (Y=AK). Here A refers to the level of 
technology, assumed constant and K refers capital stock. Thus, in this model, the rise in saving rate has a 
proportional effect on the growth rate of per capita income, which contradicts the level effect argument of Solow 
model (Jones 1998).   
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Besides the above-mentioned contradictory theories, empirical findings that show the 
relationship between external debt, investment, and GDP growth provide mixed and 
inconclusive results. Results of findings using a linear econometric approach can be classified 
into two categories - the first groups support that external debt decreases investment and growth 
(Borensztein 1990; Iyoha 1999; Were 2001; Maghyereh et al. 2002; Hameed et al. 2008; Guei 
2019). However, other studies, such as (Jayaraman – Lau 2009; Ahlborn – Schweickert 2015; 
Egbetunde 2012; Sánchez-Juárez – García-Almada 2016; Owusu-Nantwi – Erickson 2016) 
claim external debt has a positive impact on investment, as well as on growth. Currently, 
however, an essential feature of the research in this area indicates that the impact of external 
debt on investment and growth can be non-linear rather than linear. Hence, there is a threshold 
below or above which external debt can affect either investment or growth (Krugman 1988; 
Sachs 1989; Reinhart – Rogoff 2010a, 2010b; Checherita-Westphal – Rother 2012; Mupunga 
– Roux 2015). However, while some studies examined the non-linear relationship between 
external debt and investment (and growth), there is no empirical study in the case of HIPCs. 
Besides the direct impact, external debt can affect growth indirectly through investment 
channel, but there is no empirical evidence in HIPCs. Also, although the issue of the impact of 
foreign debt on investment and growth gained a great interest of researchers, the potential 
empirical studies have received little attention in the case of HIPCs that consider both the SSA 
and Latin American countries. Moreover, except for a few, most empirical studies employed 
conventional estimation techniques and did not consider the existence of CD in their 
methodologies. Also, except for Abdelaziz et al. (2019), who used a linear model, none of the 
studies estimated their models simultaneously, but rather estimated separately. Furthermore, 
except for a few, most empirical studies in the area employed outdated data, which leads to 
literature, methodology, and time gaps.    
Thus, based on the existing contradictory theories along with empirical findings, 
literature, time, and methodological gaps, this chapter aimed to confirm which theory works 
and fill the existing research gaps. Therefore, this chapter's primary objective is to investigate 
the impact of external debt on investment and growth in 15 HIPCs by considering the non-
linear and the investment channel in which external debt affects growth. The chapter used panel 
time series data ranging from 1990 to 2017 and employed a simultaneous equations technique 




6.1.2. Literature review  
 
This section discusses both theoretical and empirical literature regarding the link between 
external debt, investment, and growth. The theoretical literature explains the relationship with 
or impact of external debt on investment (growth). Meanwhile, in the empirical literature, 
different findings (differing in the case studies, type of data, and methodologies) have shown 
the impacts of external debt on investment (growth).   
6.1.2.1.  External debt, investment, and growth 
 
This section begins with the broad concept of the impact of external debt on growth 
through the investment channel to show the link between external debt and investment. As we 
explained so far, the Keynesians and Classical economists are the two main contradictory 
schools of thought concerning the relationship between external debt and growth. The 
Keynesians believe that external debt has a positive contribution to growth, but the Classicals 
are against it.  The early post-Keynesian models of growth (e.g., the Harrod-Domar model) and 
the neoclassical growth model (Solow-Swan model) have emphasized the importance of 
savings and investment in furthering growth. However, for developing countries, there is a 
savings-investment gap. Hence, they need foreign borrowing to fill this gap and to achieve the 
required investment for growth. Similarly, the neoclassical growth model of absolute and 
conditional convergence hypothesis argues an increase in saving, which increases investments 
and generates growth. Nevertheless, currently, in most developing countries, including HIPCs, 
there is a lack of saving to fulfil the required investment, which is one of the obstacles for 
countries not to converge. Therefore, to fill this gap, imported foreign capital, such as foreign 
debt or aid plays a vital role in growth. Besides, the AK theory, the first version of the 
endogenous theory, explained the importance of saving for growth through investment. 
Furthermore, the endogenous growth model argues that capital mobility or a country's ability 
to lend or borrow increase transitional growth (Oleksandr 2003). According to this theory, 
indebtedness stimulates demand, results in a more proportionate increase in investment through 
the accelerator effect and increases production.  
To the reverse, based on the debt overhang and crowding out effect theories, the classical 
economists argue that the impact of indebtedness on growth is negative. The debt overhang 
theory implies that investors expect lower returns when external debt grows beyond certain 
limits because of fear of higher and progressively more distortionary taxes being imposed to 
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service the debt. Furthermore, due to the uncertainties about what portion of the external debt 
will be serviced relative to the countries’ resources, new investment is discouraged, and this, 
in turn, reduces capital accumulation (Hwang et al. 2010). Also, they consider indebtedness as 
a future tax. It is a negative connotation because public indebtedness hinders capital 
accumulation and consumption by present and future generations (Diallo 2009). Likewise, the 
crowding out effect theory argues that external debt negatively affects economic growth by 
crowding out investment. Due to high real interest rates, adverse TOT of borrowed countries, 
and the absence of a foreign credit market, the investment will decline because of fearing the 
government's expected higher tax to service the debt. In the crowding out effect, if a more 
significant portion of external resources is used to repay foreign debt, very small is available 
for investment activities and growth (Pattillo et al. 2002; Clements et al.  2005). 
At the early stage of economic growth and development, developing countries have 
limited capital stock, and they have many investment opportunities with a higher rate of return 
relative to developed nations. In solving the lack of capital accumulation, which is vital for 
growth, developing countries borrow from abroad. If they use this fund for productive purposes 
along with a stable macroeconomic environment, their economy will increase, and they can 
repay the borrowed fund timely (Pattillo et al. 2004). However, due to debt overhang, a massive 
amount of external debt reduces the growth of a country since the forthcoming debt will be 
bigger than the repayment capacity of a country, and it thus discourages investment (Krugman 
1988; Sachs 1989; Agénor – Montiel 1996; Serven 1997; Serieux 2001; Pattillo et al. 2002; 
Hwang et al. 2010). Furthermore, the “debt Laffer curve” shows the relationship between 
massive external debt accumulation and the probability of repaying the debt. Based on this 
curve, more massive debt stocks are associated with lower probabilities of debt repayment. As 
a result, even though there is an expectation of debt relief, investors will not be willing to invest 
due to their fear of a creditor's distortionary tax on their products to service the external debt 
(Pattillo et al. 2004). 
6.1.2.2. Empirical literature 
 
This section presents empirical literature about the relationship or impacts of external 
debt on investment (growth). Specifically, it has the author's name along with the year, the 










The scope and case 
study            
 
Results 
The impact of external debt on investment 






From 1975 to 1987, 
23 developing 
countries.  
Private investment is negatively 
related to external debt stock and 
debt service.  
Warner 
(1992) 
OLS for an 
individual country 
and FE for the 
panel. 
From 1982 to 1989, 
13 developing 
countries 




Pooled data for 
each sub-period 





The study periods 
are classified into 
three: from 1965 to 
1973, 1974 to 1981, 
and from 1982 to 
1987, for 81 
developing 
countries. 







From 1976 to 1988, 
15 developing 
countries 




OLS From 1965 to 1990, 
13 Latin American 
countries 
The post-1981 debt crisis period 





Dummy Variable  
model 
From 1971 to 1991, 
13 countries.  
External debt adversely affects 
investment. 
Fosu (1999)  
 
OLS From 1980 to 1990, 
35 SSA countries. 
Little evidence of a negative 
correlation between debt and 
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investment levels, but it harms 
growth.   
Karagol 
(2002) 
VAR From 1956 to 1996,  
Turkey  





VAR  From 1974 to 2007, 
Iran 
 








From 1970 to 2010, 
12 Euro area 
countries 
There is a negative association 






From 1970 to 2009, 
Ghana 




2SLS From 1981 to 2012, 
Nigeria 
The impact of external debt on 






GMM From 1993 to 2012, 
32 states in Mexico  
Public debt exerts a positive 
effect on public investment, 




Panel ARDL From 1970 to 2007, 
40 HIPCs 




ARDL From 1970 to 2013, 
Nigeria 
External debt and debt service 




SUR From 2000 to 2017, 
Low-income 
countries 
External debt negatively affects 
investment 
Picarell et al. 
(2019) 
GMM From 1995 to 2015, 
26 EU countries 
External debt negatively affects 
investment 
Turan –  
Yanıkkaya 
(2020) 
GMM Nine five-year 
periods: from 1970 
to 2014, 89 













From 1971 to 1988, 
20 Middle income 
developing 
countries 
There is a negative relationship 





OLS From 1965 to 1987, 
81 Developing 
Countries 
External debt does not affect the 
GNP growth rate. 
Iyoha (1999) Simultaneous 
equation method 
 
From 1970 to 1995, 
SSA countries 
Large stock of external debt 
depresses investment and lowers 






From 1982 to 1999, 
35 HIPC and 25 
non-HIPC 
The long-term economic growth 




OLS From 1964 to 1986, 
Ethiopia 
External debt does not affect 
growth   
Were (2001) ECM From 1970 to 1995, 
Kenya 
Economic growth is negatively 
affected by external debt 
accumulation. 
Maghyereh 
et al. (2002) 
OLS and 2SLS From 1970 to 2000, 
Jordan 
External debt negatively affects 
GDP growth when it exceeds to 
53 % of GDP. 




From 1980 to 1999, 
ECOWAS SSA 
countries 
Mixed results – the external debt 
service has an inverse 
relationship with economic 
growth in most periods under 
investigation, and the total debt 




Patenio –  
Tan-Cruz 
(2007) 
VAR From 1981 to 2005, 
Philippines 
Economic growth is not very 
much affected by external debt 
servicing. 




OLS and GLS 
 
From 1980 to 2007, 
A comparative 
study of Nigerian 
and South African 
economies 
External debt and its servicing 





GLS approach From 1970 to 2003, 
Pakistan 
Debt service tends to affect GDP 
negatively and, thereby, the rate 
of economic growth in the long 
run. 




From 1988 to 2004, 
Six Pacific Island 
countries 
In the short-run, external 




Technique for time 
series resulting in 
the ECM 
From 1972 to 2005, 
Guinea 
External debt negatively affects 
per capita growth. 
Choong et al. 
(2010) 
OLS From 1970 to 2006, 
Malaysia 
An increase in the foreign debt 
level adversely influences 
economic performance. 
Safdari –  
Mehrizi 
(2011) 
VAR From 1974 to 2007, 
Iran 





From 1960 to 2008, 
Ethiopia 
Both external debt stock as well 
as debt servicing have a negative 
and significant impact on 
economic growth. 
Gohar et al. 
(2012) 
Least squares 
multiple regression  
From 1990 to 2008, 
36 low-income 
countries 
External debt service harms the 








From 1974 to 2010, 
Bangladesh 
 
In the long run, external public 
debt service negatively affects 
GDP growth, while foreign 
public debt stock positively 
affects the GDP growth.  
Egbetunde 
(2012) 
VAR From 1970  to 2010, 
Nigeria 
Public debt and economic 
growth have a positive long-run 
relationship. 
Ajayi – Oke 
(2012) 
OLS From 1985 to 2012, 
Nigeria 
The external debt burden harms 
the nation's income and per 




OLS From 1970 to 2011, 




Debt service does not have any 
direct effect on GDP or private 
capital. 
Rocha –    
Oreiro 
(2013) 
System GMM From 1980 to 2000, 
55 emerging 
countries 
In the long run, external debt 
negatively affects growth.  
Shabbir 
(2013) 
FE and RE From 1976 to 2011, 
70 developing 
countries 
An increase in external debt 
stock reduces both private fixed 







the Vector error 
correction model 
(VECM) 
From 1970 to 2012, 
Ghana 
There is a positive and 
significant long-run relationship 
between public debt and 
economic growth. 
Shittu et al. 
(2018) 
Fully modified 
OLS and dynamic 
OLS 
techniques  
From 1990 to 2015, 
five SSA countries 
 
 
External debt negatively and 




Guei (2019) Panel ARDL From 1990 to 2016, 
13 emerging 
countries  
In the short run, external debt is 
negatively and significantly 
correlated to economic growth 
but not in the long run. 
Abdelaziz et 
al. (2019) 
SUR From 2000 to 2017, 
low-income 
countries 





FE and System 
GMM 
Nine five-year 
periods: from 1970 
to 2014, 61 
developing 
countries 
External debt stock adversely 
affects developing countries' 
growth, and the study also did 
not support the existence 
inverted non-linear relationship 
between external debt and 
growth.  
The impact of external debt on growth (non-linear models) 
Elbadawi et 
al. (1997) 
OLS From 1970 to 1994, 
99 developing 
countries 
Excessive indebtedness hurts the 
growth rate and follows an 
inverted U-shape.  
Siddiqui – 
Malik (2001) 
OLS and FE From 1975 to 1998, 
3 South Asian 
countries 
There is a non-linear relationship 
between economic growth and 
all the indicators of the debt 
burden. 
Pattillo et al. 
(2002) 
OLS, instrumental 
Variable, FE and 
system GMM 
From 1969 to 1998, 
93 developing 
countries 
There is a non-linear relationship 
between external debt and 




OLS From 1970 to 2012, 
Pakistan 
External debt expands the 
growth of the economy to a 
certain point; after that, the debt 






FE From 1970 to 1999, 
55 low-income 
countries 
Excessive indebtedness hurts the 
growth rate, and debt service has 
no direct effect on real per capita 
GDP growth. 
Pattillo et al. 
(2004) 
 




The negative impact of high debt 
on growth operates both through 
a strong negative effect on 
physical capital accumulation 
and TFP growth. 
Schclarek 
(2005) 
System GMM 5-year periods from 
1970 to 2002, 59 
developing and 24 
industrial countries 
No evidence of an inverted U-
shape relationship between 





(BE), fixed effects 
(FE), and SGMM 
From 1970 to 2007, 




There is some evidence of non-
linearity with higher levels of 
initial debt having a 
proportionately larger negative 
effect on subsequent growth 
Afonso – 
Jalles (2011) 
Pooled OLS, OLS 
with least absolute 
deviation robust 
version, MM 
estimator a la 









From 1970 to 2008, 
155 OECD 
countries 
Government debt has a non-







FE, 2SLS, GMM From 1970 to 2010, 
12 Euro countries 
There is an inverted U 
relationship between debt and 
per capita growth. 
Lawanson 
(2014) 
FE and GMM  From 1970-2008, 
14 West African 
countries 
Debt appears to have a non-
linear effect on growth and 
follows an inverted U-shape 








From 1974 to 2009, 
Turkey  
Economic development and 




Statistical analysis From 1980 to 2013, 
OECD countries 
There is an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the external 




FE From 1991 to 2013, 
South Asia 
Countries 
There is a non-linear relationship 
between debt and economic 
growth and follows an inverted 
U-shape.  
Thieu Dao – 
Oanh (2017) 
OLS and ECM From 2000Q1 to 
2012Q4, Vietnam  
 
There is a non-linear (inverted 
U-shaped) relationship between 




System GMM From 1990 to 2013, 
39 SSA countries 
External debt directly impedes 
economic growth in SSA. 
However, the study did not 





GMM From 1970 to 2017, 
Kenya 
The relationship between 






From 2002 to 2016, 
109 middle and 
The nexus between external debt 





linear. Besides, a statistically 
negative relationship between 
external debt and economic 
growth above the threshold level 
of 15.28%. 
Source: Constructed by the author 
The empirical findings in Table 6.1 used a different time frame, case study, and 
methodology for their studies, and their findings are mixed and inconclusive. Most of the 
results confirm the negative impact of external debt on investment (Borensztein 1990; Greene 
– Villanueva 1991; Serven – Solimano 1993; Rockerbie 1994; Deshpande 1997; Safdari – 
Mehrizi 2011; Tuffour 2012; Siddique et al. 2016). However, few findings (Cohen 1993; 
Warner 1992) did not support the debt overhang and the crowding out effect of external debt 
on investment. Similarly, except for a few, such as Cohen (1993), Befekadu (2001), Patenio – 
Tan-Cruz (2007), and Jayaraman – Lau (2009), most empirical findings confirmed that external 
debt adversely affects growth.  
Among empirical studies about debt – growth relationship, only Clements et al. (2003), 
Pattillo et al.  (2004), Schclarek (2005), Kumar –  Woo (2010),  Afonso – Jalles (2011), 
Checherita-Westphal – Rother (2012), Riffat – Munir (2015), Abdelaziz et al. (2019), and Silva 
(2020) examined the channels through which external debt is transmitted to the economy and 
affect the economic growth of nations. Among the channels studies, Clements et al. (2003), 
Schclarek (2005), Pattillo et al. (2004),  Kumar – Woo (2010), Checherita-Westphal – Rother 
(2012), Riffat – Munir (2015), and Silva (2020) investigated the investment (either private or 
public or total) channel through which external debt affects growth using a non-linear model, 
while Abdelaziz et al. (2019) employed a linear model. Based on the above evidence, we can 
conclude that there is no empirical study that considers the non-linear effect of external debt 
on investment and growth in the case of HIPCs. Also, the investment channel through which 
external debt affects growth is not investigated in HIPCs, leading to a literature gap. 
Concerning the methodologies, except for a few studies, most used conventional static 
models (pooled OLS, OLS, FE, RE) and some of them used dynamic models (GMM, panel 
ARDL). Even though the GMM is a dynamic model, it only captures the short-run relationship 
between variables and ignores the long run one. Only a few studies used panel ARDL, but they 
are either outdated or did not consider CD in the errors. However, similar to this study, only 
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Abdelaziz et al. (2019) used both simultaneous and dynamic model, but their model did not 
consider the non-linear relationship between external debt and investment (growth) and also 
the study missed basic results in panel data econometrics such as CD, unit root test, and 
cointegration tests.   
 
6.1.3. Empirical results and discussion 
Econometric results and their interpretations, together with the study's theoretical and 
empirical support, are presented in this section. More specifically, the descriptive statistics, 
unobserved heterogeneity test, the CD test, unit root test, cointegration test, and the estimated 
SUR results for investment and growth are presented.  
 6.1.3.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
The descriptive statistics of the two models' variables (investment and growth) are 
presented in Table 6.2. For both models, the range of the dependent variable (investment) is 
between -5.67 and 61.46 shows that the variation is not high while the range of GDPGR is 
between -50.24 and 35.22. The mean value of external debt is 57.88, and its range varies 
between 10.23 and 278.97. The mean, minimum, and maximum values of external debt service 
are 2.49, 0.051, and 13.84, respectively (see Table 6.2 for other variables).   
Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.   Min Max 
INV 420 20.62 10.38 -5.67 61.46 
GDPGR 420 3.79 5.79 -50.24 35.22 
ED   420 57.88 41.46 10.23 278.97 
ED2 420 5065.9 10090.14 104.77 77829.37 
DSR 420 2.49  1.96 0.051 13.84 
INF 420 31.9 328.87 -9.15 5016.1 
POLITY2 420 1.87 5.23 -8 9 
OPPN 420 61.49 25.89 19.68 136.48 
EXCH 420 553.04 835.95 0.140 7384.4 
DMCR 420 18.548 13.347 1.60 64.53 
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LAB 420 40.61 6.328 26.12 50.67 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata15. 
 6.1.3.2. Capturing unobserved heterogeneity 
 
One major problem with cross-section, time series, and panel data regression is that they 
fail to control heterogeneity among countries and across time periods (Vijayamohanan 2016). 
Currently, these unobserved differences among the countries and across the time-specific 
period are vital in the way the error term is specified and how the model is estimated (Ampah 
2020). But these unobserved heterogeneities can be captured by including both country and 
time dummies in the regression. However, if the number of observations is lower than the 
number of parameters, it is impossible, and the estimation will be broken down 
(Vijayamohanan 2016). Nevertheless, in our study, it is possible to estimate the models with 
countries and time dummies since the number of observations is greater than the number of 
parameters to be estimated. If we included both country and time dummies, our assumption 
would be the slope coefficients were constant, but intercept varied over countries and time, 
which would give the two-way error components model. Therefore, this study tests the null 
hypothesis if intercepts are different across countries and time in general. In this case, we can 
do the poolability test of the null hypothesis of zero cross-section and time effects using Stata.  
Table 6.3 shows the result of this study about whether the cross-sectional specific and 
time-specific fixed effects specified in Equations 20 and 21 are valid. The result reveals that 
the null hypothesis of the captured unobserved heterogeneity is homogenous across the 
countries and time is rejected at 1%, which implies Equations 20 and 21 are correctly specified. 
Besides, to check the two-way error component model's robustness relative to the pooled OLS 
estimator, this study conducted an additional poolability test. The result shows the null 
hypothesis that intercepts homogeneity (pooling) is rejected at 1% level; therefore, the LSDV 
or the FE model is most applicable, but the pooled OLS is biased. Therefore, this study 
estimated the LSDV(FE) model (see Table 6.3) besides the SUR model.   
Table 6.3 Test for individual cross-sections and time-specific effects 
Tests Investment model Growth model Decision




(H0): zero cross 





F(41, 369) = 7.16 0.0000 F(41, 370) = 1.87 0.0015 reject H0 
at 1% 
level 






F(41, 369) = 8.71 0.0000 F(41, 370) = 3.19 0.0000 reject H0 
at 1% 
level 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata15 
 6.1.3.3. Cross-sectional dependence, unit root, and cointegration tests 
 
Since neglecting cross-section dependence can lead to biased estimates and spurious 
results, this study conducted a CD test using Pesaran (2004) test. The result fails to reject the 
null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence at a 5 and 1% of level of significance for 
investment and growth model, respectively (see Table 6.4).  




Investment model Growth model 
Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence 2.511 5.071 
The average absolute value of the off-diagonal 
elements 
0.329 0.179 
Probability 0.0121* 0.0000* 
Note: * ⇒ existence of cross-sectional dependence  
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
The study also examined the stationarity of the variables in the model. Due to the 
existence of cross-section dependence in the models, this study uses the second-generation unit 
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root test rather than the traditional tests. The result fails to reject the null hypothesis of unit root 
(non-stationary) for all variables at a 1% level of significance at the first difference, which led 
us to notice all measures are integrated of order one (I(1)). Thus, we might expect there is long-
run relationships among the variables together. 
 
 




CIPS (intercepts only)            
         Critical values Investment model Growth model 
Levels 1st diff. Levels 1st diff. 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 10 % 5 % 1 % 















ED -2.086 - 4.691*** -2.086 - 4.691*** 
ED2 -1.785 -4.149*** -1.785 -4.149*** 
DSR -2.678*** -5.731*** -2.678*** -5.731*** 
INF -3.968 ***   -5.897*** -3.968 ***   -5.897*** 
GDPGR  -4.584*** -3.533***  -4.584*** -3.533*** 
POLITY2 -2.661*** -2.663*** ---- ----- 
OPPN -2.266** -4.650*** -2.266** -4.650*** 
EXCH -1.748 -3.460*** -1.748 -3.460*** 
DMCR -2.353** -4.525 *** ---- ---- 
LAB ----- ----- -0.996 -2.629*** 
Note: *** ⇒ significant (stationary) at 1% level  
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
Besides the panel unit root test, this study conducted a cointegration test. However, unlike 
chapter five, this chapter used the McCoskey – Kao (1998) cointegration test. Table 6.6 shows 
a long-run relationship among the variables in both models at a 1% level of significance. 




Investment Model  Growth Model  
Statistic   p-value Statistic   p-value 
Modified Dickey-Fuller t -5.7910 0.0000*** -20.1295 0.0000*** 
Dickey-Fuller t -4.1312 0.0000*** -16.2846 0.0000*** 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -2.9589 0.0015*** -10.4095 0.0000*** 
Unadjusted modified Dickey-Fuller t -6.3601 0.0000*** -28.2302 0.0000*** 
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t   -4.2905 0.000*** -17.1237 0.0000*** 
Note: *** ⇒Significant at 1% level 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
 
 6.1.3.4. SUR estimation results  
 
Chapter five found that external debt is unsustainable in HIPCs and also, there is a 
theoretical argument that explains that unsustainable external debt can adversely affect growth 
and other macroeconomic variables. Therefore, to confirm this, this chapter empirically 
examined the impact of external debt on investment and growth (see Table 6.7).    
The long-run result of the investment model shows that external debt stock negatively 
and significantly affects the investment level of HIPCs. The coefficient for external debt 
indicates that a percentage point increase in external debt accumulations reduces investment 
level by 0.0612 percentage point, which substantially supports the prediction of the debt 
overhang hypothesis. This result also implies that the borrowed funds have not been allocated 
efficiently to productive investment projects. This result also in line with Greene – Villanueva 
(1991); Serven – Solimano (1993); Rockerbie (1994); Deshpande (1997); Safdari – Mehrizi 
(2011); Tuffour (2012); Siddique et al. (2016); Adamu (2016); Abdelaziz et al. (2019); Picarell 
et al. (2019); and Turan – Yanıkkaya (2020).  Nevertheless, the above studies did not consider 
a non-linear impact of external debt on investment.  
Furthermore, the result shows that the coefficient of the square of external debt 
positively and significantly affects the investment level, which implies that the relationship 
between external debt and investment is non-linear. Up to 153 % of external debt stock to GDP, 
the relationship between the external debt stock and investment is negative; over this limit, it 
is positive. This means the external debt has a positive effect on investment above the 153 debt 
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threshold. However, it is difficult to conclude the relationship between external debt and 
investment follows U-shape. Because, except for Mozambique (1990-1999) and Nicaragua 
(1990-1995), HIPCs external debt in all periods remained below the threshold values; hence, 
the relationship is dominantly negative. Therefore, we can say that the relationship between 
external debt and investment is negative and non-linear. Furthermore, after a deep check of 
country-by-country analysis, the study found that the relationship between external debt and 
investment is inverted U-shape (in four countries), U-shape (in one country), positive and non-
linear (in two countries), and insignificant (in eight countries).   
The result of this study coincides with other non-linear findings, such as Checherita-
Westphal – Rother (2012) and Apere (2014). However, Checherita-Westphal – Rother (2012) 
examined the impact of public debt on public investment, and Apere (2014) studied the impact 
of external debt on private investment. Unlike the above non-linear studies, this study examined 
the impact of external debt on total investment. Furthermore, the case study of the above studies 
is not HIPCs. Therefore, this result is different from the above studies due to its broader scope 
in measuring the investment variable and the number of countries included in the model. Even 
though many studies show negative/positive impact of external debt on investment (private or 
public), to the best of the writer's knowledge, there is no empirical study on the non-linear 
effects of external debt on investment in the case of HIPCs, which makes the result of this study 
has a potential to fill the literature gap. 
In the long run, the result revealed that external debt service significantly reduces the 
investment level of HIPCs in the study period. A one percentage point increase in debt service 
reduces the investment by 0.95 percentage point, which supports the crowding out effect. This 
means that substantial foreign debt service has led to domestic borrowing by the government. 
This raises the domestic lending interest rate, constraining private domestic borrowing as 
demand for loanable funds increases. The increased interest rate raises the cost of borrowing, 
thereby reducing investment. Furthermore, this study correlates with the hypothesized sign and 
match with previous findings, such as Greene – Villanueva (1991), Iyoha (1999), Karagol 
(2002), Shabbir (2013), and Adamu (2016). However, this study's result is different from the 
above studies; it is the latest one and filled the time gap. Also, the model of this study is non-
linear rather than linear.      
Trade openness significantly increases the investment level of HIPCs. In the long run, a 
percentage point increment in trade openness increases the investment level of HIPCs by 0.22 
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percentage points. International trade openness leads to increased investment by allowing 
import of investment goods, particularly if it is developing. Imports can increase, owing to two 
reasons. Firstly, the demand for exporting firms is high. The second is the effect of foreign 
exchange earnings from exports; particularly, if the need for investment is emanating from the 
exporting sector, the process will follow self-generating circular causation. The exporting 
sector can import capital goods that are likely to promote technological advancement and 
export more. 
The estimated result of the growth model shows that external debt significantly reduces 
the GDP growth of HIPCs. A percentage point increase in external debt reduces the GDP 
growth by 0.0401 percentage point, which supports both the debt overhang and crowding out 
effect theories of classical economists. The result of this finding also coincides with Afxentiou 
(1993); Elbadawi et al. (1997); Fosu (1999); Iyoha (1999); Chowdhury (2001); Were (2001); 
Ayadi –Ayadi (2008); Diallo (2009); Choong et al. (2010); Safdari – Mehrizi (2011); 
Hailemariam (2011); Ajayi – Oke (2012); Shabbir (2013); Senadza et al. (2017); Shittu et al. 
(2018); Abdelaziz et al. (2019); and Turan – Yanıkkaya (2020).  
However, the square of external debt significantly increases the GDP growth of HIPCs, 
which implies there is a non-linear relationship between external debt and growth. Up to 200 
% of external debt stock to GDP, the relationship between the external debt stock and GDP 
growth is negative; over this limit, it is positive. This means the external debt has a positive 
effect on growth above the 200-debt threshold. However, the relationship between external 
debt and GDP growth does not follow a U-shape. As most HIPCs external debt in most periods 
remained below the threshold values, the relationship between external debt and GDP growth 
is negative and non-linear. Furthermore, the country-by-country analysis shows that the 
relationship between external debt and GDP growth is inverted U-shape (in one country), U-
shape (in four countries), and insignificant (in ten countries).   
The negative and non-linear relationship between external debt and growth of this study 
contradicts the theoretical expected inverted U-shape. The existence of an inverted U-shape 
relationship or the decline in the growth rate resulting from a high debt cannot hold in an 
imperfect market. If there is a rigidity of wages in the labor market, leading to unemployment, 
public debt is neutral (Greiner 2013). A higher debt ratio can then lead to higher growth and 
less unemployment if the deficit is used for productive public investment (Greiner – Flaschel 
2010; Greiner 2013). However, an inverted U-shaped relation between debt and growth does 
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not exist, but the growth rate rises until the economy reaches the full employment state. 
Besides, under the Golden Rule of Public Finance (GRPF), Greiner (2013) derived an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between debt and growth by assuming the amount of public investment 
must always be equal to that of newly issued bonds, i.e., public investment must be financed 
only by newly issued bonds. Moreover, Ueshina – Nakamura (2019) argues that the inverted 
U-shaped relationship emerges when public investment is partly financed by other sources than 
government bonds, such as taxes. Therefore, based on the above evidence, since HIPCs have 
incomplete market structures and limited domestic resources to finance their deficit and public 
investment, an inverted U-shape relationship may not exist. This result coincides with other 
findings that used a non-linear model, such as Pattillo et al.27 (2002), Afonso – Jalles28 (2011), 
Eberhardt – Presbitero (2013), and Haron – Maingi (2018). Furthermore, the findings of 
Schclarek (2005), Cordella et al. (2005), and Daud – Podivinsky (2012) did not support the 
existence of an inverted U-shape relationship between debt and growth, and the result of this 
study is also partially in line with these studies. However, it contradicts with Elbadawi et al. 
(1997); Siddiqui – Malik (2001); Pattillo et al. (2002); Clements et al. (2003); Oleksandr 
(2003); Pattillo et al. 2004; Kumar – Woo (2010), Afonso – Jalles29 (2011); Checherita-
Westphal – Rother (2012); Lawanson (2014); Casares (2015); Riffat – Munir (2015); Thieu 
Dao – Oanh (2017); Zaghdoudi (2018).   
The other significant result is the reciprocal interrelationship between investment and 
GDP growth. An increase of one percentage point in investment leads to a 0.214 percentage 
point increase in GDP growth, and a one percentage point increase in GDP growth increases 
investment by 0.53 percentage point. Considering investment as a production factor, this result 
is consistent with the neoclassical (Solow – Swan) growth model. In their model, they assumed 
higher investments lead to more accumulated capital per worker, contribute to wealth 
accumulation, create more job opportunities, and increase wages. This subsequently enhances 
economic growth and development. Also, in an endogenous growth model, the concept of 
capital is broad. According to this model, physical capital positively impacts growth through 
direct or indirect investment in human capital formation, domestic, and foreign direct 
investment. Besides, this result is also similar to other empirical findings - Chowdhury (2001), 
                                                          
27 when the total external debt-to-GDP ratio is below 35-40%. 
28 when debt-to-GDP ratio is below 30% 
29 when debt-to-GDP ratio is above 90% 
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Patenio – Tan-Cruz (2007), Hameed et al. (2008), Ayadi – Ayadi (2008), and Abdelaziz et al. 
(2019).  
The rise (depreciation) in the official exchange rate significantly increases the GDP 
growth of HIPCs. A one percentage point increment in the official exchange rate increases the 
GDP growth rate by 0.0007 percentage point due to its impact on increasing exports and 
decreasing the quantity of imports, which results in a positive trade balance and growth in the 
long run.  
Table 6.7 Results of SUR Model for the Total (HIPCs) Sample 
Equations  Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
INV  
(Equation 7) 
ED -0.0612  0.0333 0.066*  
ED2 0.0002  0.0001 0.099*  
DSR -0.9523  0.2843  0.001***  
INF 0.00078  0.0013  0.566  
GDPGR 0.5335  0.0723  0.000***  
POLITY2 -0.2428  0.0886  0.006*** 
OPPN 0.2286  0.0201 0.000*** 
EXCH -0.001  0.0005 0.066* 
DMCR -0.010  0.0424 0.803 
Constant  10.575  1.724  0.000***  
GDPGR 
(Equation 8) 
INV 0.2142  0.0308 0.000***  
ED -0.0401  0.0210  0.056* 
ED2 0.0001  0.00008 0.044** 
DSR 0.304  0.1837  0.097* 
LAB 0.075  0.0456  0.099* 
OPPN -0.02  0.0144  0.150  
INF -0.001  0.0008  0.203 
EXCH 0.0007  0.0003  0.029** 
Constant  -2.086  2.441 0.393 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R-sq Chi2 P 
INV 420  9 8.623 0.308  240.31  0.0000 
GDPGR 420  8 5.661  0.044 68.00  0.0000 
Notes: *, **, *** ⇒ significant at 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
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Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
Generally, this study confirmed that external debt adversely affects both investment and 
growth, which supports the hypothesis of the debt overhang and crowding out effect. This result 
also indirectly confirms the conclusion of chapter five – external debt is unsustainable in HIPCs 
and the hypothesis that unsustainable external debt adversely affects investment and growth. 
Besides, it revealed a non-linear relationship between external debt and investment (GDP 
growth) but does not follow a U-shaped form in HIPCs, and it contradicts with the theoretical 
expectation of (inverted U-shape) relationship. This result implies that initially, the effect of 
external debt on investment and growth is negative, and then it may have a positive impact in 
the future. This is due to weak macroeconomic policies and institutions to handle the 
accumulated external debt; mismanagement and misuse of external finance to productive 
sectorsꓼ corruption due to week rule and regulation and irresponsible government officials' 
action in capital flight can be reasons for the current ineffectiveness of external debt on 
investment and growth. Due to the unsustainability of external debt, we have evidence30 in 
which external debt had a negative contribution to investment and growth. This implies that if 
the external debt had a positive impact on investment and growth, countries could meet their 
current and future external debt service obligations without recourse to debt rescheduling or 
the accumulation of arrears without compromising growth. However, this does not happen in 
HIPCs. Therefore, this study could not agree with the inverted U-shape relationship between 
external debt and investment (growth) and questioned why HIPCs external debt was 
unsustainable in the 1990s and 2000s if the external debt had a positive contribution to growth 
and investment.  
The other impressive result of this study is external debt affects growth through 
investment channel. Since external debt negatively affects investment and there is a positive 
relationship between investment and growth, we can say that external debt affects investment 
and growth indirectly through the investment channel. The investment channel result of this 
study coincides with Clements et al. (2003), Schclarek (2005), Pattillo et al. (2004), Checherita-
Westphal – Rother (2012), Riffat – Munir (2015), and Abdelaziz et al. (2019).  
                                                          
30 Two HIPCs Initiatives in the late 1990s and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2005 aiming to 
reduce the debt burden. 
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To ensure the robustness of the above result, this study divided the dataset into two sub-
regions (HIPCs in SSA countries31 and HIPCs in non-SSA32), but similarly to chapter three and 
four, this chapter also did not provide an empirical result for HIPCs in non-SSA. This is because 
there are only three HIPCs in non-SSA, and they did not fulfil the minimum rule (5*parameters 
< observations) of econometrics. Therefore, the estimation in this study is carried out for only 
HIPCs in SSA. The results of HIPCs in SSA countries are similar to the findings in the case of 
all HIPCs. The impact of external debt on investment is negative and non-linear for HIPCs in 
SSA countries, and its turning point is 95.75 % of external debt stock to GDP (See Table 5.9).  
Similarly, the growth model result for HIPCs in SSA revealed that the impact of external 
debt on growth is negative and non-linear. This implies, up to 215 % of external debt stock to 
GDP, the relationship between the foreign debt stock and GDP growth is negative; over this 
limit, it is positive. When we see the relationship between investment and growth, the GDP 
growth significantly increases the investment level of HIPCs in SSA and also, the reciprocal 
effect is positive and significant for the sub-region (see Table 6.8). Generally, the total sample 
(HIPCs) and the HIPCs in SSA have similarities in both investment and growth models. This 
implies that the linear coefficient of external debt confirmed the debt overhang and crowding 
out effect of external debt on investment and growth. Besides, since the coefficient of the 
square of external debt is significant, there is a non-linear relationship between external debt 
and investment (growth). This means initially, the effect of external debt on investment 
(growth) is negative, but it will positively affect the future.  
Table 6.8 Results of the SUR model for HIPCs in SSA countries 
Equations  Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
INV  
(Equation 7) 
ED -0.0766 0.036  0.035** 
ED2 0.0004 0.0001  0.003*** 
DSR -0.9754  0.334  0.004*** 
INF 0.00072  0.036  0.984 
GDPGR 0.4647  0.0725 0.000*** 
POLITY2 0.0150  0.1021 0.883 
OPPN 0.2354  0.0265 0.000*** 
                                                          
31 Benin, Burundi, Cameron, Central African Republic, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, and Togo 
32 Honduras, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. 
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EXCH -0.0013  0.00059 0.022** 
DMCR 0.1859  0.0752 0.013** 
Constant  8.512  1.844 0.000*** 
GDPGR 
(Equation 8) 
INV  0.232  0.0388 0.000***  
ED  -0.043  0.026 0.094* 
ED2  0.0001  0.0001 0.097* 
DSR  0.3614  0.2468 0.143 
LAB  0.084  0.0546 0.120 
OPPN  -0.028 0.020 0.180 
INF  -0.029  0.025 0.257 
EXCH  0.000  0.0004 0.019**  
Constant  -2.41  2.94 0.413 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R-sq Chi2 P 
INV 336  9  8.46  0.38   249.48  0.0000 
GDPGR 336 8  6.19  0.05   58.99 0.0000 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
Moreover, to confirm the SUR model's robustness and compare it with other standard 
approaches, this study estimated the models using the LSDV (FE) (see Table 6.9). Unlike the 
SUR model, the target variables – external debt and its square – have an insignificant effect on 
investment for both HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA countries. However, the other target variable 
(debt service) negatively and significantly affect investment. Similarly to the SUR model, the 
effect of other variables, such as GDP growth rate, trade openness, and exchange rate on 
investment for both HIPC and HIPCs in SSA countries is the same.   
Furthermore, for HIPCs, we can observe similar results with the SUR model regarding 
the effect of the main targeted variables (investment, external debt and its square) on economic 
growth. However, the impact of debt service on growth is insignificant using the LSDV model. 
When we see the growth model of HIPCs in SSA countries, the only significant variables are 
investment and external debt when we use the LSDV model. However, the impact of both 
variables on growth is similar to the SUR model. Unlike the SUR model, the quadratic term of 





Table 6.9 Results of LSDV (FE) model for the HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA countries 
Equations  Variables HIPCs HIPCs in SSA countries 
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
INV  
(Equation 7) 
ED 0.0541 0.249 0.0792 0.101 
ED2 -0.00017 0.257 -0.00001 0.937 
DSR -1.370 0.000***  -1.466 0.000***  
INF 0.0029 0.012**  -0.0487 0.168  
GDPGR 0.1678 0.010**  0.174 0.007***  
POLITY2 -0.1092 0.455 -0.33495 0.026** 
OPPN 0.218 0.000*** 0.3023 0.000*** 
EXCH -0.0013 0.095* -0.0019 0.019** 
DMCR -0.164 0.010** -0.128 0.226 
Constant  10.646 0.001***  4.136 0.266  
GDPGR 
(Equation 8) 
INV 0.114 0.006***  0.1323 0.012**  
ED -0.072 0.053* -0.0806 0.064* 
ED2 0.0002 0.056* 0.0002 0.155 
DSR 0.065 0.777 0.064 0.834 
LAB 0.186 0.322 0.561 0.192 
OPPN -0.0417 0.097*  -0.053 0.122  
INF -0.0005 0.594 -0.0038 0.902 
EXCH 0.0010 0.077* 0.0010 0.124 
Constant  -3.479 0.644 -17.91 0.302 
Notes: *, **, *** ⇒ significant at 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
6.1.4. Chapter summary  
 
External debt accumulation is a common characteristic of developing countries and 
HIPCs at the early stage of economic growth and development. However, once the debt grows 
more prominent and unsustainable, it will hurt both investment and growth. Most studies 
examined the linear impact of external debt on investment and growth. However, there is a lack 
of studies that show the non-linear impact of external debt on investment and growth. Besides, 
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most studies examined the direct impact of external debt on investment or growth, i.e., the 
investment channel through which external debt affects growth was not analyzed for HIPCs. 
Therefore, this chapter's central focus was to examine the non-linear impact of external debt 
on investment and growth (considering an investment is an important channel that affects 
growth) in HIPCs employing the GLS-SUR estimation techniques for the period ranging from 
1990 to 2017. The evidence indicates that the relationship between external debt and 
investment (GDP growth) is negative and non-linear. The turning point between external debt 
and investment is at 153% (for HIPCs) and 95.75% for HIPCs in SSA. Similarly, the turning 
point for the external debt-GDP growth model is at 200% for HIPCs and 215% for HIPCs in 
SSA. Furthermore, investment has a positive and significant effect on growth in HIPCs and 
HIPCs in SSA. This implies that external debt affects growth through the investment channel 
in both HIPCs and HIPCs in SSA. Consequently, this chapter does not reject the hypotheses 
of H3, H3a, and H3b. Specifically, it does not reject the hypotheses that external debt has 
(H3) a direct or indirect impact on investment and economic growth of HIPCs, (H3a) a 
significant and non-linear impact on both investment and economic growth in HIPCs, 








The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the impact of external debt on national 
saving and economic growth in the case of HIPCs. Besides, it examines the effect of external 
debt on growth through the national saving channel. Similarly to the previous chapter, this 
chapter also considered the non-linear relationship between the variables. In order to achieve 
its objective, this chapter estimated two models by employing dynamic estimation techniques 
– PMG estimation and PCSE regression – for the period ranging from 1990 to 2017. This 
chapter begins by providing background information in section 6.2.1. Section 6.2.2 discusses 
the literature review regarding the topic. The estimated results along with discussion found in 
section 6.2.3. Finally, section 6.2.4. offers a chapter summary.   
6.2.1. Background of the study 
 
In the initial stages of a country’s development, national savings may not be adequate 
to finance the domestic investment necessary to ensure sustained growth. It becomes essential 
to look for overseas borrowing to supplement domestic savings. When dealing with external 
debt, savings, and growth, the Keynesian, Classical, Investment – Saving (IS) gap and debt 
overhang can be important theories (Oageng – Boitumelo 2017). The early post-Keynesian 
models of growth (e.g., the Harrod – Domar) and the neoclassical growth model (Solow – 
Swan) have emphasized the importance of savings in furthering growth. Besides, the AK 
theory, the first version of the endogenous theory, explained the importance of saving for 
growth. Furthermore, the endogenous growth model argues that capital mobility or a country's 
ability to lend or borrow increase transitional growth (Oleksandr 2003). However, for 
developing countries, there is the savings-investment gap. Hence, they need foreign borrowing 
to fill this gap and to achieve the required investment for growth.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between savings and economic growth is still an open 
debatable issue to academicians and policymakers. According to Solow (1956), savings affect 
countries’ economic growth because higher savings lead to an increase in capital accumulation, 
which in turn expands the GDP growth rate of a nation. Theoretically, since the growth models 
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of Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946), the relationship between savings and GDP growth has 
been a researcher’s agenda. According to Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) growth models 
argues that economic growth is based on savings, and as a result, increases in savings lead to 
significant increases in the rate of economic growth. However, the neoclassical growth models, 
such as the Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) believe that saving has a positive impact on growth 
only in the short run and also the endogenous growth theories of Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), 
and Rebelo (1991) specified that a rise in savings could generate a permanent increase in 
economic growth.  
When we construct the association between external debt, savings, and growth, since 
savings are the primary sources of growth, there is a channel through which external debt is 
likely to impact economic growth. According to Pattillo et al. (2002), the effect of debt on 
growth could occur through all the primary sources of growth like savings. The main arguments 
that support the saving channel are the debt overhang theory of Krugman (1988), and Sachs 
(1989) implies that when the government holds all foreign debt, the debt overhang problem 
may spill over to savings. This is because the government would have little incentive to pursue 
policies that stimulate private savings and investment when debt payments absorb most of the 
country's gains. Therefore, the external debt burden affects saving and then economic growth.  
Concerning this, even though most empirical findings focus on the linear impact of 
external debt on growth, in recent times, some studies and scholars have argued that the impact 
of external debt on growth can be non-linear. Thus, studies, such as Elbadawi et al. (1997); 
Siddiqui – Malik (2001); Pattillo et al. (2002); Clements et al. (2003); Oleksandr (2003); 
Pattillo et al. (2004); Schclarek (2005); Kumar –Woo (2010); Afonso – Jalles (2011); 
Checherita-Westphal – Rother (2012); Lawanson (2014); Doğan – Bilgili (2014); Casares 
2015; Riffat – Munir (2015); Thieu Dao – Oanh (2017); Senadza et al. (2017); Haron – Maingi 
(2018); and Zaghdoudi (2018) analyzed the impact of external debt on growth using non-linear 
models.  
Furthermore, Pattillo et al. (2002) argue that the effect of external debt on growth can 
occur through all the primary sources of growth like savings. However, only Schclarek (2005), 
Pattillo et al. (2004),  Checherita-Westphal – Rother (2012), Riffat – Munir (2015), and Silva 
(2020) investigated the saving (either private or domestic or national) channel through which 
external debt affects growth using a non-linear model. Nevertheless, surprisingly, there is no 
empirical study about the non-linear impact of external debt on national saving (growth) in the 
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case of HIPCs. Besides, the saving channel through which external debt is transmitted to the 
economy and growth is not analyzed for HIPCs, leading to gaps in the literature (knowledge). 
Moreover, regardless of the model type and the channels employed. The existing empirical 
findings have inconclusive and contradicting results concerning the impact of external debt on 
growth. Furthermore, most of the studies about the impact of external debt and growth 
employed either static models or dynamic models but did not capture the long-run relationships 
or take the CD into account or analyzed it for a single country which may/may not be in the 
list of HIPCs but could not represent HIPCs or used outdated data. Thus, this chapter attempts 
to fill the gap in scope, literature, and methodology. Therefore, the primary objective of this 
chapter is to investigate the impact of external debt on national savings and growth along with 
the national saving channel in which external debt affects growth in the case of HIPCs. 
6.2.2. Literature review 
 
This section presents the theoretical framework and empirical findings on the topic. The 
theoretical framework discusses the effect of external debt on national savings and growth. 
Besides, the empirical literature presents different studies that support or contradict the existing 
theories.  
 6.2.2.1. Theoretical framework of the study  
 
This section discusses different theories, such as the Keynesian, Classical, IS gap, and 
debt overhang theories, which show the relationship between external debt and savings. 
Furthermore, on the relationship between external debt on growth, this section also presents 
the Keynesians (early post-Keynesian, neoclassical, and endogenous growth models) and the 
classical model (debt overhang) theories.  
6.2.2.1.1. The effect of external debt on national saving and growth 
  
The Keynesian, Classical, IS gap, and debt overhang theories are the most important in 
discussing savings and external debt. Besides, the two opposing schools of thought – Keynesian 
and Classical theories – are useful when dealing with the relationship between external debt 
and economic growth. The Keynesian theory hypothesizes that indebtedness motivates 
demand, which leads to a rise in investment and production. However, the classical theory 
considers that debt is a future tax and hence it hinders capital accumulation and consumption 
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(Oleksandr 2003; Pattillo et al. 2004; Diallo 2009; Sheikh et al. 2014; Oageng – Boitumelo 
2017).  
The theories mentioned above also work in explaining the savings behaviors of 
individuals and nations. The Keynesian theory states that when there is an increment in income, 
some part of it can be saved, which implies that there is a positive relationship between savings 
and income. However, the classical theory argues that there is a positive association between 
interest and savings, which can be observed in the theories of life cycle or inter-temporal 
consumption and savings (Oageng – Boitumelo, 2017). From these theories, Chaudhry et al. 
(2009) argue that the rise in interest rate has income and substitution effects. When countries 
have small net assets, the substitution effect is expected to be higher than the income effect; 
thus, there will be a positive correlation between savings and interest rate. This implies the cost 
of borrowing will increase in a given economy; therefore, the level of investment spending is 
severely affected (Chaudhry et al. 2009; Oageng – Boitumelo 2017). Similarly, McCallum 
(1993) suggested that the effect of a one-dollar increment in government consumption which 
is financed by borrowing can reduce the national savings by the same amount (McCallum 1993; 
Oageng – Boitumelo 2017). Besides, the Life Cycle Theory of Hall (1978) states at the 
beginning of their work, and individuals are rational to borrow to finance their consumptions 
needs and to repay later the borrowed money when their income increase and save some part 
of their income for future consumption during retirement (Oageng – Boitumelo 2017).  
There are also many schools of thoughts, such as early post-Keynesian, neoclassical, and 
endogenous growth models that support the importance of external debt, which helps provide 
resources required for savings and investment and achieve economic growth. However, the 
classical or debt overhang theories and crowding out theorists do not support external debt for 
growth due to its adverse effect. 
 6.2.2.2. Empirical literature 
 
This section presents the most selected and basic findings related to the title. However, 
since empirical findings about the impact of external debt on growth were discussed in chapter 
6.1, this section only provides empirical findings of the impact of external debt on savings and 
the impact of savings on growth (see Table 6.10). 
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Results 
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Griffin – 
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Weisskopf 
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There is a causal and negative 









From 1970 to 2010, 
for 12 Euro area 
countries 
The public debt and its square 
have a positive and negative 







From 1970 to 2010, 
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VECM From 1980 to 2014, 
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External debt hurts national 
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South Africa 
Savings enhanced growth and at 




VECM From 1946 to 1992, 
North Africa 
Economic growth is directly and 




Granger Causality  From 1960 to 2001, 
13 countries 
For low-income countries, the 
Keynesian theory of savings is 
confirmed. In contrast, for 
countries with high and more 
than average incomes, the Solow 
hypothesis of savings is a 
determinant of economic growth 




VECM From 1973 to 2003, 
Pakistan 
The study confirmed that the 
Keynesian view, i.e., saving is a 
function of income levels 
Odhiambo 
(2008) 
Granger causality From 1991 to 2005, 
Kenya 
Economic growth Granger 
causes savings, while savings 
drive the development of the 
financial sector. The study, 
therefore, warns that any 
argument that financial 
development unambiguously 
leads to economic growth should 
be treated with extreme caution 
Sheggu 
(2009) 
VAR From 1960 to 2003, 
Ethiopia 





VAR From 1960 to 1996, 
Mexico 
Savings have a positive effect on 
economic growth  
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Singh (2010) ARDL From 1950 to 2002, 
India 
An increase in savings leads to 
higher income and economic 
growth. 
Najarzadeh 
et al. (2014) 
ARDL From 1972 to 2010, 
Iran  
Savings and economic growth 




ARDL From 1980 to 2013, 
Botswana 
There is a significant 
relationship between savings and 
economic growth and the study 
supported Harrod-Domar 
growth Model. 
Source: Constructed by the author 
All empirical findings in Table 6.10 confirmed that external borrowing adversely affects 
either domestic or national savings and has a positive relationship with the growth of countries. 
However, in general, there are few studies about the impact of external debt on saving and 
nothing for HIPCs specifically.  Even though Okafor – Tyrowicz (2009) examined SSA, Latin 
America with Caribbean countries (most HIPCs constitutes), they employed conventional 
estimation techniques and outdated data set, which ended in 2004. Besides, some of the 
countries in the list of HIPCs in 2004/9 may not be found today. Hence, the results and 
recommendations of this study may not be appropriate and work for these days. Furthermore, 
almost all studies about the impact of external debt on savings are outdated. For example, the 
latest study is Oageng – Boitumelo (2017), which used the dataset that ended in 2014. 
However, the study employed a conventional estimation technique for Botswana, which is not 
found in the current list of HIPCs. Also, a single country (which has a population of around 2 
million and 581,726 km2 area) study and policy recommendations cannot represent HIPCs.  
Table 6.10 also shows all empirical studies that found the positive relationship between 
saving and growth. However, there are no empirical findings in the case of HIPCs, and except 
for few, all applied conventional estimation techniques. Although Singh (2010), Najarzadeh et 
al.  (2014), and Jagadeesh (2015) employed the latest methodology (ARDL), the case studies 
are for a single country that is not HIPC.  
Among debt-growth studies, only Clements et al. (2003), Pattillo et al. (2004), Schclarek 
(2005), Kumar –  Woo (2010),  Afonso – Jalles (2011), Checherita-Westphal – Rother (2012), 
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Riffat – Munir (2015), Abdelaziz et al. (2019), and Silva (2020) examined the channels through 
which external debt is transmitted to the economy and affect the economic growth of nations 
(see Table 6.1). Among studies that investigated the channels Schclarek (2005), Pattillo et al. 
(2004),  Checherita-Westphal – Rother (2012), Riffat – Munir (2015), and Silva (2020) 
investigated the saving (either private or domestic or national) channel through which external 
debt affects growth using a non-linear model. This implies that, to the best of the writer's 
knowledge, no study shows the non-linear effect of external debt on national saving and growth 
in the case of HIPCs. Also, the national saving channel through which external debt affects 
growth is not investigated in HIPCs, leading to a literature gap.  
6.2.3. Empirical results and discussion 
 
This section presents the empirical results of the study and their interpretation. Specifically, 
the descriptive statistics, the unit root test (both first and second-generation tests), the co-
integration test (using Kao and McCoskey – Kao (1998)) and the long-run and short-run 
estimations.  
 6.2.3.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables in the model  
Table 6.11 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables which are included in the 
models. The mean of national saving is 12.8, and the range is between -18.03 and 44.7, showing 
that the variation is not significant. Similarly, the mean value of GDP growth has a small 
variation in its range. However, one of the target variables, external debt, ranges between 10.23 
and 278.9, which is high. Likewise, the square of foreign debt has a high range between 104.7 
and 77829.37. The mean of external debt service is 2.49, and its range is between 0.051 and 
13.84, which implies that the variation is small. When we see the skewness and Kurtosis of the 
variables in the model, all the variables are positively skewed except GDP growth, dependency 
ratio, labor force, and population growth. Besides, all the variables have positive kurtosis with 
values between 2.7 and 209.4. The standard deviation, which is the deviation of the variables 
from their means of all variables except a square of external debt, have a small growth rate 
(fluctuation) over the study period. All other descriptive statistics of the other variables appear 
in Table 6.11. 
Table 6.11 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
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SAV 12.80 13.23 44.70 -18.03 8.86 0.010 3.308 0.433 
GDPG
R 
3.791 4.461 35.22 -50.24 5.7994 -2.464 29.166 0.0000 
ED 57.88 48.388 278.9 10.23 41.463 2.723 12.483 0.0000 
ED2 5065.9 2341.4 77829.37 104.7 10090.14 4.765 27.484 0.0000 
DSR 2.4913 1.896 13.84 0.051 1.960 1.642 7.0917 0.0000 
INF 31.990 5.897 5016.10 -9.156 328.877 14.403 209.42 0.0000 
OPPN 61.49 55.511 136.4 19.68 25.896 0.911 3.192 0.0000 
EXCH 553.04 476.99 7384.43 0.140 835.956 4.017 24.427 0.0000 
DEPE
N 
88.425 89.842 112.8 55.28 10.947 -0.478 3.89 0.0000 
LAB 40.619 41.408 50.67 26.12 6.328 -0.800 2.755 0.0000 
POP 2.480 2.674 8.117 -6.766 1.173 -2.564 23.882 0.0000 
Observations                                                  N (total observations) = 420 
                                   n (total number of countries) = 15 
                                                                       T (total number of years) = 28  
Source: Computed by the author using EViews 10. 
 6.2.3.2. Cross-sectional dependence, unit root, and cointegration tests 
 
This study conducted the CD test using the Pesaran (2004) test. Unlike the previous 
chapter's investment model, the result fails to reject the null hypothesis of cross-sectional 
independence in the saving model, which led us to employ the first-generation panel unit root 
test. However, the result strongly rejects the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence 
in the growth model, suggesting the presence of CD; therefore, it is required to use the second-
generation panel unit root test. The growth model's cointegration test results are similar to the 
previous chapter, even though this study substituted investment variables by national saving. 
Furthermore, the study conducted a serial correlation and heteroskedasticity test for the growth 
model to confirm the PSCE estimation's appropriateness. Based on Table 6.12 results, we 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation and homoscedasticity (or constant 
variance) with a 5 and 1% level of significance, respectively. This implies both serial 
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correlation and heteroscedasticity have existed in the growth model at 5 and 1% of significance, 
respectively (see Table 6.12).   




Saving model Growth model 
Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence 0.109 4.093 
The average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements 0.272 0.182 
Probability 0.9134 0.0000* 
Serial correlation and heteroscedasticity tests for a growth model 
Tests  F statistics(chi2) Prob 
Serial correlation: 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
6.381 0.0242** 
Heteroskedasticity: 
Modified Wald test for GroupWise 
Heteroskedasticity 
8732.61 0.0000*** 
Note: * ⇒ existence of cross-sectional dependence, ** and *** ⇒ presence of serial correlation 
and heteroscedasticity at 5 and 1 % of significance, respectively. 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
The growth model of this chapter strongly rejects the null hypothesis of cross-sectional 
independence; hence, this study uses the ‘CIPS’ test to examine the panel unit root. Table 6.13 
summarizes the second-generation panel unit root test, both in level and first difference. Based 
on Table 5.15 results, we strongly fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root for all variables 
at a 1% level of significance at the first difference. Hence, all the variables are statistically 
significant at the first difference with a 1% level of significance, we notice that all measures 
are integrated into order one (I(1)). Thus, we might expect there is a long-run connection 
between these variables together. 
The saving model of this study confirms that there is no CD in the errors, and therefore, 
the study employed the first-generation panel unit root test, which is different from the previous 
chapter. The unit root test result confirms that national saving, external debt service, GDP 
growth, dependency ratio, inflation, and labor force are integrated at level (I(0)). In contrast, 
other variables such as external debt and its square and population growth are an integration of 
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order one (I(1)) (see Table 6.13). This implies that the model variables have a mixed order of 
integration, leading to use the panel ARDL–PMG estimation technique.  
Table 6.13 Unit root test  
Saving model 























































Growth Model (Pesaran (2007) test) 
 CIPS (intercepts only)  
Critical values Levels 1st diff. 
Statistic Statistic 10 % 5 % 1 % 















SAV -3.223*** -5.553*** 
ED -2.086 -4.691*** 
ED2 -1.785 -4.149*** 
DSR -3.049*** -5.727*** 
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 OPPN -2.266** -4.650*** 
EXCH -1.748 -3.460*** 
LAB -0.996 -2.629*** 
Note: **,*** ⇒ Significant (stationary) at 5 and 1% level, respectively  
Source: Computed by the author using EViews 10 (for saving model) and Stata 15 (growth 
model) 
 
The cointegration test is an essential task to confirm whether the variables in the model 
have a long-run relationship or not. Hence, for a saving model, this study used the Kao residual 
cointegration test due to cross-sectional independence and many variables in the saving model. 
It is also relatively more comprehensive than the Fisher type. Furthermore, due to eight 
independent variables in the growth model, this study used McCoskey and Kao (1998) 
cointegration tests. The result confirms a long-run relationship between the variables in both 
models (see Table 6.14). 
Table 6.14 Cointegration test 
  
Tests 
Saving Model (Kao residual) 
t-Statistic Prob 
ADF -6.513380 0.0000*** 
Residual variance 29.04981 ___ 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 26.17813 ___ 
Growth Model (McCoskey and Kao (1998)) 
Modified Dickey-Fuller t -19.9209 0.0000*** 
Dickey-Fuller t -16.0968 0.0000*** 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -10.3045 0.0000*** 
Unadjusted modified Dickey-Fuller t -27.9912 0.0000*** 
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t   -16.9439 0.0000*** 
Note: *** ⇒Significant at 1% level 






6.2.3.3. PMG estimation results for national saving model  
 
Once the cointegration test confirmed a long-run relationship among the variables in the 
saving model, the next step is the long-run and Error correction model (ECM) using PMG 
estimation technique (see Table 6.15). The result shows that external debt significantly 
increases the national saving of HIPCs, which does not support the debt overhang hypothesis 
of a negative impact of external debt on national savings. This means a percentage point 
increase in external debt leads to a 0.1469 percentage point increment in national savings. 
However, the square of external debt negatively and significantly affects the national savings 
of HIPCs; this implies there is an existence of a non-linear relationship between external debt 
and national savings. That means, up to 81.61 of external debt to GDP ratio, the relationship 
between external debt and saving is positive; over this limit, it is negative. However, their 
relationship does not follow an inverted U-shape. This is because around 82% of sampled 
countries (HIPCs) external debt in most periods remained below the threshold values; hence, 
the relationship is dominantly positive. Therefore, the relationship between external debt and 
national savings is positive and non-linear. Furthermore, the individual country analysis found 
identical long-run results, such as the panel regression since the PMG considers all countries 
to be homogenous; however, the short-run results are different. The result shows that the ECM 
value is insignificant at a 1% level of significance in eight HIPCs.  
This chapter (national saving) and chapter 6.1 (investment) are dependent variables and 
considered a channel in which external debt affects growth. However, unlike chapter 6.1, the 
impact of external debt on national saving is positive and non-linear. The reason for the 
variation may be due to differences in estimation techniques and the variables included in the 
models. For example, chapter 6.1 used the SUR model, which simultaneously estimates both 
investment and growth models, but this chapter used the PMG estimator for the saving model 
alone. Hence, this factor may lead to a different result.  
The debt service and GDP growth of countries significantly increase national savings. 
One percentage point increment in debt service increases the national savings by 2.1531 
percentage point, while a percentage point increment in GDP growth increases the national 
saving by 0.63 percentage point. Nevertheless, the dependency ratio and labor force 
significantly reduce the countries' national savings (see Table 6.15). 
Table 6.15 Estimated long-run coefficients and ECM using the PMG approach 
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Variables Coefficients  Std. Error Z-Statistic  Prob. 
ED 0.1469 0.0376 3.90 0.000*** 
ED2 -0.0009 0.0002 -4.92 0.000*** 
DSR 2.1531 0.5523 3.90 0.000*** 
GDPGR 0.6329 0.1129 5.61 0.000*** 
DEPEN -0.578 0.0954 -6.06 0.000*** 
INF -0.0032 0.0032 -1.00 0.318 
POP  -0.6597 0.9853 -0.67 0.503 
LAB -3.420 0.4133 -8.28 0.000*** 
ECM -0.4031 0.0988 -4.08 0.000*** 
*** ⇒ Significant at 1 % level  
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
Table 6.15 also shows that the coefficient of the lagged error correction term (ECM) is 
negative (between zero and negative one) and highly significant at 1 % level of significance. 
This confirms the existence of the cointegration relationship among the variables in the model. 
It stands for the rate of adjustment to restore equilibrium in the dynamic model following a 
disturbance. The coefficient of the error correction term is -0.403, which means around 40 % 
of deviation from the long-term is adjusted each year. In other words, the significant error 
correction term suggests that about 40 % of disequilibrium in the previous year is corrected in 
the current year. 
6.2.3.4. PCSE estimation results for growth model  
To examine the effect of external debt and the saving channel through which external 
debt affect growth, similarly to chapter four, this chapter also adopts the two-stage modified 
OLS estimator – PCSE estimator (see Table 6.16). The result shows that external debt has a 
significant adverse effect on the growth of HIPCs. A percentage point increment in external 
debt results in a reduction of GDP growth by 0.044 percentage points, which supports the debt 
overhang and crowding out effects hypothesis of classical economists. From the above results, 
we can observe that more external debt simultaneously leads to higher savings and lower 
growth; this contradiction is theoretically supported by the overlapping generation model, 
which explains high debt leads to lower economic growth (Modigliani 1961; Diamond 1965; 
Blanchard 1985). Although debt increases the national saving in the short run, a more 
increasing debt will partly use up (reduce) national savings reserved for the future generation, 
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which leads to increase the interest rate, discourage investors, reduce capital accumulation and 
growth (Rahman et al. 2019; Jalil 2020).  
The results also show the quadratic term of external debt is positive and significant, 
which confirms the presence of a non-linear but not a U-shaped relationship between external 
debt and growth. This implies that up to 220 % of external debt to GDP the relationship between 
external debt and GDP growth is negative; it is positive over this limit. Since most HIPCs 
external debt in most periods is below the threshold, the relationship between external debt and 
growth is negative and non-linear. The study also estimated the model for each country and 
found that the relationship between external debt and GDP growth is U-shaped (in two 
countries), only the quadratic term of external debt is positive and significant (in one country), 
and insignificant (in 12 countries).  
The saving channel through which external debt affects growth shows that saving has 
significantly increased the GDP growth of HIPCs. That means one percentage point increase 
in saving increases the GDP growth of HIPCs by 0.082 percentage point. Even though the 
turning points, the methodology, and the channel variables included in the growth model vary, 
a negative and non-linear relationship between external debt and growth is obtained in both 
chapter 6.1 and this chapter. Besides, the results of both this and the previous chapter confirmed 
that external debt affects the growth of HIPCs through the channels. Similarly, the one 
percentage point increment in labor force increases the GDP growth of HIPCs by 0.09 
percentage point, while inflation significantly reduces it. That means the one percentage point 
increase in inflation reduces the GDP growth by 0.0012 percentage points. 
Table 6.16 Estimated Growth Model in HIPCs  
Variables Growth model 
Coefficient Std. Err Prob. 
SAV 0.082 0.0321 0.010** 
ED -0.044 0.0230 0.052* 
ED2 0.0001 0.00008 0.028**   
DSR 0.078 0.1857 0.673 
INF -0.0012 0.00048 0.010** 
OPPN 0.017 0.0127 0.167 
EXCH 0.00078 0.00058 0.178 
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LAB 0.0917 0.0379 0.016** 
CONSTANT -1.048 1.999 0.600 
Note: *, ** ⇒ Significant at 10 and 5 % level, respectively 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
6.2.4. Chapter summary  
 
At the early stage of economic development, the accumulation of external debt is a 
common phenomenon of developing and emerging countries. However, once the debt grows 
more prominent and unmanageable, it will hurt macroeconomic variables, including saving and 
growth. Regarding this, the Keynesian, Classical, investment – saving (IS) gap and debt 
overhang theories are well known. Furthermore, few scholars argue that the relationship 
between external debt with growth is non-linear. However, the potential empirical studies about 
the non-linear relationship between external debt and growth have received little attention in 
HIPCs, which has resulted in a literature gap. In addition, most studies focused on the direct 
impact of external debt on growth but did not analyze the saving channels through which 
external debt affects growth. Therefore, this chapter examined the impact of external debt on 
national saving and growth using panel time-series data between 1990 and 2017 for HIPCs 
employing the PMG and PCSE estimation techniques. The evidence indicates that external debt 
positively contributes to national savings and there is no evidence of Classical economists’ 
hypothesis. However, the effect of external debt on growth is negative and significant, which 
supports classical economists' hypothesis. Also, the result confirmed that there is a non-linear 
relationship between external debt and national saving (and growth). However, the relationship 
between external debt and national saving is positive and non-linear but there is negative and 
non-linear relationship between external debt and GDP growth. Furthermore, external debt 
affects GDP growth through the national saving channel. Having the above evidence, we can 
conclude that the hypothesis of external debt has (H4) a direct or indirect impact on the 
national saving and economic growth of HIPCs, (H4a) a significant and non-linear impact 
on both national saving and economic growth in HIPCs, and (H4b) a significant effect on 




6.3. THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL DEBT ON HUMAN CAPITAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to explore the impact of external debt on HCD and 
economic growth in HIPCs. Similarly to chapter 6.1, the chapter also considers the non-linear 
relationship between the variables and employs the second-generation panel data analysis. The 
chapter used the panel time series data ranging from 1990-2017 along with SUR estimation 
technique to achieve its objective. This chapter starts by providing background information in 
section 6.3.1. Section 6.3.2 discusses the literature review regarding the topic. Section 6.3.3. 
presents the stylized facts about the human development index and its components, external 
debt, and growth in HIPCs. The estimated results along with discussion are also found in 
section 6.3.4. Finally, section 6.3.5. offers a summary of the chapter.   
 6.3.1. Background of the study  
The OECD (2001, 18) broadly defined human capital as “the knowledge, skills, 
competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, 
social and economic well-being.” Due to the demerits of conventional33 measurement of human 
capital, a new measurement approach is proposed by UNDP and ILO (Kwon 2009). Hence, 
since 1990 UNDP has developed a new and more comprehensive measure of human capital 
called the Human Development Index (HDI) (Ivanova et al. 1999; Kwon 2009). Therefore, 
according to UNDP (2019), HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key 
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having 
a decent living standard.  
The issue of human capital in history of economic is dated back to the late 15th century. 
Concerning this, Petty (1690), Smith (1776), and Farr (1853) argue that human beings and their 
acquired abilities were considered as the main input for national wealth. Besides, after the 
works of Schultz (1961), Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974), the concept of human capital 
regained recognition and started to be applied in various economic issues (Liu – Fraumeni 
2014). Even since the new millennium, the two main development plans – Millennium 
                                                          
33 Out-put based, cost based, income based, OECD approaches.  
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Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – have broadly 
focused on achieving either of the three elements of HDI.  
Besides, endogenous growth models emphasized the role of endogenous factors (i.e., 
human capital stock and research & development activities) as the main engines of economic 
growth. According to Lucas (1993), the accumulation of human capital serves as an engine of 
growth. Countries vary in their quality of life because of the differences in their accumulated 
human capital. Furthermore, Mankiw (1992) argues that the increase in human capital 
accumulation directly increases growth rate (Hasan – Butt 2008). The two broad categories of 
studies that examine the relationship between economic growth and human capital 
accumulation are: (a) the growth accounting framework theorist (e.g., Baumol 1986; Barro 
1991; Barro – Lee 1993) argues that human capital accumulation due to education increases 
individuals’ productivity and is a pillar for growth (b) endogenous growth theorists, such as 
Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), and Grossman (1991), argue that human capital creates new ideas 
which are transformed into scientific knowledge and ultimately leads to accelerating the 
process of economic growth. Human capital is an important source of long-term growth, either 
because it is a direct input into research (Romer 1990) or because of its positive externalities 
(Lucas 1988). The inclusion of human capital variable in endogenous growth models is 
intended to capture quality differences in the labor force, as non-physical capital investment 
increases the productivity of the existing labor force (Barro – Lee 1993). 
However, human capital accumulation and its effect on economic growth depend on the 
level of external debt accumulation. According to Haaparanta – Virta (2007), Pattillo et al. 
(2004), and Tabengwa (2014), at low levels of debt, external borrowing boosts investment in 
human capital, thereby increasing growth. However, if the debt burden is very high, debt 
overhang and crowding out effect conditions may occur, which will adversely affect both 
human capital and growth. Concerning this, evidence shows that the high external debt level is 
one of the causes for the failure to achieve the MDGs because debt servicing absorbs resources 
that could be used for essential spending on poverty reduction and diverts resources away from 
investment in education and health.  
There is a contradictory school of thoughts concerning the impact of external debt on 
growth – the Keynesians and Classical economists. The Keynesians argue that external debt 
has a positive contribution to growth but the Classicals postulate the reverse. Besides, based 
on the type of functional model, empirical findings concerning the impact of external debt on 
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economic growth can be broadly categorized into two groups. The first groups consider a linear 
relationship between external debt and growth, while the second groups use a non-linear model. 
However, similar to the theories, empirical studies about the impact of external debt on growth 
is mixed and inconclusive. Besides the direct effect of external debt on growth, scholars noted 
that there are channels in which external debt is transmitted to the economy and affects nations’ 
economic growth. 
The existing empirical studies regarding the impact of external debt on human 
capital/welfare can be categorized into two groups. The first group used a composite HDI as a 
dependent variable (Egungwu 2018; Zaghdoudi 2018; Ampah 2020). The other group 
examined the effects of external debt on either of the three components of the HDI, i.e., health, 
education and living standards (poverty) (Pattillo et al. 2004; Tabengwa 2014; Fosu 2007, 
2010; Eduardo – Mauricio 2007; Shabbir – Yasin 2015; Zaghdoudi – Hakimi 2017; Emerah – 
Ogege 2013; Saungweme – Mufandaedza 2013). However, there are no empirical studies about 
the impact of external debt on HCD in the case of HIPCs even though the countries have 
experienced a bad history in external debt accumulation and its adverse effect on 
macroeconomic variables since the 1970s debt crisis. 
Besides, except for Pattillo et al. (2004), Zaghdoudi (2018) and Ampah (2020), all other 
studies neglected the optimal threshold beyond which external debt can affect positively or 
negatively the human capital, which means previous studies examined the linear relationships 
between the variables. Also, except for Zaghdoudi (2018), Egungwu (2018), and Ampah 
(2020), all the others narrowly investigated the effect of external debt on either of health or 
education or living standards. Furthermore, most previous studies evaluated the direct impact 
of external debt on economic growth rather than an indirect effect through the human capital 
channel. Also, except for a few studies, most of the previous findings did not consider a non-
linear relationship between external debt and growth and also neglected the most concerned 
countries – HIPCs. For example, only Pattillo et al. (2004) examined the human capital channel 
through which external debt affects growth using a non-linear model for 61 developing 
countries from 1969 to 1998. This implies empirical studies that analyzed the non-linear impact 
of external debt on growth, considering the human capital channel, are not found in HIPCs.   
Therefore, unlike other findings in this area, this chapter focuses on the most concerned 
countries. Hence, investigating the impact of foreign debt on HCD and growth in the case of 
HIPCs is vital to provide policy recommendations that help overcome the adverse effect of 
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debt accumulation. Besides, since the 1970s external debt crisis, HIPCs have experienced 
external debt accumulation, making their debt unsustainable and qualified for repeated debt 
cancellation and relief. Therefore, examining the effect of external debt HCD and growth is an 
important research area for HIPCs. Also, unlike other studies, this chapter used a more 
comprehensive34 measurement called HDI to measure HCD. Furthermore, recently, an 
essential feature of the research in this area has indicated that the impact of external debt on 
HCD and growth can be non-linear rather than linear; therefore, this chapter considered the 
non-linear relationship. Also, previous studies did not show the HCD channel through which 
external debt affects growth and did not consider the CD in the errors in their methodologies. 
Therefore, this study's primary objective is to investigate the impact of external debt on HCD 
and growth using time series data ranging from 1990 to 2017 in the case of HIPCs employing 
the SUR method. 
6.3.2. Literature review 
 
This section presents theoretical and empirical literature related to the relationship 
between external debt, human capital/welfare, and growth. 
 
 6.3.2.1. External debt, human capital, and growth 
 
Since the human capital can be measured using HDI, which considers better 
achievements in education, health, and living standards, any activities that hinder either of these 
elements adversely affect countries' human capital. Besides, the scope of HDI is broad and 
even sometimes considered as human welfare. Regarding this, Veltmeyer – Rushton (2012) 
noted that human welfare is primarily a matter of education, health, and income, as reflected 
in the HDI, a composite of three social welfare variables. 
 
                                                          
34 Even though HDI is average measurement of only three indices and may not show a comprehensive picture, the 
UNDP (1990) provided the following arguments in its yearly report – lack of data that impose some limits on its 
measurements and comprehensiveness is not always and completely achievable. Including too many variables 
provides complex and confusing picture and disturb policy makers. Besides, some indicators may overlap with 
existing indicators (e.g., infant mortality with life expectancy indicator) ( Nayak 2009). Even in recent years Jahan 
(2016) has also argued that the composite indices (HDI) provide a specific value (number) and are extremely good 
for advocacy, for initiating healthy competition among societies and for raising awareness compared to Human 
Development Accounting measurement.  
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The two main theories which link external debt accumulation with human capital 
(welfare) and growth are the debt overhang and crowding out effect theories. According to the 
debt overhang theory, the accumulation of external debt adversely affects both welfare and 
growth. When there is excessive external debt accumulation, domestic and foreign investors 
perceive that the government will finance the accumulated debt by distortionary measures, such 
as heavy taxes seigniorage or cut in productive public investment. Therefore, investors will 
prefer to withhold or invest less or invest abroad, which adversely affects welfare-related 
investments (education and health) and then growth.  
Similarly, the crowding out theory argues that excessive external debt accumulation leads 
to massive debt servicing, which shifts resources away from the social sector, especially health 
and education (Fosu 2008). Concerning this, Shabbir – Yasin (2015) also added that 
government expenditure is a vital factor for economic growth and governments in developing 
countries have to spend effectively in social sectors. However, debt servicing can adversely 
affect constructive fiscal allocations in these countries. The very objective underlying foreign 
borrowing (to promote growth and development) is depressed by servicing liabilities, which 
consumes a sizeable part of the scarce resources generated through exports and/or foreign 
remittances, and little is left behind to finance growth. 
 6.3.2.2. Empirical literature  
Table 6.17 presents the empirical findings concerning the impact of external debt on HDI 
or either of its components. Specifically, the author(s) name(s), the model type they adopted, 
the time scope with the case studies, and their results. However, similar to chapter 6.2, this 
section skipped the empirical literature about the impact of external debt on economic growth. 





The scope and 
case study            
 
Results 
The impact of external debt on human capital or human development or welfare 
measured using HDI 
Egungwu 
(2018) 
OLS From 1986 to 
2015, Nigeria 
Both external debt stock and 
external debt servicing had a 
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From 2002 to 
2015, 25 
countries 
The relationship between 
external debt and human 
development is non-linear and 
the optimal threshold of 
external debt is 41.7775% and 
below this threshold, external 








From 1990 to 
2015, 24 SSA 
countries 
The relationship between 
external debt and welfare is 
non-linear and U-shaped.  
The impact of external debt on education or health or both 
Fosu (2007) Pooled OLS and RE Five-year panel 
data from 1975 
to 1994, 35 SSA 
countries 
While actual debt service has 
little or no effect on education 
spending, predicted debt service 
that reflects the debt burden 





Arellano Bond - 
GMM 
From 1985 to 
2003, 50 
countries  
Public debt hurts both education 
and health expenditures.  
Fosu (2010) SUR  Five-year panel 
data from 1975 
to 1994, 35 
African 
countries  
While observed debt service is 
a poor predictor of expenditure 
allocation, constraining debt 
servicing shifts spending away 
from the social sector, with 










Debt servicing liability harms 
social sector spending, e.g., 
education and health.  
The impact of external debt on living standards 
Pattillo et al.  
(2004) 
Five estimation 
methods (OLS, IV, 
FE, diff-GMM, and 
system GMM) 




A high level of external debt has 
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2012, Zimbabwe  
An adverse relationship 


























External debt increase poverty 
Source: Constructed by the author 
 
From Table 6.17, we can easily observe that there are only three empirical studies that 
use the comprehensive measure of human capital or human development or welfare – Egungwu 
(2018), Zaghdoudi (2018), and Ampah (2020). However, Egungwu’s (2018) study is only for 
Nigeria, and the country is not found in the current IMF list of HIPCs. The study also neglected 
the optimal threshold beyond which external debt can positively or negatively affect human 
capital. Furthermore, the study used conventional estimation techniques that overlooked the 
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dynamic nature of the model, included I(0), I(1) and I(2) variables in its estimations, and it 
neglected the cointegration test. Hence, the policy recommendations based on a single country 
and other limitations discussed above may not be appropriate for and represent HIPCs. 
Therefore, this study overcomes Egungwu’s (2018) limitations by considering the most 
concerned countries, non-linear relationship between external debt and human capital, a better 
estimation technique which takes dynamic behavior into account along with basic steps in 
econometrics such as cross-sectional dependence, unit root, and cointegration tests.  
Zaghdoudi (2018) used HDI to measure human development, considered the non-linear 
relationship between external debt and HDI, used a good estimation technique, and 
incorporated many countries in his study. However, the study mixed countries that are suffering 
from massive & unsustainable external debt with others. That means around 70% of the case 
studies are not in the list of HIPCs and hence its results and policy recommendations may not 
represent HIPCs. Besides, the study neglected two basic tests – CD and panel cointegration– 
in its econometric estimation. The panel data models may have CD in the errors and ignoring 
these conditions leads to get biased estimates and spurious inference. Furthermore, the CD test 
determines the type of panel unit root and cointegration tests which the study should follow. 
Therefore, unlike Zaghdoudi (2018), this study focuses on the most concerned countries 
experiencing accumulated & unsustainable external debt and repeated debt cancellations & 
relief and conducts basic econometric tests before estimation.   
Ampah (2020) also used HDI to measure welfare, considered the non-linear relationship 
between external debt and HDI, and applied basic panel econometric tests. However, the 
Driscoll – Kraay (1998) technique of the study estimated by pooled OLS/ weighted least-
squares regression and FE (within) regression (Driscoll – Kraay 1998) which implies that 
Ampah’s (2020) study was a static model. Therefore, our study differs in considering the 
dynamic nature of the model and it is the relatively latest one (until 2017).  
Unlike the above studies, studies, such as Pattillo et al. (2004), Fosu (2007), Eduardo – 
Mauricio (2007), Fosu (2010), Emerah – Ogege (2013), Saungweme – Mufandaedza (2013), 
Tabengwa (2014), Shabbir – Yasin (2015), and Zaghdoudi – Hakimi (2017) examined the 
relationship between external debt on either of three HDI elements. This implies these studies 
did not use a broad and comprehensive measurement of HCD, which can limit their scope of 
analysis.   
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Concerning empirical studies about debt-growth relationship, Clements et al.  (2003), 
Pattillo et al. (2004), Schclarek (2005), Kumar –  Woo (2010),  Afonso – Jalles (2011), 
Checherita-Westphal – Rother (2012), Riffat – Munir (2015), Abdelaziz et al. (2019), and Silva 
(2020) examined the channels through which external debt is transmitted to the economy and 
affects the economic growth of nations (see Table 6.1). Among studies that investigated the 
channels, only Pattillo et al. (2004) investigated the human capital channel through which 
external debt affects growth using a non-linear model for 61 developing countries. This implies 
that, to the best of the writer's knowledge, no study shows the non-linear effect of external debt 
on human capital development and growth in the case of HIPCs. Also, the human capital 
development channel through which external debt affects growth is not investigated in HIPCs, 
leading to a literature gap. 
6.3.3. Stylized facts of HDI and its components, external debt, and growth in HIPCs. 
This section presents the magnitude of HDI along with its components, external debt and 
its service, and GDP growth of 36 post-completion-point HIPCs from 1990 to 2017. Based on 
the three elements of HDI – education, health, and standard of living – and following the 
statistical table of HDI and its components of the UNDP human development report (2019), 
this section constructed Table 6.18. It has HDI and life expectancy at birth (represents health), 
expected & mean years of schooling (denotes education), and GNI per capita (represents living 
standard).  
Table 6.18 HDI and its components, external debt, and GDP growth of HIPCs 






























1990 0.289 51.342 5.647 2.269 402.500 1.127 60.854 3.223 
1991 0.290 51.356 5.717 2.344 397.222 1.659 62.637 3.130 
1992 0.281 51.392 5.756 2.417 412.778 -0.239 65.275 2.451 
1993 0.293 51.461 5.889 2.500 409.444 1.029 67.181 2.444 
1994 0.294 51.597 5.986 2.583 378.333 -0.494 71.449 2.910 
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1995 0.299 51.794 6.203 2.661 382.500 4.865 71.163 3.869 
1996 0.303 52.053 6.369 2.719 398.611 4.409 65.514 2.983 
1997 0.307 52.336 6.525 2.786 411.667 3.708 61.251 2.640 
1998 0.311 52.644 6.728 2.842 404.444 2.612 61.462 2.586 
1999 0.325 52.989 7.189 2.908 393.889 2.953 56.125 2.397 
2000 0.366 53.361 7.431 3.308 392.778 2.342 52.639 2.145 
2001 0.372 53.792 7.653 3.381 386.389 3.695 48.310 1.711 
2002 0.386 54.261 7.872 3.453 389.722 3.644 47.992 1.842 
2003 0.390 54.803 7.997 3.508 433.333 3.431 49.585 1.714 
2004 0.411 55.381 8.222 3.581 494.444 5.333 47.718 1.685 
2005 0.429 55.997 8.444 3.722 555.278 5.100 41.852 1.587 
2006 0.437 56.661 8.669 3.800 616.111 5.505 29.334 1.456 
2007 0.445 57.328 8.847 3.872 685.556 5.166 29.044 1.833 
2008 0.453 58.006 9.094 3.978 803.611 5.351 28.382 1.955 
2009 0.461 58.669 9.328 4.042 876.944 4.239 30.541 1.551 
2010 0.468 59.311 9.436 4.164 922.778 5.837 27.238 1.392 
2011 0.475 59.922 9.711 4.222 969.167 4.730 28.125 1.504 
2012 0.481 60.511 9.825 4.317 1041.11 5.888 28.069 1.468 
2013 0.487 61.067 9.958 4.439 1104.16 4.586 32.044 1.651 
2014 0.492 61.594 10.044 4.519 1141.66 4.874 33.446 1.892 
2015 0.497 62.075 10.133 4.608 1144.44 3.525 34.990 1.921 
2016 0.500 62.522 10.178 4.703 1110.27 3.850 35.728 2.327 
2017 0.504 62.919 10.258 4.792 1114.72 4.305 38.433 2.716 
Source: Computed by the author using UNDP and WDI* databases.  
Table 6.18 shows HDI, life expectancy, expected and mean year of schooling have 
increased since 1990. For example, the HDI was 0.289 in 1990, and it grew to 0.5 in 2017. 
Similarly, the life expectancy of HIPCs has risen from 51 to 63 years in the studied period. The 
two education indicators, i.e., expected and mean years of schooling, also showed an 
improvement from 5.6 to 10.2 and 2.2 to 4.7 years, respectively. Unlike other HDI indicators, 
the GNI per capita has had a fluctuating trend since 1990, which can hinder the progress of 
HDI. Even though the performance of HDI, life expectancy, expected and mean year of 
schooling was good, their growth rate was not satisfactory, which implies the growth rates of 
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all the above indicators were fluctuating in the studied period. For example, the growth rate of 
HDI was fluctuating between -3.2 and 12.7 % and the highest score in 2000. Similarly, the 
growth rate of mean years of schooling was not stable in the studied period, fluctuating between 
1.4 and 13.7 years and the maximum years of schooling took place in 2000. The growth rate 
of life expectancy was relatively good during the second half of the 2000s, but it became worse 
after 2010. Table 6.18 also shows unstable GDP growth, external debt stock, and debt services 
in the HIPCs. All GDP growth, total external debt, and debt services were relatively worse and 
better in the 1990s and since 2000, respectively.  
Besides the above nominal relationships, Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between 
annual growth rates of HDI, GDP, external debt, and external debt service of HIPCs between 
1991 and 2017. The Figure confirms that the adverse effect of external debt and its service on 
HDI and GDP growth has mostly been observed since 2012.   
Figure 6.1 Annual growth rates of HDI, GDP, external debt, and external debt service from 
1991-2017.  
 
Source: Computed by the author using UNDP and WDI databases and EViews 10. 
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6.3.4. Empirical results and discussion 
This section presents the econometrics results, i.e., descriptive statistics of the variables, 
CD, panel unit root, cointegration tests, and the long run estimation result of Equation 18 and 
19. 
 6.3.4.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
Table 6.19 describes the descriptive statistics of the variables in both the human capital 
and growth model. The mean of HDI is 0.427, and its range is between 0.199 and 0.693, which 
implies the variation is not high. Similarly, the range of ED is between 10.23 and 278.97, which 
also shows the variation is not high when considering the variable's behavior. That means such 
a type of range is common for the variables, such as ED. However, the range is too high for its 
square. The other basic variable in this study is GDPGR; its mean is 3.79 and the range is 
between -50.24 and 35.22, which has a small range (see Table 6.19 for other variables). 
 
Table 6.19 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.   Min Max 
HDI 420 0.4272 0.112 0.199 0.693 
GDPGR 420 3.79 5.79 -50.24 35.22 
ED   420 57.88 41.46 10.23 278.97 
ED2 420 5065.9 10090.14 104.77 77829.37 
DSR 420 2.49  1.96 0.051 13.84 
INF 420 31.9 328.87 -9.15 5016.1 
INSQ 420 1.87 5.23 -8 9 
OPPN 420 61.49 25.89 19.68 136.48 
EXCH 420 553.04 835.95 0.140 7384.4 
POP 420 2.480 1.173 -6.766 8.117 
NBTOT 420 119.18 38.94 21.39 283.17 
LAB 420 40.61 6.328 26.12 50.67 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata15. 
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 6.3.4.2. Cross-sectional dependence, unit root, and cointegration tests  
Similarly to previous chapters, this chapter also conducted a CD test using Pesaran 
(2004). According to Table 6.20, we strongly reject the null hypothesis cross-sectional 
independence in both models at a 1% level of significance.  







Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence 23.253 4.366 
The average absolute value of the off-diagonal 
elements 
0.458 0.175 
Probability 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Note: * ⇒ Existence of cross-sectional dependence  
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
Besides the cross-sectional dependency test, the study examined the panel unit root of 
the variables in the model. Due to cross-section dependence in the models, similarly to chapter 
6.1, this study used the second-generation unit root test. Table 6.21 summarizes the panel unit 
root tests, both for the variables in level and first difference. The result fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary) for all variables at the first difference at a 1% level of 
significance. Since all the variables are highly significant at the first difference, we might 
expect a long-run relationship between these variables.  
 




CIPS (intercepts only)            
         Critical values Human capital model Growth model 
Levels 1st diff. Levels 1st diff. 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 10 % 5 % 1 % 












ED -2.086 - 4.691*** -2.086 - 4.691*** 
ED2 -1.785 -4.149*** -1.785 -4.149*** 
DSR -2.678*** -5.731*** -2.678*** -5.731*** 
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INF ----  ---- -3.968 ***   -5.897*** -2.14 -2.25 -2.45 
GDPGR  -4.584*** -3.533***  -4.584*** -3.533*** 
INSQ -2.661*** -5.175*** ---- ----- 
OPPN --- --- -2.266** -4.650*** 
EXCH --- --- -1.748 -3.460*** 
LAB ----- ----- -0.996 -0.996*** 
POP -1.91 -3.533*** ----- ----- 
NBTOT -1.925 -5.167*** --- ----  
Note: *** ⇒ Significant (stationary) at 1% level  
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
Since all variables are highly significant and stationary at the first differences, we can 
proceed to the cointegration test. Based on CD results and the number of variables in each 
model, this study employed Westerlund (2007) cointegration test for human capital model. On 
the other hand, it used McCoskey – Kao (1998) for growth model. Table 6.22 shows a long-
run relationship among the variables in both models at a 1% level of significance. 
 
Table 6.22 Panel cointegration test 
 HIPCs 
Human capital model 
(Westerlund (2007)) 
Growth Model 
(McCoskey and Kao 
(1998)) 
Statistic   p-value Statistic   p-value 
Variance ratio 6.9837 0.0000*** ----- ----- 
Modified Dickey-Fuller t  -20.2288 0.0000*** 
Dickey-Fuller t -16.4146 0.0000*** 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -10.5852 0.0000*** 
Unadjusted modified Dickey-Fuller t -28.4548 0.0000*** 
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t   -17.2657 0.0000*** 
Note: *** ⇒ Significant at 1% level 




6.3.4.3. SUR estimation results 
 
Table 6.23 shows the estimation result of the impact of external debt on HCD and growth 
by considering the human capital channel in which external debt affects growth. The result 
supports the hypothesis that external debt has a negative relationship with human capital 
measured using HDI. The coefficient for external debt indicates that a percentage increase in 
external debt accumulations reduces human capital by 0.18 %. This means when external 
borrowing of HIPCs increases their human capital becomes worse compared to the previous 
years. This negative relationship supports the hypothesis of the debt overhang and the crowding 
out effect theories. This result is also consistent with the findings of Egungwu (2018) and 
Ampah (2020).  
The relationship between external debt and human capital is also non-linear, expressed 
by the coefficient of the quadratic term of external debt, even though their relationship is 
contrary to the theoretical expectation of an inverted U-shape. The result confirms that up to 
236 % of external debt stock to GDP, the relationship between the external debt stock and 
human capital is negative; over this limit, it is positive. This means above the 236% debt 
threshold, external debt has a positive effect on HCD. Hence, in this study, the relationship 
between external debt and HCD is negative and non-linear but does not follow a U-shaped 
form. Moreover, the individual country estimation shows that the relationship between external 
debt and HCD is inverted U-shape (in four countries), U-shape (in two countries), positive and 
non-linear (in one country), only non-linear (in three countries), only linear (in one country), 
and insignificant (for four countries).  
Similar to chapter 6.1 but different from chapter 6.2, this chapter found a negative and 
non-linear relationship between external debt and one of its channel variables through which 
external debt affects growth. This result is also consistent with Ampah’s (2020) findings but 
contrary to Zaghdoudi (2018). The reason for the existence of an inverted U-shape relationship 
between external debt and human development in Zaghdoudi (2018) can be the countries 
included in the study. Around 70% of Zaghdoudi (2018) case studies were non-HIPCs, and 
even some of them are emerging and European countries with better debt management 
strategies. Besides, Zaghdoudi (2018) measured the square of external debt as (external debt * 
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growth of external debt) rather than our measurement (external debt * external debt), which 
may explain the difference in the estimated results.  
The result in Table 5.28 also confirmed that, in the long run, external debt service 
significantly increases the human capital of HIPCs over the studied period. A percentage point 
increase in debt service raises the human capital by 2.2 percent. Regarding this, Fosu (2007; 
2010) independently examined the impact of actual and predicted debt service on social 
spending’s, such as education and health, and concluded that relative to actual debt service, the 
predicted debt service that reflects the debt burden exhibits adverse impact on social spending. 
Hence, in our study, the debt service is the actual debt service rather than the expected one. 
Therefore, when the government paid its liability in the long run, potential investors prefer to 
invest more, which positively affects welfare-related investments (education and health).  
The net barter TOT and institutional quality significantly increases the human capital 
development of HIPCs in the study period. A one-point increment in the net barter TOT and 
institutional quality increases the human capital development by 0.00023 and 0.0057 points, 
respectively. Improvement in TOT means the export price index of countries is better than their 
imports and hence countries can get enough foreign exchange, which helps to invest in either 
of HDI elements. However, the population growth of HIPCs significantly reduces the human 
capital of nations. The result reveals that a percentage increases in population lead to about 
0.96 reductions in human capital. This means population growth of HIPCs can hinder 
households and governments’ spending on education, health, poverty reduction activities, and 
individuals’ per capita income.       
Table 6.23 Results of SUR model for HIPCs 
Equations  Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
HDI  
(Equation 18) 
ED -0.0018 0.00035 0.000*** 
ED2 3.80e-06 1.39e-06 0.006*** 
DSR 0.0225 0.00272 0.000***  
GDPGR 0.0031 0.00082 0.000***  
POP -0.0096 0.0040 0.017** 
NBTOT 0.00023 0.00011 0.045** 
INSQ 0.0057  0.0009 0.000*** 
Constant  0.4302 0.0226 0.000***  
GDPGR HDI 9.601 3.190 0.003***  
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(Equation 19) ED -0.0303 0.0223 0.175 
ED2 0.00016 0.00008 0.061* 
DSR -0.1508 0.1887 0.424 
LAB 0.0882 0.0468 0.060* 
OPPN 0.02075 0.0140 0.140 
INF -0.0012 0.00090 0.186 
EXCH 0.0005 0.00035 0.107 
Constant  -4.1454 2.6565 0.119 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R-sq Chi2 P 
HDI 420  7 0.0920 0.328 220.72 0.0001 
GDPGR 420  8 5.661  0.044 68.00  0.0000 
Notes: *, **, *** ⇒ Significant at 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
The estimated result of the growth model shows that external debt insignificantly reduces 
the GDP growth of HIPCs, which does not support either the debt overhang or crowding out 
effect theories. However, the positive and statistically significant quadratic term of external 
debt only (since the coefficient of the linear term of external debt is insignificant) shows the 
existence of a non-linear relationship between external debt and GDP growth. Furthermore, a 
single country estimation result confirmed that the relationship between external debt and GDP 
growth is U-shape (in two countries), insignificant (in 12 countries), and only non-linear (in 
one country). 
The other significant result is the reciprocal interrelationship between human capital and 
GDP growth. An increase of one point in HDI leads to a 9.6 percentage point increase in GDP 
growth, and a one percentage point increase in GDP growth increases human capital by 0.31 
percent. Higher levels of human capital affect the economy by enhancing citizens' capacities 
and, consequently, their creativity and productivity. Many studies argue that as people hold 
either of HDI elements, they indirectly contribute more to economic growth through labor 
productivity, improved technology, attracting more foreign capital, and higher exports. 
Therefore, considering human capital as a production factor, this result is consistent with the 
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classical theories of economic growth35, growth accounting framework, and endogenous 
growth theorist who argue the vital role of human capital for economic growth. Similarly, the 
result confirms that the GDP growth of HIPCs positively contributes to their human capital 
development. This means when the economy grows, governments can have enough resources 
to spend on education and health. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, the GDP growth of countries 
leads to raising citizens’ per capita income, which improves their living standard. Concerning 
this, using the endogenous growth model, Mulligan – Sala-i-Martin (1992) noted that economic 
growth can increase the return rate on human capital and individuals can invest more in it. 
Furthermore, the strong connection between human capital and economic growth is explained 
by the two chains model of Ranis – Stewart (2005). They argue that economic growth provides 
the resources to permit sustained improvements in human development. Similarly, human 
development improvements raise the capacities of economic agents who make critical 
contributions to growth.    
The results in Table 6.23 also reveals that external debt affects growth through the HCD 
channel. This means we observed that external debt negatively affects human capital. There is 
a positive relationship between human capital and growth; therefore, we can conclude that 
external debt affects growth indirectly through the human capital channel. This conclusion was 
also obtained in the previous findings, even though the channel variables are different. While 
in chapter 6.1 and 6.2, investment and national saving were considered the channels in which 
external debt affects growth, in this chapter, human capital development was examined as a 
channel. Therefore, regardless of these variations, all commonly confirmed that there is a 
channel through which external debt affects growth.  
Finally, to ensure the robustness of the above result, this study divided the dataset into 
two sub-regions (HIPCs in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and HIPCs in non-SSA), but the 
estimation was carried out only for 12 HIPCs in SSA. This is because HIPCs in non-SSA are 
only three countries and hence the observations will be n*T = 84. However, in econometrics, 
the minimum rule for estimation is 5*parameters < observations. The parameters for three 
countries (n+T) are 31, and estimation for HIPCs in non-SSA did not fulfil the minimum rule 
of econometrics and hard to accept the estimated results. Therefore, the results in Table 6.24 
show, except for numerical differences in the coefficients, the impact of external debt on human 
                                                          
35 Adam Smith had a significant influence, in whose vision the accumulation of human capital, technological 
advancement and specialization of labor are considered the main sources of economic growth (Daniela-Mihaela 
– Oana-Georgiana 2015). 
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capital (negative and non-linear) and growth (only non-linear), and the human capital channel 
effect of external debt on growth which was observed for HIPCs also existed for HIPCs in SSA 
countries. 
Table 6.24 Results of SUR model for HIPCs in SSA countries 
Equations  Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
HDI  
(Equation 18) 
ED -0.0018 0.00031 0.000*** 
ED2 3.89e-06 1.27e-06 0.023** 
DSR 0.0091 0.00267 0.001***  
GDPGR 0.003 0.00064 0.000***  
POP 0.011 0.0033 0.001*** 
NBTOT -0.0001 0.00011 0.328 
INSQ -0.0027  0.00084  0.001*** 
Constant  0.428 0.0197 0.000***  
GDPGR 
(Equation 19) 
HDI 22.159 5.320 0.000***  
ED -0.0302 0.0277 0.276 
ED2 0.00024 0.00001 0.025** 
DSR 0.0081 0.247 0.974 
LAB 0.090 0.054 0.098* 
OPPN 0.022 0.0196 0.261 
INF -0.0284 0.0261 0.276 
EXCH 0.00055 0.00039 0.163 
Constant  -9.258 3.443 0.007*** 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R-sq Chi2 P 
HDI 336  7 0.07115 0.27 157.74 0.0000*** 
GDPGR 336  8 6.223  0.048 47.58 0.0000*** 
Notes: *, **, *** ⇒ Significant at 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
Finally, we observed that although external debt and external debt service are strongly related, 
they have opposing effects on HDI. That means an increase in the stock of external debt 
negatively affects the human capital development (until a very high threshold value), while the 
external debt service has a positive effect on HDI. These opposing results might be due to huge 
differences in their magnitude. For instance, in Table 6.18, the amount of the average external 
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debt service reduces over time (it was below 2% of GDP between 2001 and 2015), which is 
almost insignificant amount. This might be the reason behind the positive effect of debt service 
on HDI. However, when we see the trends of total external debt, although it is reducing, on 
average, it is more than 40% of GDP from 1990 to 2005 and oscillating between 27 and 38% 
of GDP from 2006. This implies external debt is substantial and leads to an adverse effect on 
HDI. Furthermore, it is possible that debt service is a proxy of solvency. If a highly indebted 
country can pay the debt service, it means things are going relatively well (e.g., no civil war, 
no coup d’état, tax offices are working and can collect taxes) (Kotosz 2016).   
6.3.5. Chapter summary 
 
Both the growth accounting framework and endogenous growth theorists argue that 
human capital accumulation (development) is vital for economic growth. However, human 
capital accumulation and its effect on economic growth depend on the level of external debt 
accumulation. Besides, since the contradicting arguments between the Keynesian and Classical 
economists, the impact of external debt on growth is still a debatable issue. Furthermore, 
scholars noted that the relationship between external debt and growth can be non-linear rather 
than linear and also external debt can affect growth through the human capital channel. 
However, empirical studies about the channels and impact of external debt on the growth of 
HIPCs is given limited attention. Therefore, this chapter aimed to investigate the impact of 
external debt on HCD and growth by considering the HCD channel through which external 
debt affects the growth of HIPCs by employing the SUR model for the period from 1990 to 
2017. The result indicates that external debt has a negative and significant impact on HCD. 
This chapter also found that the relationship between external debt and HCD is negative and 
non-linear, but only non-linearity is observed between external debt and growth. Besides, the 
result confirmed that external debt affects HIPCs growth through the HCD channel. As a result, 
this chapter does not reject the stated hypotheses – H5, H5a, and H5b.  Specifically, it 
does not reject the hypotheses that external debt has (H5) a direct or indirect impact on 
human capital development and the economic growth of HIPCs, (H5a) a significant and 
non-linear impact on both HCD and economic growth in HIPC, and (H5b) a significant 




6.4. THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL DEBT ON TOTAL FACTOR 
PRODUCTIVITY AND GROWTH 
Introduction 
  
The main goal of this chapter is to analyze the impact of external debt on TFP and 
economic growth in the case of HIPCs. Similarly to the previous chapter, this chapter also 
considered the non-linear relationship between the variables, employed the second-generation 
panel analysis, the SUR estimation technique, for the time between 1990 and 2017. This 
chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.4.1 discusses background information, while section 
6.4.2 offers the literature review. Section 6.4.3. presents the stylized facts about TFP, external 
debt, and growth in HIPCs. The estimated results and discussion and summary of the chapter 
are presented in section 6.4.4 and section 6.4.5, respectively.  
6.4.1. Background of the study 
 
Issues about how high and sustainable economic growth can be achieved are the concerns 
of economists, governments, and policymakers. Established growth literature argues that 
factors of production and TFP are the two main factors for output growth. Factors of production 
refer to physical capital and labor forces, while TFP denotes other things that affect growth 
other than physical capital and labor. Since the days of Adam Smith (theory of specialization), 
the concept of TFP has become the focus of studies on economic growth and production 
efficiency, and it measures how well inputs are used in production. Factors, such as innovation 
in technology, sound economic policies, and institutional quality can improve the performance 
of produced output per unit of inputs, which enhances productivity. Furthermore, the level of 
productivity can increase investments rate of returns and then lead to economic growth 
(Garzarelli – Limam 2019). 
Economists and growth theorists commonly argue that factor productivity plays a vital 
role in economic growth rate, global competitiveness, the welfare of a nation (Klenow et al. 
1997; Easterly – Levine 2001; Garzarelli – Limam 2019). Regarding this, the first two popular 
models which discussed the economy responds to changes in technological progress along with 
other factor inputs (investment and labor) are the Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) which led to 
the neoclassical model – Solow or Solow – Swan model. The neoclassical growth model is the 
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method of growth accounting36, and the growth accounting offers a breakdown of observed 
economic growth into its main components, namely the changes due to the growth in factor 
inputs, such as capital and labor and the residual or unexplained technological component. In 
the analysis of growth accounting, this component is called the ‘Solow residual’ or TFP or 
multi-factor productivity (Erken et al. 2009). 
There is a contradictory school of thoughts concerning the impact of external debt on 
growth – the Keynesians and Classical economists. The Keynesians argue that external debt 
has a positive contribution to growth, but the Classicals postulate the reverse. Besides, based 
on the type of functional model, empirical findings concerning the impact of external debt on 
economic growth can be broadly categorized into two groups. The first group considers a linear 
relationship between external debt and growth, while the second group uses a non-linear model. 
However, similarly to the theories, empirical studies about the impact of external debt on 
growth are mixed and inconclusive. Besides the direct effect of external debt on growth, in 
recent times, an essential feature of the research in this area indicates that there is a channel 
(e.g., TFP) in which external debt is transmitted to the economy and affects the economic 
growth of nations (Pattillo et al. 2004; Schclarek 2005; Checherita-Westphal – Rother 2012; 
Riffat – Munir 2015; Silva 2020).  
At the early stage of development, most developing and emerging countries borrow from 
abroad to finance their resource gap, domestic investment, and economic growth. Concerning 
this, the Keynesians argue that external debt positively contributes to growth, but the classicals 
postulate the reverse. The Classical economists argue that once the debt grows more prominent 
and unmanageable, it becomes a major bottleneck for growth. This implies that even though 
the TFP plays a vital role in countries' economic growth, external debt can depress economic 
growth by lowering TFP growth. The efficiency of investment and productivity can be affected 
by a lousy policy environment. Also, a large amount of external debt (the debt overhang) can 
hinder the incentive for technological advancement or use limited resources efficiently, and 
this leads to slower productivity growth (Pattillo et al. 2002, 2004; Clements et al. 2005; 
Schclarek 2005; Akinlo 2005; Kumar – Woo 2010; Checherita-Westphal – Rother 2012; Riffat 
– Munir 2015; Shahzad – Javid 2015).  
Among the existing empirical studies about the impact of external debt on TFP, Schclarek 
(2005), Akinlo (2005), Kumar – Woo (2010), Afonso – Jalles (2011), and Silva (2020) 
                                                          
36 It has its roots in work by Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) and, in an earlier stage, Tinbergen (1942). 
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examined the linear impact of external debt on TFP. However, Pattillo et al. (2004), Checherita-
Westphal – Rother (2012), Riffat – Munir (2015), and Adeve (2016) focused on the non-linear 
one. Differently, Shahzad – Javid (2015) used both linear and non-linear models in their study. 
However, as far as the author's knowledge, there are no empirical studies in the case of heavily 
indebted poor countries (HIPCs) specifically, which leads a literature (knowledge) gap in the 
area. For example, Akinlo (2005) examined 34 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries; however, 
currently, around 30% of the sampled countries are not found in the list of HIPCs. Furthermore, 
the study is outdated and employed a conventional estimation technique. Similarly, Adeve 
(2016) investigated Togo, which is one of HIPCs. However, a single country study, especially 
for Togo (smallest in area and 33rd in population size in Africa), cannot represent HIPCs and 
its policy recommendations. Only a few studies used the dynamic model, mostly GMM, but it 
captures only the short-run dynamics and ignores the long-run relationships between the 
variables. Besides, except for Afonso – Jalles (2011), all the other studies mistakenly missed 
the possible inter-dependences among the cross-sectional unit and their regressors. However, 
according to Pesaran (2007), neglecting the CD among regressors and across countries when it 
is present in the data can lead to misleading inferences. Therefore, this study fills the previous 
findings’ limitations by employing a dynamic model that captures the long-run results along 
with the CD test, for most concerned countries (HIPCs), and using the latest data.    
Based on the above evidence, it is possible to conclude that the empirical studies about 
the TFP channel through which external debt of a country affects economic growth are limited 
in general and non-existent for HIPCs in particular. Even the existing studies about the impact 
of external debt on economic growth that considered the non-linear relationship between them 
are not found in HIPCs. This leads to a literature (knowledge) gap in the area.  
Hence, having contradictory theories and mixed and inconclusive empirical studies, gaps 
in the literature, methodologies, and scope; this study aims to examine these theories and fill 
the existing gaps. Therefore, this study's primary objective was to investigate the impact of 
external debt on TFP and growth in HIPCs using time series data ranging from 1990 to 2017. 
This study also employed a non-linear model and investigated the TFP channel through which 





6.4.2. Literature review  
 
This section begins by discussing the theoretical relationship between external debt, TFP, 
and growth. Besides, since the empirical relationship between external debt and economic 
growth was discussed in chapter 6.1, this section selectively presents empirical findings on the 
impact of external debt on TFP. 
 6.4.2.1. The link between external debt, TFP, and growth 
 
One of the leading theories which links external debt and growth is debt overhang 
hypothesis. It also takes the TFP into account as one of the channels through which external 
debt affects economic growth. According to this theory, a massive external debt accumulation 
adversely affects economic growth by reducing the TFP growth. Due to excessive external 
debt, governments fear that foreign creditors will take a significant part of the future profit and 
then they will be inactive to undertake reforms, which will make a country unfavorable for 
investment, affecting growth (Akinlo 2005; Riffat – Munir 2015; Shahzad – Javid 2015). 
Besides, due to debt overhang, investors will be uncertain about the feature which hinder their 
investment in technological improvement and hence the efficient use of factor inputs (Pattillo 
et al. 2004; Riffat – Munir 2015; Shahzad – Javid 2015). This is because investors will spend 
on short term projects (have quick return) rather than the long term when a high uncertainty 
emerges from debt overhang. This misallocation of resources and less productive investment 
projects may result in slower productivity growth (Shahzad – Javid 2015), and hence external 
debt affects economic growth through TFP. Moreover, after reviewing several studies, Akinlo 
(2005) noted that external debt could adversely affect TFP through its effects on investment 
(through debt overhang) and exports (via debt service). Furthermore, various debt burden 
indicators could reduce expenditures on public sectors and thus productivity. However, 
external debt stock can increase TFP when taken as evidence of creditworthiness, indicating 
higher expected foreign exchange availability and a positive contribution on investment 




 6.4.2.2. Empirical literature  
Table 6.25 presents empirical studies about the impact of external debt on TFP and 
economic growth while the impact of external debt on growth is already discussed in chapter 
6.1. Therefore, for precise and easy understanding, the Table classified each study according 
to the author's name with year of publication, the adopted model, the scope of study in terms 
of time and case studies, and their findings.  





The scope and case 




The impact of external debt on TFP 





GMM, and system 
GMM) 
From 1969 to 1998, 
61 developing 
countries  
A high level of external debt 
harms TFP growth. 
Akinlo 
(2005) 
FE From 1980 to 2002, 
34 SSA countries 




System-GMM  Seven 5-year 
periods from1970 
to 2002, 24 
industrial and 59 
developing 
countries 
Limited evidence found on 
the relationship between 





(BE) and GMM 
From 1970 to 2007, 




Initial government debt has 






From 1970 to 2008, 
155 countries 
Higher debt ratios are 
beneficial to TFP growth 
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GMM  From 1970 to 2010, 
12-Euro area 
countries 






Pooled OLS  From 1991 to 2013, 
South Asia 
countries  
Debt affects economic 
growth through TFP 
Shahzad – 
Javid (2015) 
FE and GMM From 1984 to 2007, 
developing Asian 
countries  
Debt is negatively and 







From 1980 to 2012, 
Togo 
The external public debt 
improves the productive 
efficiency of the economy 
Silva (2020) OLS From 1999 to 2019, 
Portugal  
There is no evidence that 
gross external debt affected 
the private TFP 
Source: Constructed by the author 
 
Based on Table 6.25, concerning the impact of external debt on TFP, we can easily see 
that there are no empirical studies in the case of most concerned countries (HIPCs) even though 
there is tangible evidence in which their external debt stock led them unsustainability and 
frequent debt cancellation and relief. Of course, Akinlo (2005) examined 34 SSA countries; 
however, the sampled countries, such as Angola, Botswana, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe are not found in the current IMF list of 
post-completion-point HIPCs. Furthermore, the study's time scope ends in 2002, which is 
outdated, and the study also employed a conventional estimation technique that does not 
consider the dynamic nature of the model. Similarly, Adeve (2016) examined one of HIPCs 
(Togo); however, a single country study cannot represent HIPCs. Therefore, the findings and 
policy recommendations of previous studies may not represent and be applicable to HIPCs.  
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Concerning the methodology, except for few studies, such as Pattillo et al. (2004), 
Schclarek (2005), Kumar – Woo (2010), Afonso – Jalles (2011), Checherita-Westphal – Rother 
(2012), and Shahzad – Javid (2015) applied the dynamic estimation technique – GMM or 
system-GMM. However, the GMM method provides only the short-run relationship among the 
model variable and ignores the long-run one. Besides, except for Afonso – Jalles (2011), all 
the previous studies mistakenly ignored the possible inter-dependences among the cross-
sectional unit and their regressors. Furthermore, except for Silva (2020), whose case study is 
in Portugal, the time scope of previous studies is somehow outdated. Therefore, we can say 
that due to the limitations of the employed estimation technique and outdated data of previous 
findings, their estimated results and policy recommendations are doubtful and may not work 
these days, not only for HIPCs but also for others.  
Besides, empirical studies about the TFP channel through which a country's external debt 
affects economic growth are limited in general and non-existent for HIPCs in particular. 
Although there are several studies about the impact of external debt on economic growth, 
studies that focus on the non-linear relationship between them are limited in general and 
specifically in HIPCs. These lead to the literature (knowledge) gap in the area. For example, 
there are many empirical findings of the linear or non-linear impact of external debt on growth. 
However, only Pattillo et al. (2004), Schclarek (2005), Kumar –  Woo (2010),  Checherita-
Westphal – Rother (2012), Afonso – Jalles (2011), Riffat – Munir (2015), and Silva (2020) 
investigated the TFP channel through which external debt affects growth using a non-linear 
model.  
Furthermore, Table 6.1 also presented findings that used a non-linear model to analyze 
external debt’s impact on economic growth. As observed, empirical studies in the case of 
HIPCs are not found, leading to the literature gap. Besides, except for a few studies, most 
studies used conventional estimation techniques that ignore the dynamic nature of the data and 
countries. Even though some of them used a dynamic estimation technique such as GMM, but 
it also has a limitation. Moreover, except Zaghdoudi (2018), all other studies are outdated in 
time scope. Therefore, this study fills the existing gaps in scope (both time and case studies), 





6.4.3. Stylized facts of TFP, external debt, and growth in HIPCs 
Due to a lack of available data, especially on TFP, this section is constrained to present 
the existing facts only for 17 post-completion-point HIPCs between 1990 and 2017.  
 
Table 6.26 TFP, external debt, and GDP growth of 17 HIPCs37 
Year  TFP GDP growth (% 
annual)* 
Total external 
debt (% GDP)* 
Total external debt 
service (% GDP)* 
1990 0.473 0.878 65.997 3.561 
1991 0.456 1.532 66.653 3.771 
1992 0.418 -0.881 69.471 3.089 
1993 0.396 0.189 71.591 3.154 
1994 0.380 -0.877 75.477 3.536 
1995 0.380 5.693 74.069 3.486 
1996 0.377 4.429 67.227 3.700 
1997 0.372 4.471 60.945 3.299 
1998 0.366 4.883 60.052 3.346 
1999 0.356 3.489 56.615 3.124 
2000 0.361 2.233 53.002 2.823 
2001 0.364 3.668 46.718 2.274 
2002 0.376 5.484 48.085 2.129 
2003 0.390 3.856 49.053 1.989 
2004 0.384 4.878 48.057 2.010 
2005 0.386 4.431 42.603 1.977 
2006 0.401 5.872 30.364 1.904 
2007 0.390 4.455 29.793 2.318 
2008 0.377 4.856 29.536 2.413 
2009 0.361 3.022 32.602 2.167 
2010 0.346 4.955 31.430 2.059 
2011 0.340 4.509 32.890 2.259 
2012 0.340 6.710 32.641 2.056 
                                                          
37 Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Honduras, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Togo 
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2013 0.335 4.009 36.368 2.197 
2014 0.331 5.366 36.785 2.384 
2015 0.327 3.360 38.058 2.490 
2016 0.326 4.682 38.125 2.775 
2017 0.323 4.731 41.717 3.666 
Source: Computed by the author using Penn World Table 9.1 and WDI* databases. 
Table 6.26 shows that the TFP of HIPCs was better in the early 1990s, which was above 
0.41. However, from 1993 it declined and fluctuated between 0.356 and 0.396 until it grew to 
0.4 in 2006. But, since 2007, the TFP of HIPCs has continuously deteriorated. Table 6.26 also 
shows that the HIPCs recorded negative GDP growth for a few years in the early 1990s. 
However, after better performance in 1995, HIPCs had a deteriorated GDP growth for a decade. 
In 2006 and 2012, the GDP growth was good, even though it was not sustained after those 
years. Both the total external debt and debt services of HIPCs were relatively worse and better 
in the 1990s and after 2000, respectively.  
6.4.4. Empirical results and discussion 
This section presents the study's empirical results, such as descriptive statistics of the 
variables, basic panel econometric tests (CD, panel unit root, panel cointegration), and the SUR 
estimation results.  
6.4.4.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables in both TFP and growth models are presented 
in Table 6.27. From the Table, we can observe that TFP has a small variation, which is indicated 
by its range (gap) between the minimum (0.1278) and maximum (0.87) values. Besides, the 
variable also has a mean of 0.356. Similarly, when we consider external debt variable behavior, 
its variation is not significant, and its range lies in 10.23 and 278.97. This chapter's other target 
variable is GDPGR and DSR, and their means are 3.79 and 2.49, respectively. The range of 
GDPGR is between -50.24 and 35.22, while between 0.051 and 13.84 for DSR; this implies 
both variables have a small range (see Table 6.27 for other variables). 
 
Table 6.27 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.   Min Max 
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TFP 420 0.3567 0.12615 0.1278 0.8703 
GDPGR 420 3.79 5.79 -50.24 35.22 
ED   420 57.88 41.46 10.23 278.97 
ED2 420 5065.9 10090.14 104.77 77829.37 
DSR 420 2.49  1.96 0.051 13.84 
INF 420 31.9 328.87 -9.15 5016.1 
POLITY 2 420 1.87 5.23 -8 9 
OPPN 420 61.49 25.89 19.68 136.48 
EXCH 420 553.04 835.95 0.140 7384.4 
POP 420 2.480 1.173 -6.766 8.117 
NBTOT 420 119.18 38.94 21.39 283.17 
LAB 420 40.61 6.328 26.12 50.67 
GCF 420 21.001 9.743 -2.424 61.468 
OPPN 420 61.498 25.896 19.684 136.48 
UNEMP 420 4.115 2.935 0.266 12.482 
HC 420 0.4272 0.1124 0.199 0.693 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata15. 
 
6.4.4.2. Cross-sectional dependence, unit root, and cointegration tests  
 
This study conducted a CD test using Pesaran (2004) and the result strongly rejects the 
null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence at a 1 % level of significance in both models. 
Besides, the average absolute correlation of the residuals is 0.375 and 0.181 in TFP and growth 
models, respectively, which are very high values. Hence, there is enough evidence suggesting 
the presence of CD (see Table 6.28). 




TFP model Growth model 
Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence 7.189 4.616 
The average absolute value of the off-diagonal 
elements 
0.375 0.181 
Probability 0.0000* 0.0000* 
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Note: * ⇒ existence of cross-sectional dependence  
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
Once we confirmed CD in the models, the next step is checking the stationary behavior 
of all variables included in the models. Hence, due to the presence of CD, like in chapters 6.1 
and 6.3, this chapter employed the second-generation panel unit root test – Pesaran (2007) of 
CIPS test (see Table 6.29). The result shows that all the variables are stationary and highly 
significant at the first difference (I(1)), making us predict a long-run relationship between the 
variables. 
 




CIPS (intercepts only)            
         Critical values TFP model Growth model 
Levels 1st diff. Levels 1st diff. 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 10 % 5 % 1 % 















ED -2.086 - 4.691*** -2.086 - 4.691*** 
ED2 -1.785 -4.149*** -1.785 -4.149*** 
DSR -2.678*** -5.731*** -2.678*** -5.731*** 
INF ----  ---- -3.968 ***   -5.897*** 
GDPGR  -4.584*** -3.533***  -4.584*** -3.533*** 
POLITY2 -2.661*** -5.175*** ----  ---- 
OPPN ----  ---- -2.266** -4.650*** 
EXCH ----  ---- -1.748 -3.460*** 
LAB ----  ---- -0.996 -0.996*** 
POP -1.91 -3.533*** ----  ---- 
UNEMP -1.389 -3.957*** ----  ---- 
HC -2.073 -3.656 *** ----  ---- 
NBTOT -1.925 -5.167*** ----  ---- 
GCF -2.737*** -5.151*** ----  ---- 
Note: *** ⇒ significant (stationary) at 1% level  




This study conducted a panel cointegration test to confirm our expectation of a long-run 
relationship among the variables in the models. Therefore, since our models exhibit CD and 
have more than seven regressors in each model, this study employed McCoskey – Kao (1998) 
type of cointegration test (see Table 6.30). The result confirms, at a 1% level of significance, 
there is a long-run relationship among the variables in both models. 
 
Table 6.30 Panel cointegration test, McCoskey – Kao (1998) 
 HIPC 
TFP Model  Growth Model  
Statistic   p-value Statistic   p-value 
Modified Dickey-Fuller t -3.0439 0.0012*** -19.5188 0.0000*** 
Dickey-Fuller t -3.8873 0.0001*** -16.1764 0.0000*** 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -2.8811 0.0020*** -10.2125 0.0000*** 
Unadjusted modified Dickey-Fuller t -3.5029 0.0002*** -28.2299 0.0000*** 
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t   -4.0612 0.0000*** -17.1410 0.0000*** 
Note: *** ⇒Significant at 1% level 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
6.4.4.3. SUR estimation results 
 
The SUR estimation results about the impact of external debt on TFP and economic 
growth is found in Table 6.31. Besides, the result considered the non-linear relationship 
between the variables and the TFP channel through which external debt is transmitted to the 
economy of HIPCs. Our target variable – external debt – negatively and significantly affects 
both TFP and GDP growth. A linear coefficient of external debt indicates that a percentage 
increase in external debt stock reduces TFP and GDP growth by 0.176 % and 0.043 percentage 
point, respectively. Therefore, this negative relationship between external debt and TFP (GDP 
growth) supports the debt overhang hypothesis. In line with this study, the result of chapter 6.1 
also supports debt overhang hypothesis, which means external debt significantly reduces both 
investment and growth of HIPCs. When we consider the impact of external debt on TFP alone, 
this result is consistent with the findings of Akinlo (2005), Checherita-Westphal – Rother 
(2012), and Shahzad – Javid (2015), and Adeve (2016), but contradicts with Kumar – Woo 
(2010); Afonso – Jalles (2011); Riffat – Munir (2015); Silva and (2020). Furthermore, the 
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negative impact of external debt on the growth of this study also coincides with Afxentiou 
(1993); Elbadawi et al. (1997); Fosu (1996); Iyoha (1999); Chowdhury (2001); Were (2001); 
Ayadi – Ayadi (2008); Diallo (2009); Choong et al. (2010); Safdari – Mehrizi (2011); 
Hailemariam (2011); Ajayi – Oke (2012); Shabbir (2013); Senadza et al. (2017); Shittu et al. 
(2018); Abdelaziz et al. (2019).  
However, the coefficient of the square of external debt has a positive and significant 
effect on both TFP and GDP growth, which confirms a non-linear relationship between the 
variables. However, it does not coincide with the theory of an inverted U-shape relationship. 
The result in Table 6.31 shows that up to 126.4 and 128.8% of external debt stock to GDP, the 
relationship between the external debt stock and TFP and GDP growth is negative; over this 
limit, it is positive, respectively. This means the external debt positively affects TFP and GDP 
growth above 126.4 and 128.8 debt threshold, respectively. However, it is difficult to conclude 
that the relationship between external debt and TFP (GDP growth) is U-shaped. As, except for 
Mozambique (between 1990 and 2000) and Nicaragua (between 1990 and 1995), all HIPCs 
external debt in most periods remained below the threshold values, the relationship is 
dominantly negative. Therefore, the relationship between external debt and TFP (GDP growth) 
is negative and non-linear. Besides, the individual country estimation confirmed that the 
relationship between external debt and TFP is U-shape (in one country), inverted U-shape (in 
two countries), insignificant (in nine countries), only linear (in one country), and only non-
linear (in two countries). Furthermore, the relationship between external debt and GDP growth 
is inverted U-shape (in one country), insignificant (for 13 countries), and only linear (in one 
country). 
Similarly to this finding, chapter 6.1 and 6.2 also obtained a negative and non-linear 
relationship between external debt and growth. A positive and significant effect of quadratic 
external debt on TFP of this result matches with Adeve (2016) findings but contradicts with 
Pattillo et al. (2004); Checherita-Westphal – Rother (2012); and Riffat – Munir (2015). 
Likewise, a positive and significant impact of quadratic external debt on GDP growth of this 
study coincides with Pattillo et al.38 (2002); Afonso – Jalles39 (2011); and Haron – Maingi 
(2018). Besides, since the findings of Schclarek (2005), Cordella et al. (2005), and Daud – 
Podivinsky (2012) did not support the existence of an inverted U-shape relationship between 
debt and growth, the result of this study is partially in line with these studies. However, it 
                                                          
38 when the total external debt-to-GDP ratio is below 35-40%. 
39 when debt-to-GDP ratio is below 30% 
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contradicts with Elbadawi et al. (1997); Siddiqui – Malik (2001); Pattillo et al. (2002); 
Clements et al. (2003); Oleksandr (2003); Pattillo et al. (2004); Kumar – Woo (2010), Afonso 
– Jalles40 (2011); Checherita-Westphal – Rother (2012); Lawanson (2014); Casares (2015); 
Riffat – Munir (2015); Thieu Dao – Oanh (2017); and Zaghdoudi (2018). 
The result in Table 6.31 also confirms that, in the long run, external debt service 
significantly increases the TFP, but it is insignificant on the GDP growth of HIPCs in the 
studied period. A percentage point increase in debt service raises the TFP by 2.4 %, which does 
not support the crowding out effect. Similarly, both unemployment and political stability 
significantly increase the TFP of HIPCs. A one percentage point and percent increase in 
population and political stability result in a 2.1 and 0.19 % increment in TFP, respectively. 
Unemployment significantly increases TFP, which is an unexpected result but not surprising. 
This may be due to the inappropriateness of the global definition and measurement of 
unemployment for developing countries. Even though unemployed is generally defined as a 
person who is actively searching for employment but unable to find work, due to lack of a well-
structured and more formalized labor market, most “unemployed” people in developing 
countries, e.g., in Africa, are participating in the informal economy and are productive, which 
hides the adverse effect of unemployment. For example, according to ILO (2018), 85.8 % of 
employment is informal in Africa. This implies unemployed people in Africa can be productive 
by participating in the informal economy. However, demographic factor-like population 
growth negatively and significantly reduces the TFP of HIPCs. The coefficient value implies 
that a percentage point increase in population leads to a 1.2 % reduction in TFP.  
 
Table 6.31 Results of SUR Model for the Total (HIPCs) Sample 
Equations  Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
TFP 
(Equation 20) 
ED -0.00176 0.0004 0.000*** 
ED2 6.96e-06 1.53e-06 0.000*** 
DSR 0.0246 0.003245 0.000***  
GCF -0.000316 0.0006409 0.622  
GDPGR 0.00224 0.0008775 0.011** 
NBTOT 1.67e-06 0.0001262 0.989 
POP -0.01238 0.00430 0.004*** 
                                                          
40 when debt-to-GDP ratio is above 90% 
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OPPN -0.00039 0.0002617 0.135 
INF 0.0000261 0.000022 0.245 
UNEMPL 0.02166 0.001823 0.000*** 
HC 0.01991 0.05837 0.733 
POLITY2 0.00198 0.001 0.049** 
Constant 0.3131 0.03281 0.000*** 
GDPGR 
(Equation 21) 
TFP 6.345 2.7737 0.022**  
ED -0.0438 0.02133 0.040** 
ED2 0.00017 0.000084 0.037** 
DSR -0.138 0.198 0.486 
LAB 0.1463 0.052 0.005*** 
OPPN 0.03359 0.0127 0.008*** 
INF -0.00123 0.00131 0.350 
EXCH 0.0007 0.00036 0.057* 
Constant  -4.855 3.197 0.129 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R-sq Chi2 P 
TFP 420  12 .0955845 0.4246 313.11 0.0000 
GDPGR 420  8 5.661957 0.0446 22.18 0.0046 
Notes: *, **, *** ⇒ Significant at 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
 
The growth model result shows that both the labor force and trade openness significantly 
contribute to the economy of HIPCs. A one percentage point increase in labor and openness 
results in raising the GDP growth by 0.14 and 0.033 percentage points, respectively. The other 
impressive result is the reciprocal interrelationship between TFP and GDP growth. A point 
increment in TFP leads to a 6.34 percentage point increase in GDP growth, and a one 
percentage point increase in GDP growth increases TFP by 0.22 percent. Both neoclassical and 
new endogenous growth theories argue that TFP is vital for sustainable growth. The 
neoclassical growth model assumes that due to decreasing returns to scale of capital stock and 
population growth, their long-run impact on economic growth is relatively less. Therefore, in 
the long run, exogenous TFP is the main economic growth factor (Solow 1956). Besides, 
endogenous growth theories confirm that TFP is the primary endogenous economic growth 
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factor (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988). Similarly, economic growth can provide basic 
infrastructures that help to enhance factors productivity. 
Furthermore, this study also estimated the impact of external debt on TFP and economic 
growth for HIPCs in SSA countries to ensure the robustness of the above HIPCs result. 
Therefore, Table 6.32 shows that debt negatively and significantly affects both TFP and GDP 
growth of HIPCs in SSA countries, which implies the debt overhang hypothesis also holds for 
the sub-region. Besides, we can say that there is a non-linear relationship between external debt 
with TFP because the coefficients of debt squared term have shown a significant sign. 
Therefore, similarly to HIPCs, the relationship between external debt and TFP is negative and 
non-linear. Correspondingly, the relationship between external debt and GDP growth is 
negative and non-linear in HIPCs in SSA. Like HIPCs, we can observe that external debt affects 
economic growth through the TFP channel in HIPCs in SSA countries (see Table 6.32). 
Concerning the channels, all chapters 6.1 – 6.4 commonly agree that external debt can affect 
the growth of HIPCs not only directly but also indirectly, through the growth factors 
(investment, national saving, HCD, and TFP).  
 
Table 6.32 Results of SUR Model for the HIPCs in SSA countries 
Equations  Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
TFP 
(Equation 20) 
ED -0.00211 0.0004 0.000*** 
ED2 7.85e-06 1.81e-06 0.000*** 
DSR 0.0257 0.00374 0.000***  
GCF -0.00028 0.000722 0.691  
GDPGR 0.00261 0.0008887 0.001*** 
NBTOT 0.0003 0.000155 0.049** 
POP -0.01151 0.00468 0.014** 
OPPN -0.0005 0.0003338 0.132 
INF 0.00146 0.0004161 0.000*** 
UNEMPL 0.02472 0.001923 0.000*** 
HCD -0.0519 0.09372 0.580 
POLITY2 0.00181 0.0011 0.125 
Constant 0.2902 0.04487 0.000*** 
GDPGR TFP 7.988 3.284 0.015**  
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(Equation 21) ED -0.0604 0.0263 0.022** 
ED2 0.00027 0.0001 0.012** 
DSR -0.0470 0.2612 0.857 
LAB 0.1782 0.0630 0.005*** 
OPPN 0.0469 0.0175 0.008*** 
INF -0.0462 0.0263 0.080* 
EXCH 0.0007 0.0004 0.063* 
Constant  -6.624 3.9 0.090* 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R-sq Chi2 P 
TFP 336  12 0.0946757 0.4585 289.03 0.0000 
GDPGR 336  8 6.176509 0.0630 26.15 0.0010 
Notes: *, **, *** ⇒ Significant at 10, 5, 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Computed by the author using Stata 15 
6.4.5. Chapter summary  
 
Every country aims to achieve high, rapid, and sustainable economic growth and 
development. Regarding this, in addition to factor inputs accumulation, both the neoclassical 
and new endogenous growth theories argue that TFP is vital for sustainable growth. Likewise, 
foreign borrowing is also essential to fill resource gaps and achieve economic growth. 
However, scholars argue that the impact of TFP on economic growth is determined by the level 
of external debt stock of countries, which implies external debt can affect growth through TFP 
channel – debt overhang theory. Besides, in recent times, scholars argue that the relationship 
between external debt and TFP (economic growth) is non-linear. Therefore, this chapter’s main 
objective was to investigate the impact of external debt on TFP and growth (considering TFP 
channel and non-linearity) for the HIPCs from 1990 to 2017 by employing the SUR model. 
The result confirms that external debt negatively and significantly affects both TFP and GDP 
growth. The result showed a non-linear relationship between them. Therefore, the relationship 
between external debt and TFP (GDP growth) is negative and non-linear. Furthermore, the 
result reveals that external debt affects the economic growth of HIPCs indirectly via TFP 
channel. Therefore, this chapter does not reject the hypotheses that external debt has (H6) 
a direct or indirect impact on total factor productivity and economic growth of HIPCs, 
(H6a) a significant and non-linear impact on both total factor productivity and growth in 




SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents the summary along with conclusions, contributions to the topic, 
and policy implications of the study. Therefore, this chapter is organized as follows: summaries 
of the studies focused on the key findings presented in section 7.1, while section 7.2 evaluates 
hypotheses and the study’s objectives. Section 7.3 provides the contributions of this 
dissertation in terms of the existed research gaps in the topic. Section 7.4 offers policy 
recommendations and the limitations of the study, respectively.   
7.1. Summary of the study 
This dissertation began by introducing the general structure of the study in chapter one. 
It provided the study’s background, statement of the problem, objectives, and hypothesis of the 
study. Besides, chapter one discussed the significance, scope, and organization of the study. 
Chapter two provided detailed information about the definitions of external debt, a description 
of the study area, the debt crisis, and the conditions after the debt crisis in HIPCs. Methodology 
of the study specifically data type, sources, and data analysis, panel econometrics procedures, 
and model specification, justifications, and estimation techniques are presented in chapter 
three. 
The empirical studies in the case of HIPCs began in chapter four. Before estimation, all 
models passed through basic steps in panel data econometrics, such as cross-sectional 
dependence, panel unit root and panel cointegration tests. All empirical chapters, except for 
chapter five, examined the period between 1990 and 2017 in the case of 15 HIPCs. Specifically, 
chapter four investigated the determinants of external debt, while chapter five examined 
whether the external debt is sustainable in HIPCs after the 1990s initiatives. It employed an 
indicator-based (from 2000-2018), CPIA policy rating (from 2005-2019) and intertemporal 
approach to the current account (from 2000-2017). To get robust and assertive results, in the 
intertemporal approach to the current account, this chapter classified countries into three 
strata—HIPCs in general, HIPCs in SSA countries and HIPCs in non-SSA. For the indicator-
based and CPIA policy rating approaches, it used a sample of 36 HIPCs, while 32 HIPCs for 
the intertemporal approach to the current account. 
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Chapter six is broad and investigated the impact of external debt on growth factors and 
growth in HIPCs, and also covered the examination of the indirect channels through which 
external debt affects growth. This chapter has four different sub-chapters (studies), and all of 
them are in the case of 15 HIPCs for the period from 1990 to 2017 and considered the non-
linear relationship between the variables. The first sub-chapter (chapter 6.1) examined the 
impact of external debt on investment and growth, employing the SUR estimation technique, 
while chapter 6.2 investigated the impact of external debt on national savings and growth in 
HIPCs and due to different results in CD test, it employed two estimation techniques: PMG 
and PCSE. Besides, chapter 6.3 explored the impact of external debt on HCD and growth in 
HIPCs by using the SUR estimation technique. Finally, chapter 6.4 examined the impact of 
external debt on TFP and growth in HIPCs by employing the SUR model.  
7.2. Conclusions of the study 
Based on the empirical result in chapter 4, 5, and 6, this study concludes that: 
1. The debt service, imports, and growth rate of advanced countries significantly increase 
external debt, while exports reduce it. Furthermore, foreign direct investment and 
political stability significantly reduce the external debt of HIPCs.  
2. External debt is not sustainable in either HIPCs in general or in sub-regions of HIPCs.  
3. External debt significantly reduces both investment and growth, which supports the 
debt overhang and crowding out effect theories of classical economists. Besides, the 
relationship between external debt and investment (and growth) is negative and non-
linear.  
4. There is a positive and non-linear impact of external debt on national saving, and the 
turning point is at 81.61 % of external debt to GDP. However, the effect of external 
debt on growth is negative and non-linear with the turning point at 220 % of external 
debt to GDP.  
5. External debt has a negative and significant impact on HCD which supports the debt 
overhang hypothesis, and also, the relationship between external debt and human 
capital is non-linear. Besides, the quadratic coefficient of external debt (positive and 
significant) indicates a non-linear relationship between external debt and growth.  
6. External debt negatively and significantly affects both TFP and GDP growth, and also 
it is observed that there is a non-linear relationship between them.  




Furthermore, based on the listed activities in sections 1.2 and 1.3, this section concludes 
and evaluates whether the objectives and hypotheses of the study are achieved or not. Hence, 
this study achieved its objectives by: 
I. Showing the magnitude and components of foreign debt in HIPCs and in sub-regions. 
II. Examining the determinants of external indebtedness in HIPCs  
III. Investigating the debt sustainability condition of HIPCs after the initiatives. 
IV. Examining the impact of external debt on growth factors and growth:  the channels 
through which external debt affect economic growth in HIPCs  
V. Providing policy recommendations. 
 
Besides achieving the objectives, the study also evaluated its hypotheses listed in 
section 1.3.   
I. H1: Both internal and external factors determine the level of external debt of HIPCs.  
Chapter four focused on examining this hypothesis and found that debt service, imports, 
and growth rate of advanced countries significantly increase external debt while exports reduce 
it. Furthermore, foreign direct investment and political stability significantly reduce the 
external debt of HIPCs. This implies that compared to external factors, domestic factors played 
a major role in determining the level of external debt in HIPCs. Therefore, this study fails to 
reject the hypothesis that both internal and external factors determine the level of 
external debt of HIPCs.  
II. H2: External debt is sustainable for HIPCs after the 1990s initiatives. 
By employing indicator-based and CPIA policy rating approaches (for 36 HIPCs) and 
intertemporal approach to the current account (for 32 HIPCs), chapter five evaluated the second 
hypothesis for the period between 2000/05 and 2017/18/19. All approaches confirmed that 
external debt is not sustainable; therefore, this study rejects the hypothesis that external 
debt is sustainable for HIPCs after the 1990s initiatives.  
III. H3: External debt has a direct or indirect impact on investment and economic growth 
of HIPCs. 
H3a: External debt has a significant and non-linear impact on both investment and 
growth in HIPCs.  




Chapter 6.1 examined the impact of external debt on investment and growth in 15 HIPCs 
using the SUR estimation technique from 1990-2017. Besides, it considered both a non-linear 
relationship between the variables and the investment channel through which external debt 
affects growth. The result shows that external debt significantly reduces both investment and 
growth. Also, the relationship between external debt and investment (and growth) is non-linear. 
Furthermore, the result confirmed that investment is a channel through which external debt 
affects the growth of HIPCs. Hence, this study fails to reject the hypotheses that external 
debt has (H3) a direct or indirect impact on investment and economic growth of HIPCs, 
(H3a) a significant and non-linear impact on both investment and growth in HIPCs, 
(H3b) has a significant effect on the growth of HIPCs through investment channel. 
IV. H4: External debt has a direct or indirect impact on the national saving and economic  
       growth of HIPCs. 
H4a: External debt has a significant and non-linear impact on both national saving and 
growth in HIPCs.  
H4b: External debt has a significant impact on growth through saving channel. 
Chapter 6.2 shows the reciprocal relationship between external debt and national saving 
(and growth). To make it clear, the relationship between external debt and national saving is 
positive and non-linear, but we observed a negative and non-linear relationship between 
external debt and growth. However, the result also noted that national saving is a channel 
through which external debt affects growth. Consequently, the hypothesis of external debt 
has (H4) a direct or indirect impact on the national saving and economic growth of 
HIPCs, (H4a) a non-linear impact of external debt on both national saving and growth in 
HIPCs, (H4b) a significant impact on growth through saving channel fails to reject in this 
study.    
V. H5: External debt has a direct or indirect impact on human capital development and the    
                  economic growth of HIPCs. 
 H5a: External debt has a significant and non-linear impact on both HCD and growth   
          in HIPCs.  
 H5b: External debt has a significant impact on growth through the HCD channel. 
Similarly to chapter 6.1, chapter 6.3 also employed the same estimation technique, time 
scope, and sampled countries to examine the above hypothesis. The result confirmed a non-
linear relationship between external debt and HCD (and growth) because the coefficient of the 
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quadratic term of external debt is significant. Besides, the result shows that external debt affects 
the growth of HIPCs indirectly through the HCD channel. Based on this evidence, this study 
fails to reject the stated hypotheses (H5, H5a, and H5b).  
VI. H6: External debt has a direct or indirect impact on total factor productivity and  
       economic growth of HIPCs. 
H6a: External debt has a significant and non-linear impact on both total factor   
        productivity and growth in HIPCs.  
H6b: External debt has a significant impact on growth through the TFP channel.  
The final hypothesis of this study examined in chapter 6.4., which explored the impact 
of external debt on TFP and economic growth along with considering the TFP channel. The 
chapter also considered a non-linear relationship between the variables and used the SUR 
estimation technique for 15 HIPCs for the time period ranging from 1990 to 2017. The chapter 
found that both TFP and GDP growth of HIPCs are negatively and significantly affected by 
their external debt accumulation. Besides, the relationship between external debt and TFP (and 
growth) is negative and non-linear. Furthermore, the result confirmed that external debt could 
affect the growth of HIPCs through the TFP channel; therefore, this study fails to reject the 
stated hypothesis (H6, H6a, and H6b).  
7.3.  Contributions to the literature  
This dissertation can contribute to the existing literature concerning determinants, 
sustainability, channels, and impacts of external debt in the case of HIPCs. More specifically, 
its contributions are presented below:  
a. This study contributes to filling the existing literature (knowledge) gaps in the topic. 
For example, it empirically examined the determinants of external debt, specifically for 
HIPCs. Besides, it is the only study in analyzing the external debt sustainability 
condition in the case of HIPCs. Furthermore, this study is the only study that considers 
the non-linear relationship between external debt and growth factors (and growth) in 
HIPCs. In addition to the non-linearity model, it considers the channels through which 
external debt affects growth. 
b. This study also contributes to filling the methodological limitations of previous 
findings. Therefore, this study employed dynamic models with the latest estimation 
technique, and also it considered the CD in its empirical models. 
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c. Concerning the scopes – this study is the latest study on the determinants, sustainability, 
channels, and impacts of external debt in HIPCs. Furthermore, it is the most specific 
(for only HIPCs), still holistic (considered all HIPCs regions, such as SSA, Latin 
America, and Asia).   
7.4.  Policy recommendations, limitations, and future studies 
This section provided the following policy recommendations based on the findings 
(descriptive and empirical) of the studies and intuitive knowledge.  
a. Chapter four confirmed that the debt service, imports, and growth rate of advanced 
countries significantly increase the external debt of HIPCs, while exports reduce it. 
Furthermore, foreign direct investment and political stability significantly reduce the 
external debt of HIPCs. Based on the above evidence, this study recommends increasing 
the export volume and revenue through export diversification, simplifying regulation 
related to exports, and providing short and long-term credits to the exporters. Also, the 
international trade communities should keep international standards developed by the 
International Organization for Standardization for exports of developing countries, which 
simplify unnecessary regulatory hurdles. For instance, according to World Economic 
Forum (2016) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2016), due to 
the difference between the regulations of the European Union and international standards, 
African exporters of textiles and clothes lost 50% of their potential export revenues. Even 
though all sampled countries are members of the world trade organization (WTO), the trade 
rules of WTO still unfavorable towards developing countries. Hence, it is better to improve 
the rules to promote HIPCs exports. Similarly, attracting foreign direct investment by 
reducing foreign direct investment restrictions, providing open, transparent, and 
dependable conditions for all kind of firms that assure basic and quality infrastructures, 
reforming domestic financial markets and political stability of countries, increasing FDI 
are essential. Finally, reducing luxury imports by increasing tax on them and the import 
substitutions are crucial to reduce the external debt stock of HIPCs. 
b. The results of chapter five revealed that external debt is not sustainable in either HIPCs or 
sub-regions of HIPCs.  Domestic policy failures, ineffective control of public finances, 
collapse in primary and semi-finished commodity prices, and rise in some basic imported 
commodity prices can be potential causes for external debt's unsustainability. Therefore, 
this study recommends that because HIPCs cannot repay their external debt in the future 
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without raising more debt (e.g., currently, the IMF has approved $ 2.9 billion in loans for 
Ethiopia) and risk their future development, HIPCs need to strengthen their macroeconomic 
policies and institutions or implement other initiatives to overcome the problem. 
Furthermore, since HIPCs external debt is unsustainable, another initiative from creditors 
can protect the adverse effect of unsustainable external debt on HIPCs macroeconomics. 
c. Both chapters 6.1 and 6.4 found that the impact of external debt on investment (and TFP) 
and growth is negative, supporting the debt overhang and crowding out effect hypothesis. 
The results show that the relationships between external debt and investment (and TFP) 
(and growth) are negative and non-linear. However, unlike the above studies, the findings 
of chapter 6.2 and 6.3 obtained a mixed relationship between the target variables. For 
example, the relationship between external debt and national savings is positive and non-
linear, but there is a negative and non-linear relation between external debt and growth. 
However, chapter 6.3 found a negative and non-linear relationship between external debt 
and HDI, but only non-linear relationships were observed between external debt and 
growth.  Nevertheless, all chapters commonly confirmed that external debt affects growth 
through the channels. From the above evidence, we can conclude that currently external 
debt has a negative and significant effect on both growth factors and growth, which 
supports the hypothesis of the Classicals economists. Therefore, even though it is difficult 
and not applicable to suggest governments in HIPCs to stop or reduce their foreign 
borrowing directly, this study recommends that HIPCs should adopt strong macroeconomic 
policies, strengthen institutional performance, appropriate debt management strategies to 
handle their accumulated external debt and reduce the adverse effect on growth factors and 
growth. Besides, HIPCs should invest the borrowed funds in projects that are productive 
and provide foreign exchanges instead of non-productive activities. Moreover, creditors 
should provide loans to feasible and development projects of HIPCs and also, they have to 
follow up their implementations. In addition, by examining the status of HIPCs projects, 
creditors should provide the funds step by step instead of once.  Furthermore, improving 
the skills and knowledge of HIPCs by providing different short- and long-term trainings 
concerning resource and debt related issues, such as resource allocation, debt management, 
and project management. 
d. The studies found that investment, national saving, HCD, and TFP significantly increase 
the growth of HIPCs. Therefore, besides policies that reduce the adverse effect of growth 




Even though this study tried to fill the existing gaps (scope, methodology, literature) in 
determinants, sustainability, channels, and impacts of external debt in HIPCs, it also has 
limitations that will be addressed by future studies. Due to a lack of data on some important 
variables and to make the study consistent, except for chapter five, the study is constrained to 
15 HIPCs. 
This study is limited to macroeconomic and political factors when examining the 
determinants of external debt in HIPCs. However, there are other factors, such as natural 
disasters and capital flights, which contribute a lot for indebtedness but not included (due to 
constrained data) in this study. Hence, taking these into account, future studies can examine 
the issue further. Furthermore, to analyze the sustainability of external debt empirically, the 
study was restricted to the current account elements (like exports and imports) and external 
debt, and therefore, other variables — such as political instability (fragile and nonfragile 
states), natural disasters, landlockedness, and other macroeconomic factors — were not 
included in the model. Hence, future researchers can extend the Llorca (2017) model in their 
investigation by taking these factors into account.  
This study focused on investment, national saving, HCD, and TFP channels to investigate 
the indirect effect of external debt on growth. However, interest rate and private saving also 
some of the channels. Besides, the study used total investment rather than its components 
(private and public investment). Moreover, this study did not consider the structural breaks in 
its analysis. Therefore, future studies can extend their investigation by considering interest rate, 
private saving, the decomposed investments (to capture the accelerator principle), and 
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